The Impartiality of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): A Quantitative Analysis by Dargue, Paul
Citation: Dargue, Paul (2016) Decision-Making in the England and Wales Court of Appeal 
Criminal Division: A Quantitative Analysis. Doctoral thesis, Northumbria University. 
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/33939/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright ©  and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to third  parties  in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content  must not be 
changed in any way. Full  items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
1 
 
    
The Impartiality of the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division): A Quantitative Analysis  
  
 
P Dargue 
 
 
 
PhD  
2016 
 
 
2 
 
The Impartiality of the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division): A Quantitative Analysis  
 
Paul Dargue 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements of the University of 
Northumbria at Newcastle for the 
degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
October 2016 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the development, methodology, and results of a quantitative 
study of the decision-making of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division).  The Court of Appeal plays an important constitutional role, and the 
impartiality of the judges is central to its legitimacy.  Drawing upon research from 
the Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) research community, this thesis explores the 
question of the Court of Appeal’s impartiality.       
      
As an incomplete measurement of impartiality, a sample of the Court of Appeal’s 
decisions has been analysed.  A dataset of all murder and rape appeals against 
conviction decided between 2006 and 2010 has been created.  A range of factual, 
demographic, and legal variables have been collected from each of these 472 
appeals against conviction, utilising quantitative content analysis.  It has been 
determined, utilising binary logistic regression analysis, whether the variables 
under analysis are predictors of the outcome of appeals against conviction.   
 
Almost all of the variables analysed showed only a limited ability to predict the 
outcomes of appeals.  Moreover, this study finds support for the legal model of 
judicial decision-making.  A variable designed to capture impartial decision-
making had the strongest association with the outcome of appeals.  However, a 
small number of factual and demographic variables are shown to be predictors of 
outcomes.  There is insufficient evidence to doubt the impartiality of the Court of 
Appeal, but the emergence of these patterns in the data warrants further 
investigation.  This conclusion is important to users and observers of the Court, 
to whom the impartiality, and so legitimacy, of the Court’s decision-making is 
essential.     
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 The aims of this thesis 
This study is a quantitative empirical study of the England and Wales Court of 
Appeal (Criminal Division).1 This Court forms part of the State’s response to 
crime, in which it is intended that crimes are detected and investigated, and that 
the true perpetrators of crimes are convicted in accordance with the rule of law 
and due process.2 The Court hears appeals against Crown Court convictions and 
is required to quash any conviction which it thinks is ‘unsafe’.3 In exercising its 
function of reviewing the safety of convictions, the Court forms an important part 
of the mechanism of criminal justice in England and Wales.  For several decades, 
academic studies and governmental reviews of the Court have analysed how it 
operates its powers.4 This study addresses a specific question regarding the 
Court’s decision-making: whether it appeared to have determined appeals 
against conviction for murder and rape in an impartial manner.   
 
The question of the Court’s impartiality is a normative one, but, as Epstein and 
Martin explained, this question cannot be answered directly because impartiality 
cannot be directly observed or completely measured.5 This thesis utilises the 
methods of quantitative Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) to address the question of 
the impartiality of the Court of Appeal in a sample of cases decided by it.6  
Impartiality is measured by utilising variables which are ‘observable implications’ 
of impartial decision-making, or a lack of it.  The development of this methodology 
                                                          
1 Hereafter ‘the Court’ or ‘Court of Appeal’, unless otherwise stated.  
2 See A Ashworth and M Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th ed, Oxford University Press 2010) 
2.  
3 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, as amended by Criminal Appeal Act 1995, s 2.     
4 See Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report (cm 2263 1993) (RCCJ); S Roberts, ‘The 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and Factual Innocence: Remedying Wrongful Convictions 
in the Court of Appeal’ (2004) (1)(2) JJ 86; SJ Heaton, A Critical Evaluation of Using Innocence 
as a Criterion in the Post-Conviction Process (DPhil Thesis, University of East Anglia 2013); M 
Naughton, The Innocent and the Criminal Justice System: A Sociological Analysis of Miscarriages 
of Justice (Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
5 L Epstein and AD Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press 
2014) 29-30. 
6 See TJ Miles and CR Sunstein, ‘The New Legal Realism’ (2008) 75 U Chic L Rev 831, who 
describe judicial studies quantitative ELS as one element of a larger empirical project.  
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and its application to this Court is one of the major themes of this thesis.  The 
Court’s decision-making is analysed empirically in two ways.  Firstly, the grounds 
of appeal raised in the murder and rape appeals are analysed.  This seeks to 
replicate previous studies of the Court.  Secondly, binary logistic regression 
analysis is utilised to determine whether a range of variables are predictors of, or 
correlated with, the decision of the Court to either allow or dismiss an appeal 
against conviction.  It is this second element of the research which is primarily 
used to assess the impartiality of the Court.       
 
To be successful in addressing the question of impartiality, it must be shown that 
the question answered – whether statistical associations or patterns exist in the 
data – and the normative question raised – impartiality – are sufficiently close.7 
To achieve this, a range of factual, demographic, and legal variables have been 
collected from each case included in the study.  These are the observable 
implications which provide a proxy for the principle of impartial decision-making.  
These data have been collected via quantitative content analysis of the Court’s 
judgments, utilising the aid of a data collection template and a variable coding 
guide.  These data are analysed for the presence of statistical associations 
between the variables and the outcome of appeals against conviction for the 
offences of murder and rape, decided between 2006 and 2010.  The ultimate aim 
of this thesis is to commence an exploratory step towards a robust, quantitative, 
statistical analysis of the decision-making of the Court of Appeal.  This study 
could be considered an explorative data analysis of a unique dataset of Court 
decisions.  Explorative data analysis focuses upon the presence of patterns in 
the data, to allow for inductive theorising.8 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 See Epstein and Martin (n 5) Chapter 1.  
8 AT Jebb, S Parrigon, SE Woo, ‘Exploratory Data Analysis as a Foundation of Inductive 
Research’ (2017) HR Man Rev 265.  
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The branch of ELS known as ‘judicial studies’ has proposed a number of theories 
of judicial decision-making.  The traditional view of judicial decision-making is 
embodied by the ‘legal model’ – the theory that judges impartially apply the law 
when resolving disputes.9 Against this, some theories, such as the behavioural 
and attitudinal models postulate that personal characteristics or ideology mould 
how judges think, and so explain judicial decision-making.10 Other models have 
considered the broader institutional context in which courts and judges operate.11  
This requires a consideration of the ‘rules that structure social interactions’, in 
particular formal laws and informal norms of judicial behaviour.12 These models 
are discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, and variables from these models have 
been drawn upon in this study.  Given its explorative nature, this study does not 
seek to test these models fully, but seeks to make use of the data to explore the 
presence of patterns.   
 
Most ELS research on judicial decision-making is American, and these models, 
and others, have been tested for several decades.13 Such studies are rare in 
Britain, and, indeed, most countries outside of the United States.14  One possible 
reason for this is that American Legal Realism had a far more limited influence 
on the British legal academy, when compared to the US legal academy.15  A 
seminal 1897 article, by American judge and scholar Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, 
could be considered the starting-point of the Legal Realism movement.  He wrote: 
 
‘If we take our friend the bad man, we shall find that he does not care 
two straws for the axioms or deductions … [he wants] to know what 
the Massachusetts or the English courts are likely to do in fact.  I am 
much of this mind.  The prophesies of what the courts will do in fact, 
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law’.16   
                                                          
9 See FB Cross, ‘Decisionmaking in the US Circuits Courts of Appeals’ (2003) 91 Cal L Rev 1459. 
10 NL Maveety (Ed), The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (University of Michigan Press 2003). 
11 L Epstein and J Knight, The Choices Justices Make (CQ Press 1998) 17.   
12 ibid.  
13 See M Maveety ‘The Study of Judicial Behavior’ in Maveety (ed) (n 10). 
14 See Z Robinson, ‘Comparative Judicial Attitudinalism: A Preliminary Study of Judicial Choices 
in Westminster Legal Systems’ (2011) U Chi Legal F 209, 209.  
15 See M Adler and J Simon, ‘Stepwise Progression: The Past, Present, and Possible Future of 
Empirical Research on Law in the United States and United Kingdom’ (2014) J Law & Soc 173. 
16 OW Holmes, ‘Path of the Law’ (1897) 1 Boston L School Mag 1, 4. 
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In order to discover how courts would in fact decide, Holmes said, ‘the black-letter 
man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of 
statistics’.17 Whilst the use of statistics to test theories of judicial decision-making 
is well entrenched in the American legal academy, the method is largely in its 
infancy in Britain.  This thesis seeks to begin to redress this misbalance, by 
completing a quantitative empirical study of judicial decision-making.  No similar 
study of the relationship between a range of variables and decisions in the Court 
of Appeal exists.  By conducting this study, it is intended that a methodological 
contribution will be made, by demonstrating the strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach and its application to the Court of Appeal.   
 
A list of variables used in this study is provided in Appendix A.  In addition, a full 
explanation of all the variables which are analysed in this study is provided in 
Chapter 6.  Readers who wish an early review of the variables used in this study 
should turn to Appendix A.  Epstein and King proposed that in conducting 
quantitative analysis researchers should, 1) invoke theories that produce 
observable implications, 2) extract as many implications as possible, and 3) 
delineate how they plan to observe those implications.18 It is explained throughout 
this thesis how it has been sought to adhere to these principles, and it is evaluated 
how successful this has been.  In order to seek to extract as many implications 
as possible, data has been collected from each case in the sample in the following 
areas:    
 The bench; (individual judge, genders, ranks, etc.); 
 The appellant (gender, age, previous convictions etc.);  
 The deceased / complainant (gender, age range etc.);  
 The trial (unanimity, the trial judge, etc.);  
 Kind of offending (historical, weapons, known / stranger etc.);  
 Grounds of appeal (grounds raised, how they were dealt with by the court 
etc.);  
                                                          
17 ibid, 11.  
18 See L Epstein and G King, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 69 U Chi L Rev 1, 47 (emphasis 
added).  
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 Sentencing;  
 A variable capturing the law  
These data were then used to develop the variables which are the observable 
implications of impartial decision-making, or a lack of impartiality.  Appendix A 
shows the variables categorised into factual and demographic variables, 
institutional variables, and legal variables.   
 
Whilst the collection of these variables allows for some close analysis of the 
Court’s decision-making, it has limitations.  This study takes the form of a non-
reactive, non-experimental, observational study.  It is a database study, which 
seeks to determine the presence or absence of statistical relationships between 
variables and judicial decisions.  There are weaknesses to this approach,19 which 
are explored fully in this thesis.  To be able to capture impartiality completely, all 
data relating to both knowable and unknowable factors would need to be 
collected and analysed.  Such an ideal is impossible even for knowable factors, 
because it is not possible to control all potential explanatory variables.20 Thus, 
the variables collected in this study cannot completely capture the principle of 
impartiality – impartiality cannot be completely validly captured.   
 
A key question addressed in this thesis is which of the particular selected 
variables are the strongest predictors (i.e. have the strongest relationship with) 
the outcome of appeals against conviction.  Some of these variables, in particular 
those drawn from the behavioural model and its successor the attitudinal model, 
may be observable implications of a lack of impartiality, as they are not legally 
relevant variables.  Other variables, indicative of the legal model, may be 
observable implications of impartial decision-making.  This gives an initial 
exploration of whether the data are consistent with the Court having determined 
appeals in an impartial manner. 
                                                          
19 See HT Edwards and MA Livermore, ‘Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand 
the Factors Affecting Appellate Decision Making’ (2009) (58) Duke LJ 1895 
20 See Epstein and Martin (n 5 above ) at 7-10. 
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In order to place this study within its proper epistemological context, the results 
must be interpreted cautiously.  It is only possible to report the presence, or 
absence, of statistical patterns between the particular variables under analysis 
and the outcome of the appeals in the sample.  There is a gap between the 
variables actually collected and the variables which ideally would be collected in 
order to fully assess the impartiality of the Court.  In summary, this means that 
the presence of associations or patterns between variables and outcomes does 
not prove that the Court lacked impartiality.  Conversely, the absence of 
associations does not mean that the Court did decide appeals in an impartial 
manner.  Rather, the emergence of patterns in the data, either association or lack 
of association between variables and outcomes, will give material for further 
exploration and induction of the issues uncovered, and for the development of 
further hypotheses.  The study must therefore be understood as an explorative 
and inductive study of a range of variables which could potentially be associated 
with the outcome of appeals, and so a first step towards analysing decision-
making of the Court in this manner.      
 
1.2 The importance of impartiality  
The normative question addressed in this thesis is whether the Court appeared 
to have determined appeals against conviction in an impartial manner.  As 
explained above, this is addressed in an incomplete manner by the collection of 
data from Court of Appeal judgments which are then analysed statistically.  
Impartiality is required whenever ‘there exists a conflict of interests between two 
or more parties, with a third party being involved to either police the conflict or to 
resolve it’.21 In the Court of Appeal, there is usually a dispute between the Crown 
and an appellant.  The judges in the Court of Appeal are called upon to resolve 
such disputes, and so they must resolve them in an impartial manner.  Impartiality 
requires that the decision-maker approaches the ‘dispute in a non-partisan frame 
of mind’.22 It also means that judges should decide cases according to their merit, 
and judges should not be influenced by factors outside of the law.  A key theme 
                                                          
21 W Lucy, ‘The Possibility of Impartiality’ (2005) 25 OJLS 3, 7.  
22 ibid, 12. 
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of this thesis is the development of quantitative measurements of the impartiality 
of the Court of Appeal.    
 
The importance of impartiality in judicial decision-making is such that, no matter 
how complicated or important the issues, or how preeminent the judge, the 
appearance or possibility of a lack of impartiality renders any decision void.  This 
is because impartiality is what provides the decisions of judges with authority and 
legitimacy within the legal and political system.  A robust example of this is the 
series of Pinochet cases.  Pinochet concerned Senator Augusto Pinochet, the 
former President of Chile.  Following a warrant issued in Spain, he was arrested 
during a visit to London on suspicion of the murder, torture, and hostage-taking 
of the citizens of Chile during his dictatorship.  In R v Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet (Pinochet No 1),23 the House of Lords 
was asked to decide whether Pinochet, as a former Head of State, was entitled 
to diplomatic immunity for offences as serious as murder, torture, and hostage-
taking.  The House decided, by a 3:2 majority, that Pinochet was not entitled to 
diplomatic immunity because, ‘it hardly needs saying that torture of his own 
subjects, or of aliens, would not be regarded by international law as a function of 
a Head of State’.24              
 
That decision was declared void in Pinochet (No 2),25 when it was discovered that 
one of the judges in the majority, Lord Hoffman, was a director of Amnesty 
International which was added as an interested party to the litigation.  Holding 
that Lord Hoffman should have recused himself, Lord Hope said: 
 
‘The connections which existed between Lord Hoffmann and Amnesty 
International were of such a character, in view of their duration and 
proximity, as to disqualify him on this ground … he could not be seen 
to be impartial.’26 
                                                          
23 [2000] 1 AC 61. 
24 ibid 108-9. 
25 [2000] 1 AC 119. 
26 ibid 143. 
20 
 
The decision in Pinochet (No 1) was set aside on the ground of lack of the 
appearance of impartiality.  In Pinochet (No 3),27 the House concluded that 
Pinochet could not have immunity for offences said to have been committed after 
the ratification, in December 1988, of the International Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  The 
importance of Pinochet in relation to impartiality is that it reiterates the absolute 
requirement of impartiality and the appearance of impartiality, however serious 
the issues raised by the litigation.  It confirms that everybody, however serious 
the allegations against them, is entitled to have legal action against them 
determined by an impartial judiciary.  The requirement of impartiality is onerous, 
and the consequences of breach are serious.  Accordingly, an allegation of a lack 
of impartiality is not to be made lightly.          
 
The principle of impartiality will be explored in depth in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
The impartiality of the judiciary is a fundamental human right.  Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that:  
 
‘In the determination … of any criminal charge … everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law’.  
 
The right to an independent and impartial tribunal is the right which forms the 
basis of the rule of law and people’s rights before courts.  Trechsel and Summers 
call the right ‘by far the most important guarantee enshrined by Article 6 … without 
independent [and impartial] courts there can be no rule of law’.28 The right to an 
independent and impartial tribunal is so essential that ‘proceedings before a 
tribunal which does not satisfy the criteria of independence and impartiality can 
never be fair’.29  
 
                                                          
27 [2000] 1 AC 147. 
28 S Trechsel and S Summers, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, (Oxford University Press 
2006) 46. 
29 ibid, 47. 
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In addition to being a substantive right, the impartiality of judicial decision-making 
relates to what judges do when they make and interpret laws.  Cases which reach 
appeal level are rarely easy cases.  There are usually valid legal points to be 
made on both sides, yet judges are required to reach a decision.  What judges 
do when faced with difficult legal problems is one of the core questions of 
jurisprudence.  Scholars such as Hart and Dworkin, and lawyers such as 
Bingham, and the Legal Realists, considered the power of judges to decide cases 
and how it arises.  Central to these questions is an analysis of the indeterminacy 
of law and the presence of judicial discretion.  If the law is always determinate, 
and judges have no discretion, a lack of impartiality is highly improbable as the 
outcome of cases may flow in a deductive manner from previous law.  Legal 
theory must explain the role of discretion in judicial decision-making.  Aspects of 
legal theory concerned with judicial impartiality are considered in Chapters 2 and 
3 of this thesis.          
 
1.3 An analysis of murder and rape appeals against conviction 
The Court of Appeal hears appeals against conviction and sentence from Crown 
Courts.  This thesis does not analyse the Court’s decision-making for all offences, 
but includes only murder and rape appeals against conviction.  It does not 
consider appeals against sentence.  A total of 472 appeals against conviction, 
decided between January 2006 and December 2010, are included in the sample.  
This is all available murder and rape appeals against conviction decided in this 
period.  Table 1.1 compares data provided in the Official Statistics,30 regarding 
the total number of appeals heard between 2006 and 2010, and the number of 
murder and rape appeals analysed in this study.  
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Data relating to the overall workload of the Court between 2006 and 2010 taken from MOJ 
‘Court Statistics (Quarterly) January to March 2014’, ‘additional tables’, table 5.8. Available from 
www.gov.uk/government/statistics/court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2014 <accessed 
29 July 2016>.  
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Table 1.1: Comparison of overall Court of Appeal workload and murder and rape 
workload (2006-2010). 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals 
Sampled Appeals 120 91 66 91 104 472 
Overall workload 572 523 438 430 496 2459 
 
Although only murder and rape appeals are analysed in this study, they 
accounted for 19% of the overall conviction appeal workload of the Court in this 
period.  It is not sought to claim that this is a representative sample of all decision-
making in the Court of Appeal, and as such the results of this study are specific 
to the Court’s decision-making in relation to murder and rape appeals in this 
period.  Furthermore, the results should not be extrapolated to cases outside of 
the Court of Appeal, as there is a selection effect.  As is discussed in Chapter 5, 
the offences of murder and rape were carefully chosen with the intention that the 
Court’s decision-making in relation to these two specific offences can be 
analysed.  In particular, these offences were chosen because of their character 
as serious and stigmatic offences.  The stakes, for the Court of Appeal, wider 
society, appellants, complainants, and the deceased and their families, are 
particularly high for these offences. As such, it is appropriate to consider in closer 
depth the Court’s decision-making in relation to these two specific offences.     
 
1.4 Thesis overview 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the decision-making of the England and Wales 
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).  In particular, it is sought to explore the 
impartiality of the Court’s decision-making in relation to the offences of murder 
and rape.  A selected range of variables offer an indirect measurement of the 
principle of impartiality.  This study seeks to provide a quantitative analysis of the 
decision-making of the Court in order to make an original contribution to previous 
work. 
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Chapter 2 analyses the meaning of impartiality from a number of differing 
perspectives.  Chapter 3 explores the background and theoretical frameworks of 
this study.  Previous, primarily American, studies of judicial decision-making and 
models of judicial behaviour are analysed in order to show what has driven the 
collection for variables used in this thesis.  Chapter 4 provides a critical analysis 
of the Court of Appeal, including its history and powers.  This includes a 
comprehensive analysis of the ‘unsafety test’.  Chapter 5 explains more explicitly 
the methods employed in conducting this study.  This includes principles of data 
collection and explanations of the statistical analysis employed.  Chapter 6 
recounts fully how the individual variables were collected.  This includes an 
evaluation of the template which was used to collect the data, and a full 
recounting of all the independent variables which were collected.  Chapter 7 
presents the results of the study.  This includes analysis of the grounds of appeal 
raised; analysis of the predictive power of each independent variable; and the 
binary logistic regression analyses.  Chapter 8 analyses the results of the thesis 
and evaluates the strength of the evidence regarding the impartiality of the Court 
of Appeal.  It also evaluates how well this study has captured the principle of 
impartiality, and how the limitations of the method frame the conclusions which 
can be reached. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.     
 
1.5 Conclusion 
This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by conducting a 
quantitative analysis of the decision-making of the England and Wales Court of 
Appeal (Criminal Division).  This study addresses the level of confidence that 
observers of the Court can have in the impartiality of the Court of Appeal.  It does 
this by determining whether variables collected from each case are associated 
with the decision to allow or dismiss an appeal against conviction.  The strength 
and direction of any association found in the data are analysed, to determine what 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the impartiality of the Court of Appeal. 
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Chapter 2 
The Concept of Impartiality 
 
Introduction 
This chapter critically analyses the concept of impartiality, which is the normative 
question addressed in this thesis.  The chapter begins by discussing the 
important political and constitutional role played by the judiciary; that of upholding 
the rule of law.  In upholding the rule of law, however, judges must also act in 
accordance with it.  One important component of the rule of law is impartiality.  
Impartial decision-making is a central component of the ‘legal model’ of judicial 
decision-making.  Several related conceptions of impartiality will be explored.  
Firstly, this chapter offers general definitions of impartiality and what it means for 
courts to be impartial, and what impartiality means in the context of this thesis.  
As discussed in this chapter and in Chapter 3, the impartiality of judicial decision-
making has been explored in previous empirical legal studies in other 
jurisdictions, but rarely in Britain.  Aspects of the impartiality of the Court of Appeal 
have been measured in this thesis by collecting data from Court judgments for 
statistical analysis.          
 
The role of impartiality in legal theory is then analysed, by considering the writing 
of Lord Bingham, Hart, and Dworkin.  These three writers are analysed because 
they made some important contributions to the analysis of judicial decision-
making and impartiality.  By highlighting the central role which impartiality plays 
in legal theory, it will be shown why it is important that the impartiality of judicial 
decision-making is studied.  As well as being a jurisprudential concept, 
impartiality is a substantive right under Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  The European Court of Human Rights has divided impartiality 
into two elements: subjective and objective.  The subjective aspect requires an 
assessment of whether the judge was actually free of personal bias.  Two issues 
relating to the subjective impartiality aspect are analysed in this chapter:  the 
issue of (a lack of) diversity, and the psychology of decision-making.    
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The objective component of impartiality within Article 6 asks whether an objective 
observer would doubt the impartiality of the court in question, if aware of the facts.  
This demonstrates the importance of appearances.  The Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) has held other parts of the criminal justice system, such as the 
jury, and the trial judge, to the same standards.  The objective test of impartiality 
allows for quantitative analysis because it asks whether there is any reason to 
doubt impartiality.  It is impartiality in this objective sense which is most closely 
addressed in this thesis.   
 
2.1 The constitutional role of judges 
Traditional Diceyan constitutional theory stipulated the absolute sovereignty of 
Parliament to make and unmake any laws.31 A key source of the authority of 
Parliament is the House of Commons, which gains its authority through its 
representativeness of the electors.32 Whilst Dicey perceived the sovereignty of 
Parliament as absolute, he noted that the courts play an important role in the 
creation of law.  He said: ‘the adhesion of our judges to precedent … leads 
inevitably to the gradual formation by the Courts of fixed rules for decision, which 
are in effect laws’.33 He did not think that this undermined the sovereignty of 
Parliament, however, because ‘judicial legislation’ was a subordinate form of 
law.34  
 
In more modern times, it is acknowledged that the sovereignty of Parliament 
cannot be absolute, and that judges play a particular role.  In R (on the application 
of Jackson) v Attorney General,35 the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords 
was asked to determine whether the Hunting Act 2004 was a valid Act of 
Parliament, given that it was passed by the procedure in the Parliament Act 1949, 
which itself was passed by the procedure in the Parliament Act 1911.  The 
                                                          
31 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th edition, Macmillan 1915) 
xxxvi. 
32 ibid, 34-5. 
33 ibid, 18.  
34 ibid.  
35 2005 UKHL 56. 
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Parliament Acts allow bills to become law without the assent of the Parliamentary 
House of Lords in certain circumstances.   
 
The House decided unanimously that the 1949 Act was a valid Act of Parliament, 
and as such so was the Hunting Act, despite the Parliamentary House of Lords 
having not approved either Act.  Lord Steyn observed that on a strictly legalist 
approach the decision could mean that the government, which will usually have 
a majority in the House of Commons, could make constitutional changes, such 
as altering the composition of, or abolishing, the House of Lords.36 Moreover, the 
Parliament Act 1949 ‘could also be used to introduce oppressive and wholly 
undemocratic legislation’ which would not require the assent of the Parliamentary 
House of Lords.37 He opined that if a government was to seek to introduce 
‘oppressive’ legislation, it would be the distinct role of the judiciary to determine 
whether it was an action which Parliament, despite being sovereign, could not 
take.38 Accordingly, ‘the classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the 
supremacy of Parliament … can now be seen as out of place in the modern 
United Kingdom’.39 In particular, it is the judiciary which checks the sovereignty 
of Parliament.  
 
Other members of the House pointed to a similar role for the judiciary.  Lord Hope 
said that ‘the courts have a part to play in defining the limits of Parliament’s 
legislative sovereignty’.40 In particular, ‘the rule of law enforced by the courts is 
the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based’.41  Baroness 
Hale referred to the courts treating with suspicion any attempt by Parliament to 
‘subvert the rule of law’.42  
 
                                                          
36 ibid, [101]. See also, Lord Steyn, ‘Democracy, the Rule of Law, and the Role of Judges’ (2006) 
EHRLR 243. 
37 ibid, [102].  
38 ibid.  
39 ibid.  
40 ibid, [107].  
41 ibid.  
42 ibid, [159]. 
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In other cases the judiciary have expressed their role in enforcing the rule of law.  
In A v Secretary of State for the Home Department43 Lord Bingham said ‘the 
function of independent judges to interpret and apply the law is universally 
recognised as a cardinal of a modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule 
of law itself’.44 In R v Horseferry Road Magistrates ex parte Bennett45 the House 
of Lords accepted that part of the judicial role is to ‘oversee executive action and 
to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or 
the rule of law’.46 Finally, the Court of Appeal in R v Mullen47 stressed the 
‘considerable weight’ attached to the Court’s role in discouraging the disregarding 
of the rule of law which occurred in that case.48 
 
The judiciary’s role in enforcing the rule of law is particularly pertinent to criminal 
appeals, and particularly pertinent to criminal appeals for the most serious 
offences.  This is because it is in the enforcement of the criminal law that the 
coercive power of the State is particularly evident.  In murder and rape appeals, 
the stakes are particularly high given the extensive loss of liberty which usually 
follows if convicted of either of these offences.  As is discussed in Chapter 4, the 
specific role of the Court of Appeal is to seek to correct miscarriages of justice, in 
the sense of the conviction of the innocent, and to uphold the rule of law.49 As the 
Court has this important role, it is essential that it acts in accordance with it itself.  
As is now explained, the impartiality of judicial decision-making is a core element 
of the rule of law.    
 
2.2 The rule of law paradigm and the legal model 
Geyh referred to there being a ‘rule of law paradigm’ in relation to the decision-
making of judges.50 The paradigm ‘features competent, honest, impartial, and 
                                                          
43 2004 UKHL 56. 
44 ibid, [42].  
45 [1994] 1 AC 42. 
46 ibid, 62. 
47 [1999] 2 Cr App R 143. 
48 ibid, 156-7. 
49 See JR Spencer, ‘Quashing Convictions for Procedural Irregularities’ (2007) Crim LR 835. 
50 CG Geyh, Courting Peril: The Political Transformation of the American Judiciary (Oxford 
University Press 2016) 2. 
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independent judges who interpret and apply the rules … by bracketing out 
extralegal influences from within and without, and following the law on a case-by-
case basis’.51 The legal model, similarly, posits that ‘judges decide cases through 
the systematic application of external, objective sources of authority’.52 These 
sources of authority are the rules, standards, and principles embodied in statute 
and case law.53 Judges rely upon ‘the cannons of constructions, or perhaps a 
sense of the purpose underlying the statute’ to decide how to apply the law.54 The 
legal model is in conflict with behavioural and attitudinal models, which argue, 
owing to the indeterminacy of law, that judges can and do seek to achieve their 
policy goals.  For behaviouralists and attitudinalists, the legal model serves to 
‘[rationalise] … Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the Court’s decision-
making process’.55  
 
As discussed further in Chapter 3, the alternative models to the legal model, such 
as the behavioural or the attitudinal, developed following the American Legal 
Realism movement.  The American Legal Realists sought to debunk a version of 
the legal model, which they called formalism or functionalism.  During the 
‘formalist era’, said to exist in American law schools between 1870 and 1920, it 
was thought that judging was mechanical or syllogistic, and legal rules were 
determinate.56 The Realists doubted that legal rules determined legal 
outcomes.57 However, as Leiter discussed, the Legal Realist version of formalism 
was rather ‘vulgar’ and few scholars were likely to have subscribed to a view that 
law operated syllogistically.58 As is discussed below, Ronald Dworkin offered a 
view that the law, which he conceived as including moral principles, was 
determinate, but he was not a vulgar formalist who viewed law as mechanical.   
                                                          
51 ibid, 16. 
52 FB Cross, ‘Decisionmaking in the US Circuit Courts of Appeals’ (2003) Cali L Rev 1459, 1462. 
53 ibid.  
54 ibid, 1463. 
55 JA Segal and HJ Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge 
University Press 2002) 53. 
56 See BZ Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist / Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging 
(Princeton University Press 2009) 1.   
57 Explored in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
58 See B Leiter, ‘Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?’ (2010) LT 111.  
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The ELS community has been accused of treating the legal model as meaning 
the same thing as vulgar formalism.  Smith, for instance, argued that Segal and 
Spaeth’s The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model59 used vulgar formalism 
as a straw man version of the legal model.60 Smith argued that Dworkin’s version 
of formalism, which rejects mechanical jurisprudence but claims to limit the 
amount of decision-making discretion judges have, would be a more robust target 
against the attitudinal model.61 The legal model, therefore, is not vulgar formalism 
but posits that judicial discretion is in some way constrained by legal materials, 
and maintains that ‘politically motivated judicial decisions, unconstrained by 
precedent or reason, are incompatible with the legal model’.62 
  
A definition of the legal model in the context of UK courts has recently been 
offered by Arvind and Stirton,63 They argued that:  
 
‘Courts typically operate through relatively open-textured concepts, 
such as “reasonableness” … Whilst these concepts are not capable of 
precise definition and hence give the judiciary some flexibility in 
deploying them in deciding cases, their application in a given case is 
nevertheless guided by precedent, which constrains the ability of 
judges to simply decide cases in accordance with their ideological 
preferences’. 64              
 
A test of the legal model, therefore, is how constrained the judges are by 
precedent and other legal rules.  The legal model cannot be dismissed by pointing 
out that judges exercise discretion, and so the law is not determinate.  This is 
because the legal model can still operate when the law is indeterminate if the 
judges are constrained or guided by existing law, or the intention behind the law.  
                                                          
59 Segal and Spaeth (n 55 above). 
60 See R Smith, ‘Symposium: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model’ (1994) 4 Law and 
Courts Newsletter 8.  In The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (n 55 above) they 
do consider the implications of Dworkin and ‘postrealist formalists’.   
61 ibid.  
62 FB Cross, ‘Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary 
Ignorance’ (1998) 92 Nw U L Rev 251, 263. 
63 TT Arvind and L Stirton, ‘Legal Ideology, Legal Doctrine and the UK’s Top Judges’ (2016) PL 
418.  
64 ibid, 422. 
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The Court of Appeal operates the ‘unsafety test’ which, as discussed in Chapter 
4, is an ‘open-textured’ concept.  A measure is used in this thesis to capture how 
certain rules operate with the ‘unsafety test’, and if it operates to constrain or 
guide the operation of the judges’ discretion in the way the legal model  would 
suggest.  These measures include how strongly the presence / absence of errors 
is correlated with outcomes, and how strongly Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (CCRC) appeals are correlated with outcomes.  If these measures 
do constrain judicial discretion, a key question addressed in this thesis is whether 
there remains room for factual and demographic variables to have an association 
with the outcome of appeals and what this means for the impartiality of the Court.     
 
According to Geyh, the ‘rule of law paradigm’ is in the process of erosion in the 
United States, because social science research (especially ELS) has 
demonstrated a relationship between judicial decision-making and a range of 
factors, including extra-legal factors.65 In the UK, in contrast, there does not 
appear to be such an erosion of the rule of law paradigm.  Thomas argued that 
this is due to a ‘well-entrenched reluctance to acknowledge that the judiciary has 
political significance’.66 Robertson pointed to the lack of a written constitution in 
Britain (and the presence of one in the US) as being a reason for the difficulty in 
exploring the political significance of the British judiciary.67 It is easier to 
categorise a judicial opinion as being in a particular political direction when the 
judgment is based upon an assessment of a single document which uses political 
language and confers political rights.68  
 
Griffith’s study69 of how politics affects the decision-making of the senior British 
judiciary is one important exception to this rule.  Griffith argued that judges’ 
conception of ‘public interest’ concerns preserving the interests of the State; law 
                                                          
65 See Geyh (n 50) at 80, and especially Chapter 3. 
66 C Thomas, Judicial Diversity in the United Kingdom and Other Jurisdictions (Commission for 
Judicial Appointments 2005) 21. 
67 D Robertson, ‘Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords: A Jurimetric Analysis’ (1982) 12 Brit J 
Pol Sci 1, 7.  
68 ibid.  
69 JAG Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (5th edition, Fontana 1997). 
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and order; and the judges’ views on the social and political issues of the day.70 
He argued that the senior judiciary cannot be politically neutral because they are 
required to make political choices.71 Moreover, owing to the particular senior 
position which judges hold in society, their interpretation of where the public 
interest lies is typically conservative.72 Griffith’s study is not directly comparable 
to American attitudinal studies which have documented the impact of judicial 
politics on American judging, leading to the erosion of the ‘rule of law paradigm’.  
This is because his work was not a systematic quantitative study, but was 
doctrinal in nature and focused upon particular cases which he felt indicated the 
judiciary’s political inclinations.  Accordingly, Griffith’s publication did not lead to 
a sustained development of quantitative empirical judicial studies in Britain.73     
 
As there is no sustained culture of judicial studies in Britain, it is unclear how 
much relevance American studies, and especially the models based upon them, 
will have to judicial decision-making in the UK.  As such, this thesis does not test 
directly whether any model of judicial decision-making explains the decisions of 
the Court.  It instead explores in a broad manner one central tenant of the rule of 
law paradigm: impartiality.  As there is an absence of evidence to the contrary, it 
is assumed in this thesis that the Court did decide in accordance with the legal 
model, and did act impartially.  Any allegation of a lack of impartiality is a serious 
allegation to level against the judiciary.  Accordingly, strong evidence would be 
needed to justify any claim that the Court lacked impartiality.  This thesis seeks 
to explore whether there is sufficient evidence to question the appearance of the 
Court’s impartiality, by utilising variables from a range of models of judicial 
decision-making.    
 
 
 
                                                          
70 ibid, 297. 
71 ibid, 336. 
72 ibid.  
73 See Thomas (n 66) at 21.  
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2.3 What is impartiality? 
Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage defines ‘impartial’ as being a synonym of 
‘fair’.74 ‘Fair’ has a number of other synonyms: ‘just; equitable; disinterested; 
dispassionate; objective.’75 These adjectives describe judges who ‘have no 
personal stake or bias in an outcome and who apply the proper standards without 
improper influences’.76 Impartiality could be considered as expressing a general 
concern with fairness and equality between the parties to litigation.  This study 
seeks to provide a partial test of impartiality by exploring whether a range of 
variables are associated with particular outcomes.  
  
Lucy argued that the requirement of impartiality could have somewhat negative 
connotations.77 Few would consider being ‘dispassionate’ or ‘disinterested’ to be 
positive characteristics in most walks of life.  Moreover, judges should not be 
dispassionate or disinterested about their role of achieving the ends of justice.  
As Griffith noted, judges ‘frequently appear – and speak – as men with weighty, 
even passionate views of the nature of society and the content of laws’, and so 
do not appear wedded to a ‘sanctified’ view of impartiality.78 Impartiality, 
therefore, must mean something specific in the decision-making process when it 
relates to the requirement that judges are impartial.   
 
Lucy argued that in an adjudicative setting, impartiality relates to the judges being 
impartial as to the outcome, meaning that outcomes are produced regardless of 
the needs and status of the parties.79 Moreover, to be impartial, decisions must 
‘pay no heed to past or present deeds of disputants’, and ‘impact to exactly the 
same degree on disputants’.80 In addition to being impartial as to outcomes, in an 
adjudicative setting procedural impartiality is required.81 This highlights ‘a 
property of the rules and practices that constitute many decision-making 
                                                          
74 BA Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage, (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 2011) 428.   
75 ibid, 351. 
76 ibid.  
77 W Lucy, ‘The Possibility of Impartiality’ (2005) 25 OJLS 3, 14-5. 
78 JAG Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (5th edition, Fontana 1997) 284. 
79 Lucy (n 77) 8.  
80 ibid.  
81 ibid, 11. 
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processes’.82 Procedural impartiality ‘requires some limitation upon the type of 
consideration relevant in judicial decision-making’,83 in particular, to be impartial, 
‘adjudicative outcomes are arrived at by reference to the applicable law’.84  
 
The requirement that outcomes are arrived at by reference to the applicable law, 
Lucy argued, ‘protects and promotes impartiality because these factors serve to 
exclude others’.85 This means that ‘outcomes ought not to be determined by 
judicial empathy with the values, prejudices, principles and conceits of 
heterosexual, white upper middle class protestant men’.86 Such a conception of 
impartiality permits some analysis of whether this does accord with the actual 
decision-making of judges in Courts.  As will be explored in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, 
impartiality has been measured by determining whether certain factors are 
predictors of the outcome of appeals against conviction.  
 
The judiciary, unlike Parliamentarians in the House of Commons, do not face 
election and so their legitimacy must emanate elsewhere.  The belief that the 
British judiciary produces high quality and impartial decisions provides it with 
legitimacy.  In Tyler’s87 1984 study of the role of legitimacy in ensuring compliance 
with the law, he claimed that ‘those who regard legal authorities as having greater 
legitimacy are more likely to obey the law in their everyday lives.’88 This finding is 
in contrast with a common assumption at the time that people are motivated to 
obey the law due to instrumental concerns, such as the threat or the deliverance 
of sanctions.89 Tyler’s research since 1984 has continued to suggest that non-
instrumental factors cause compliance with the law.90 He found that if people 
perceive processes as being fair they see it as legitimate regardless of what the 
outcome of the case was.91 Thus, if a law or authority is seen as being 
                                                          
82 ibid.  
83 ibid, 23. 
84 ibid. 
85 ibid, 24. 
86 ibid.  
87 TR Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, (2nd ed, Princeton University Press 2006). 
88 ibid, 57. 
89 ibid, 21. 
90 ibid, 269-288.   
91 ibid, 101. 
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procedurally fair there is greater compliance and acceptance.  The perception of 
impartiality, which was measured by asking respondents whether the officials 
they dealt with acted improperly or dishonestly, whether they lied, or whether they 
treated the respondent badly because of their age, sex, race or nationality, 
showed a link with whether the respondents saw the official as being procedurally 
just, and so worthy of being obeyed.92 As Tyler said, ‘the elements of procedural 
justice most directly linked to decision-making are judgments about the neutrality 
of the decision-making procedure.’93  
 
Later research by Casper, Tyler and Fisher showed that those charged with 
serious crimes consider that the procedural fairness of the proceedings is linked 
to how satisfied they are with the process.94 Research by Sunshine and Tyler 
showed that people were more likely to obey the police if they viewed them as 
behaving fairly and as having legitimacy.95 A study by Paternoster and his 
colleagues showed that recidivism rates in spousal assault cases were lower if 
the accused believed he was treated fairly by the police.96  Thus, given the Court 
of Appeal’s role in reviewing the outcomes of the criminal justice process, it is 
especially important that the Court fulfils that role with impartiality, if it is to present 
an image of legitimacy. 
 
Tyler’s research was concerned with how a government can best achieve general 
compliance with its laws.  This is a different focus from this thesis, as the Court 
of Appeal does not demand general compliance from the public, or even if it does, 
its reach is minimal.  However, Tyler’s research on the importance of legitimacy 
is relevant because the Court of Appeal sits atop the criminal justice system, 
which does demand general compliance.  The importance of impartiality in 
relation to legitimacy is that a court lacking in impartiality cannot be legitimate.  If 
a court lacks legitimacy, it does not matter what the court’s decisions are.  In this 
                                                          
92 ibid, 128-130. 
93 ibid, 137. 
94 JD Casper, TR Tyler and B Fisher, ‘Procedural Justice in Felony Cases’ (1988) (22) Law and 
Soc’y Rev 483.   
95 J Sunshine and TR Tyler ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Support 
for the Police’ (2003) (37) Law and Soc’y Rev 513. 
96 R Paternoster, R Bachman, R Brame and LW Sherman, ‘Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect 
of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault’ (1997) 31 Law & Soc’y Rev 163.  
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way, the legitimacy of the court is a question which comes before the question of 
how well the court performs in fulfilling its functions.  It is this prior question which 
is addressed in this thesis: the Court of Appeal’s impartiality, and so its legitimacy.          
 
2.4 Judicial discretion and impartiality  
In his 2006 Maccabean Lecture,97 Lord Bingham said that the traditional view of 
judging, which he said was only partly true, was that judges should not be 
motivated by ‘extraneous considerations’.98 If they were, this would be 
incompatible with impartial decision-making.  These extraneous considerations 
may be the ‘prejudice or predilection of the judge, or, worse, any personal agenda 
of the judge, whether conservative, liberal, feminist, libertarian, or whatever’.99 
The traditional view of judging saw judicial decision-making as being narrowly 
concerned with deducing outcomes from legal logic.100 This view therefore holds 
that judges do not make law, but only declare it.101  
 
Lord Bingham argued that modern judges reject this interpretation of the role of 
the judge.  He said most judges acknowledge that ‘judges do make law, and 
regards it as an entirely proper judicial function, provided it is exercised within 
certain limits’.102 Most judges are said to subscribe to this understanding of the 
judicial role because ‘the [traditional] approach is radically inconsistent with the 
subjective experience of judges’.103 They know, he said: 
 
 ‘That the cases which come before them do not in the main turn on 
sections of statutes which are clear and unambiguous … they know, 
and the higher the Court the more right they are, that decisions involve 
issues of policy’.104      
                                                          
97 Available from www.law.cf.ac.uk/newsandevents/transcripts/271005.pdf <accessed 8 
November 2015>.  
98 ibid, 28. 
99 ibid.  
100 ibid, 44. 
101 See T Bingham, The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches (Oxford University 
Press 2000) 25. 
102 ibid, 27.  
103 ibid, 28.  
104 ibid, 28.  
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Thus, according to Bingham, judges accept that in cases which reach court there 
will be arguments of some strength available to both sides.  If there were not 
arguments available to both sides the litigation would never happen, as one side 
would concede, or settle, or not commence proceedings.  The fact that access to 
the senior judiciary often requires some kind of permission process, where 
another judge or body determines whether there is legal merit, further 
demonstrates that there will usually be arguments on both sides.105   
 
Lord Bingham argued that judicial discretion appears when the application of the 
law does not determine the issue, and so the resolution of the case ‘depends 
upon the individual judge’s assessment of what is fair and just to do in the 
individual case’.106 Judges have no discretion when determining issues of fact or 
of law, but when having made such findings he or she has to choose between 
different courses of action, for instance, to allow or to dismiss an appeal against 
conviction, a discretion is exercised.107  
 
The exercise or presence of discretion can appear ‘slightly deviant.’108 Discretion 
is troubling for the criminal justice system because it potentially allows its agents 
to ‘engage in discriminatory activities and to subvert policies they do not agree 
with’.109  In the Court of Appeal, this might include, for instance, judges orientated 
towards crime control quashing fewer convictions; or more liberal judges 
quashing more convictions.  As Wendel says, ‘principles of judicial impartiality 
must take a position on the existence of judicial discretion and the problem of 
legal interpretation’.110  Both Hart and Dworkin sought to explain how judicial 
preferences are excluded from the decision-making processes in their 
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theories.111 Their theories regarding the nature of law placed some importance 
on adjudication and how judges decide what the law is, or what it ought to be.  
 
Hart sought to limit the possibility of judicial discretion by arguing that law is a rule 
governed system, and the outcomes of litigation or disputes will usually be 
determined by following precedent or statutes.112  However, Hart, like Dworkin, 
was not a ‘positivistic formalist’113 who believed in mechanical decision-making.  
He argued that at times judicial decision-making requires the exercise of 
discretion when cases fall within the ‘open-texture’ of the rule.114  Hart argued 
that there are many ‘clear cases’ where general expressions are clearly 
applicable, such as a motor-car is clearly a vehicle.115 If a question was raised as 
to whether a car was permitted to enter a park which stated that there are ‘no 
vehicles allowed’, the judge would have no discretion, because a car is clearly a 
vehicle.  However, it would be more difficult to decide whether an electric toy car 
is also a vehicle under such a rule.  If a dispute arose as to whether this was a 
vehicle, ‘we confront the issues at stake and can then settle the question by 
choosing between the competing interests in the way which best satisfies us’.116  
Such a case would be a hard case, and the decision-maker would have to make 
a choice, or exercise discretion or judgment, and the judge’s answer would be 
legislative in nature, to the extent that once the decision is made there would then 
be governing precedent constituting a new rule.   
 
According to Hart, this discretion exists only at the limits, or the ‘penumbra’, of 
the rule.  It is only when the law ‘runs out’ that it is possible that partiality could 
occur as it is only here where judges exercise discretion.117  For Hart, this 
‘penumbra’ is small and is a natural consequence of the nature of language and 
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the way that society develops.  New scenarios may arise which were never 
considered by Parliament at the time they enacted a rule.   
 
Hart’s theory of law as being characterised by rules which are largely determinate 
can be disputed by challenging the size of the ‘penumbra’.  Hart could be wrong 
to say that judicial discretion exists only at the limits of legal rules.  It may instead 
infect the whole of the law.  This is the view of some adherents of Critical Legal 
Studies, such as Duncan Kennedy who argued that many of the decisions 
(primarily American) judges reach are ideological in nature.118 The Legal Realist 
position is similar.  American Legal Realism is important to this thesis, and 
evaluated further in Chapter 3.            
 
In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin sought to explain how judicial 
preferences are excluded from the decision-making process by denying that 
judges exercise strong discretion.119  Instead, even in hard cases, one party will 
have a right to win, and the judges have a duty to ‘discover what the rights of the 
parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively’.120 Judges do this because it 
is not only legal rules, but also principles which provide citizens with legal rights.  
Principles, according to Dworkin, are standards to be observed as a ‘requirement 
of justice, or fairness or some other dimension of morality’.121 As noted above, 
Dworkin was in some ways a formalist, as he believed that judges do not exercise 
strong discretion.   However, he did not believe that law was mechanical or rule 
governed.  Rather, the position of the judge was central, and the judges’ duty is 
to discover the answer to a legal question by constructing a theory which best fits 
and justifies the law.    
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To demonstrate this, Dworkin invented judge Hercules: ‘a lawyer of superhuman 
skill, learning, patience and acumen’.122 His purpose was to demonstrate how a 
judge would determine what legal principles require in hard cases.  Dworkin said 
that Hercules would ‘construct these theories in the same manner as a 
philosophical referee would construct the character of a game’.123 In a hard case 
where rules or principles point in different directions, ‘Hercules must turn to the 
remaining constitutional rules and settled practices under these rules to see 
which of these two theories provides a smoother fit with the constitutional scheme 
as a whole’.124 Dworkin acknowledged ‘many of Hercules’s decisions about legal 
rights depend upon judgments of political theory that might be made differently 
by different judges or the public at large’.125 Unlike Hart, who argued that law can 
run out due to the open-texture of rules, Dworkin believed that principles also 
formed part of the law, and these cannot run out.     
 
Dworkin argued that there is no room for partiality in his theory because the 
determination of which principles apply is not the judge’s own personal 
convictions, and must not be based upon policy, but must be based upon his or 
her attempt to determine what the law requires.  This cannot be attributed to 
Hercules’s personal convictions, but to his attempt to determine what the 
community’s constitutional and political morality is and its fit with the legal rules.126 
Decision-making is therefore not based on policy, but on judges determining 
principles.  In Law’s Empire,127Dworkin explains his proposition of ‘law as 
integrity’.  Dworkin argued that a judge determines a hard case by deciding which 
outcome ‘follows from the best interpretation of what judges characteristically do 
about statutes’.128 According to Dworkin, there will be one right answer to this 
question. 
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Law as integrity requires a judge deciding a hard case to think of himself as an 
‘author in the chain of common-law’.129 Judges in earlier cases may not have 
answered the exact same question as him, but earlier judges will have left 
precedent which orbit the question in his case.  He must then use his own 
judgment to make the story (the law) as good as it can be as a cohesive whole.130 
Since the judge is required to interpret the law in the manner of a chain novelist, 
eventually the wealth of legal materials will become so great that there is only 
one right legal answer available. 
 
The proposition that there is one right answer to every novel legal question is 
attractive because it means that partiality is impossible.  Dworkin explains that 
the judge trying to reach the right answer which fits and presents law in its best 
light, will need to draw upon his or her own conceptions of justice and political 
morality.131 If these conceptions are ‘right’ then he or she will reach the right 
answer as to what decision should be reached.  The difficulty is that Dworkin 
permits judges to use their own conceptions of justice and morality if it produces 
the ‘correct’ answer.  Indeed, the decision-making process is a political exercise, 
with which other judges or citizens may disagree.132  This does not appear 
satisfactory, because, as Raban stated, ‘who cares that these personal opinions 
are somehow “correct” if we all hold contradictory views?’133  
 
For Dworkin, the question is not whether the right answer is the result of the 
personal opinions of judges, as Dworkin accepts they are, but whether that 
opinion is right.134 But, as Posner argued, ‘interesting’ moral claims beyond 
tautological ones such as ‘killing is wrong’ are always local, in that they are 
‘relative to the moral code of the particular culture’.135  There may therefore be no 
                                                          
129 ibid, 238-9. 
130 ibid, 239.  
131 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 239. See also Dworkin Taking Rights 
Seriously (Duckworth & Co, 1977) 127. 
132 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 131) 126-8. 
133 See O Raban, Modern Legal Theory and Judicial Impartiality (Glasshouse Press 2003) 82.  
134 ibid, 80.  
135 RA Posner, ‘The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory’ (1998) (111) (7) Harv L Rev 1637, 
1642. 
41 
 
‘correct’ conceptions of political morality.  If there are no correct answers, 
Dworkin’s thesis says little about the desirability of impartial decision-making but 
appears to invite judges to decide cases based on their personal predilections. 
 
Hart’s and Dworkin’s theories concern the extent of legislative discretion available 
to judges in hard cases.  It may be observed that Lord Bingham’s opinion on how 
judges decide cases may be compatible with Hart’s, in that he acknowledges 
hard judicial discretion.  Dworkin sought to argue that judges do not exercise 
discretion in this sense, as the law (broadly defined to also include principles) 
was determinate.  It is clear, however, that Dworkin in no way proposed a theory 
of legal formalism in which it is legal rules which were determinate.  As will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, the American Legal Realists also explored the level of 
discretion available to judges.  In Chapter 4, the ‘unsafety test’ will be analysed 
in order to explore the level of discretion judges in the Court of Appeal have.  The 
‘unsafety test’ appears a particularly open-textured concept, which invites 
discretion.  However, closer analysis shows that the discretion in the operation of 
the test is constrained by rules.  In Chapter 8 is it discussed whether any of these 
theories of judicial decision-making appear to be well reflected in the sample of 
appeals studied in this thesis.     
 
2.5 Independence and impartiality    
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that:  
 
‘In the determination … of any criminal charge … everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law’.  
 
Impartiality appears to mean something separate to independence.  
Independence relates specifically to the relationship between courts and the 
executive, whilst impartiality relates to how decisions are reached.  In Findlay v 
United Kingdom,136 Mr Findlay alleged in the European Court of Human Rights 
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that his Article 6 rights were breached because his trial by court-martial was not 
an independent or an impartial tribunal.137  In considering whether the court-
martial was ‘independent’ the Court said that regard must be had, inter alia, to 
the manner of the appointment of its members and their terms of office; the 
existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the appearance of 
independence.138 This has its origins from an earlier case decided by the 
European Court of Human Rights, Le Compte v Belgium.139 In that case the Court 
said that the term ‘tribunal’ is only warranted if the body satisfies the requirement 
of independence which requires, in particular, independence from the executive 
and independence from the parties to the case.140 The Court in Findlay explained 
that there are two aspects to impartiality for the purposes of Article 6.  There is a 
subjective and an objective aspect.  The subjective aspect is that the judges of 
the court should in fact be free of personal prejudice or biases.  The objective 
aspect is that there must be sufficient guarantees from an objective viewpoint 
‘sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt as to a lack of impartiality’.141  
 
In Findlay the Court found that due to the position of a senior member of the court-
martial – the ‘convening officer’ – it lacked independence and impartiality.  The 
convening officer was the most senior officer involved in the case and it was his 
role to select the other members of the court-martial, and confirm the result, and 
he had a role in the prosecution of the offence.  Accordingly, ‘Mr Findlay’s 
misgivings about the independence and impartiality of the tribunal … were 
objectively justified’.142 Since the right to an independent and impartial tribunal 
was breached it was not necessary to consider the other claims under Article 6.  
By stating that the misgivings were objectively justified the Court was not stating 
that the court-martial lacked independence or that the members lacked actual 
impartiality.  It meant that from an objective viewpoint there were legitimate 
grounds to question the Court’s impartiality.    
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It may be challenged whether there is any difference between the concepts of 
independence and impartiality.  Trechsel and Summers are inclined to think that 
there is little difference between the two.143 Independence and impartiality are 
related because each depends upon the other.  The independence of courts 
provides the conditions for judges to decide cases impartially.  Independence 
‘concerns the relationship of the decision maker to the government’.144  
Impartiality ‘refers to what goes on, and appears to go on, in the mind of the 
decision maker’.145  In relation to the Article 6 requirement of independence in the 
sense of the constitutional position of the Court of Appeal, little else will be said 
in this thesis.  There is no challenge to the institutional independence of the Court 
of Appeal.  This thesis is concerned with impartiality in the sense of ‘what goes 
on in the mind of the decision maker’.  
 
2.6.1 The problematics of subjective impartiality 
In Findlay, referenced above, the European Court of Human Rights referred to 
there being two aspects of impartiality: a subjective aspect and an objective 
aspect.146 The court facing challenge would need to pass both aspects.  The 
subjective aspect of impartiality means that the judges themselves must in fact 
be free of personal bias.  In Incal v Turkey147 the European Court of Human Rights 
found that Mr Incal’s trial before a National Security Court breached his Article 6 
rights as it was not independent or impartial.  In concluding that Article 6 was 
breached the Court said ‘the [subjective aspect] consists in trying to determine 
the personal conviction of a particular judge in a given case’.148  The Court did 
not consider whether the judge in Incal was subjectively impartial, but instead 
focused upon the objective impartiality test.149 The Court found that there was 
objective justification for Incal’s misgivings that the Court lacked impartiality. 
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The principle that judges are subjectively impartial is problematic.  As a collective, 
the issue of a lack of diversity raises concerns about whether judges can be 
impartial.  At the individual level, it is problematic to suppose that any individual 
can be truly impartial, as, like all other human beings, judges have personal and 
political opinions which may determine how they view the world.  Psychological 
research has suggested that all human decision-making is subject to bias and 
heuristics.150  This research has been applied to judges and demonstrates that 
judges do not appear to be immune to them.151 The problematics of a lack of 
diversity, and the question of the psychology of decision-making, are analysed in 
the following sections. 
  
2.6.2 The problematic of diversity 
As Thomas says, lack of diversity raises issues of legitimacy and impartiality.152  
There are three potential threats to legitimacy which could be caused by the lack 
of diversity within the judiciary.  Firstly, the homogenous character of the judges 
could be a symptom of a lack of equal opportunities for lawyers to be elevated to 
the judiciary.  This focuses upon the difficulty faced by individuals to progress.  
Secondly, the lack of diversity may damage the perceived democratic legitimacy 
of the judiciary because it is not reflective of the demographic make-up of society.  
Thirdly, the lack of diversity may mean that there is a ‘different perspective’ 
missing from the judiciary.153  
 
It is undeniable that the higher judiciary (in particular) is not diverse.  As of April 
2015, 19% (21 out of 106) of High Court judges were female.154 21% (8 out of 38) 
Court of Appeal judges were female.155  There has only ever been one female 
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judge of the Court of the House of Lords / UK Supreme Court.  Overall, as of April 
2015, 25% of all judges were female, but the majority of these posts were in the 
relatively junior judiciary – recorders, circuit judges and district judges.156  159 out 
of 2686 (5.9%) of judges who declared their ethnicity declared it to be black or 
ethnic minority; three of those were High Court judges and the rest were of lower 
ranks.157 There was only one High Court judge whose former profession was not 
a barrister.158 Judges from non-barrister professions were more likely to be 
appointed as district judges, but promotion to the Court of Appeal appears the 
reserve of former High Court judges.  None of the current Court of Appeal judges 
were previously district judges.159 This suggests that the primary route to the 
senior judiciary, via the High Court, remains the preserve of white, 
disproportionately male, former barristers. 
   
As discussed above, the traditional view is that when a judge, or judges, preside 
over a case they ought to ignore their personal opinions and seek to decide 
according to the law.  On this view, it should not matter in relation to outcomes or 
the direction of the law that the judiciary is lacking in diversity.  This is because 
the different way that different judges see the world, if there is a difference, should 
be forgotten when they come to decide a case and the judges should seek to 
apply the law.  Rackley rejected the notion that judges can forget or ignore their 
personal opinions when deciding cases.160 This is because:  
 
‘There are times when all judges must do more than simply follow the 
rules, when the rules run out … or at least call for the exercise of some 
discretion … in all such cases … the judge must turn to his or her 
sense of justice, to an understanding of the judicial function and the 
purpose of law and the like for a solution’.161 
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Since at times judges can no longer follow rules and must turn to her or his sense 
of justice, it follows that ‘who the judge is matters’.162 This is because different 
judges may have different personalities and philosophies and so will see the 
world differently.  Since the law has ‘run out’ they cannot be entirely impartial as 
they need some basis upon which to reach a decision.  She argued that ‘the 
different lives and experiences of women and men … will lead to differences in 
the attitudes, values and perspectives’.163  Since they cannot ignore these values 
and be impartial, these different perspectives will lead to different understanding 
and interpretation of the law.164  
 
The 2013/14 Crime Survey for England and Wales included analysis of the levels 
of confidence respondents held in the criminal justice system.165 ‘Confidence’ 
was measured by confidence in effectiveness and confidence in fairness.166 64% 
of respondents indicated that they thought the system was fair, whilst only 48% 
thought it was effective.167 The Survey question most approximate with 
impartiality was ‘the criminal justice system discriminates against particular 
groups or individuals’ – 37% of respondents agreed.168 This may be considered 
a relatively high percentage of respondents believing that the system was 
discriminatory.   
 
This finding is potentially corroborated by the European Social Survey which 
placed the United Kingdom approximately mid-table in the question of how often 
respondents believed that ‘the courts make fair, impartial decisions based upon 
available evidence’.169 The UK scored higher than countries such as France, 
Spain, and the Czech Republic, but not as well as countries such as Germany, 
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Sweden, and Switzerland.  It is not known whether the lack of diversity in the 
British judiciary was what led to the lower ranking of the British courts, but it is 
one potentially explanatory factor.   
 
A study of user experience of several British tribunals conducted by Genn, Lever, 
and Gray on behalf of what was the Department for Constitutional Affairs posited 
a relationship between the composition of tribunals and perceptions of 
fairness.170 They found that users from ethnic minorities were less likely to 
perceive unfairness when the tribunal was composed of mixed ethnicities.171 
White tribunal users, in contrast, were slightly more likely to perceive unfairness 
when the tribunal was of mixed ethnicity.172 This may suggest that the key to 
understanding the problematic of diversity in relation to democratic legitimacy is 
that users of tribunals / courts want the bench to reflect themselves.  This is a 
problem for the higher judiciary in Britain, because of its distinct lack of reflection 
of broader society.    
 
It may be argued that the lack of diversity in the judiciary means that judges do 
not decide cases in a truly impartial manner, but in a particular (white, male, etc.) 
version of impartiality.  The Feminist Judgments Project,173 in which academics 
wrote alternative feminist judgments, suggested that female judges, or feminist 
female judges,174 could decide cases differently.  The Project wrote additional 
judgments for 23 cases decided by the House of Lords in a wide range of 
administrative areas.  Nine of the judgments dissented on the outcome, and two 
of these would have turned a 3:2 split into a 3:3 draw.175 The remaining judgments 
would have reached the same conclusions but for different reasons.  The 
‘judgments illustrate powerfully how, even at the same time and within the same 
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Court, cases could have been reasoned and decided differently’.176 This might 
suggest that the lack of diversity in the judiciary means that as a collective it may 
not reflect the views of wider society.            
 
Whether female judges do decide cases differently is an empirical question.  The 
evidence is mixed as to whether female judges do decide cases differently to 
male judges.  One example of this occurring is in the Supreme Court case of 
Radmacher v Granatino.177 In this case, concerning the weight which should be 
given to prenuptial agreements, Lady Hale noted the gender issue in the case 
and so wrote a partly dissenting separate judgment.178  In the United Kingdom 
there has been little empirical research into the relationship between gender and 
judicial decision-making.  In the United States, research on this issue is far more 
common.  In Boyd, Epstein and Martin’s analysis of US courts, they found 30 
systematic analyses of the association between gender and judicial decision-
making.179 Of these, one third revealed an association between gender and 
decision-making; one third showed mixed results; and one third showed no 
association.180 In their own study they did find evidence of a ‘gender effect’ in 
relation to cases concerning sex discrimination.  When a female judge sat alone 
in a sex discrimination case, and where a female sat with male judges, persons 
claiming sex discrimination were more likely to be successful.181  
 
There are difficulties with using the gender of a judge as the sole factor which 
could influence how he or she decides cases.  Firstly, it reduces everything about 
that judge to her or his gender.  There is a myriad of other potential behavioural 
factors which can influence the way that a judge sees the world – such as 
ethnicity; experience; sexuality and parenthood.  It may also be questioned 
whether female judges are that different from male judges.  A female judge is not 
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an ‘ordinary’ female, but she is an elite female and a member of an executive 
collective of wealthy senior lawyers in the same way that a male judge is an elite 
male.  She is also schooled and socialised in the operation of the law in a similar 
way that male judges are.  As Malleson noted, a female judge may be likely to 
have more in common with her fellow male judges than the females appearing 
before her in court.182  In Rackley’s opinion, the search for definitive evidence that 
female judges decide cases differently due only to their gender giving them a 
‘different voice’183 is likely to fail.184 However, ‘it may be one reason why judges 
sometimes differ’.185    
 
In this thesis, there is an examination of whether gender is associated with 
decision-making.  This includes an assessment of whether the inclusion of a 
female judge on the bench is associated with particular outcomes, and whether 
female victims / complainants are associated with particular outcomes in the 
Court of Appeal.  It is not the only variable considered, however, but it just one 
aspect of decision-making which is analysed.   
 
2.6.3 Psychology and impartiality  
Research conducted by Daniel Kahneman suggests that all kinds of decision-
making, not only judicial, involves two hypothetical sources of consciousness, 
which he labels System 1 and System 2.  System 1 tasks are: 
 
‘Typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit (not available 
to introspection), and often emotionally charged; they are also 
governed by habit and are therefore difficult to control or modify’. 
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Whereas System 2 tasks are:  
 
‘Slower, serial, effortful, more likely to be consciously monitored and 
deliberately controlled; they are also relatively flexible and potentially 
rule governed’.186 
 
Kahneman suggested that a number of phenomenon occur, which he called 
‘heuristics’, when people make decisions; and these can lead to fallacious 
decision-making.  For instance, Kahneman says that when people are searching 
for a solution to a difficult question, ‘system 1 will find a related question that is 
easier and will answer it’.187 He calls this ‘substitution’.  It is problematic because 
everybody has ‘intuitive feelings and opinions about almost everything’.188 
System 1 will answer the related question intuitively and System 2 will usually 
endorse it, because, despite being more deliberative, it is also lazy and the initial 
answer will appear intuitively attractive.189 The implications of substitution to 
judicial decision-making are clear.  Judicial decision-making tends to require the 
resolution of difficult questions.  If Kahneman is right, the psychology of decision-
making means that judging is not a deliberative process but an intuitive process.  
 
Behavioural research on the mental processes involved in judicial decision-
making has been conducted.  Guthrie and his colleagues conducted research on 
five of Kahneman’s heuristics to see if they applied to judges.190  They found that 
‘each of the cognitive illusions influenced the decision-making processes of the 
judges in our study’.191 This may cause doubt as to whether judicial decision-
making can ever be value free or impartial. Benforado concluded that in light of 
the psychological evidence, it is clear that ‘judges are susceptible to numerous 
unappreciated biases that influence their perceptions of seemingly neutral 
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facts’.192 Guthrie and his colleagues conducted a further study, utilising case 
hypotheticals, of whether judges are able to disregard inadmissible evidence 
when they reach decisions.193  They found that, although performing well in some 
situations, judges were unable to ignore inadmissible evidence or information.194  
If this is true, it indicates the difficulty in judges being expected to ignore what 
they know about the outside world when they sit as judges.    
 
Although the findings relating to the potential influence of biases on judging are 
striking, it is important to note an obvious difficulty.  The claim that psychological 
research ‘proves’ that impartial decision-making is impossible could itself be, on 
its own terms, subject to the same biases.  It suggests that all decision-making 
may be irrational, but the researchers making such findings are rational.  It may 
be that the conclusions that judges are overcome by confirmation bias was 
caused by the researchers being overcome by their own confirmation biases.  
Mitchell argued that studies applying psychological research to judicial decision-
making were unduly pessimistic of the possibility for rational judicial decision-
making.195  It is therefore important to have an element of scepticism when 
considering such findings.         
  
2.7 Objective impartiality 
The principle of objective impartiality has at its stem Lord Hewart’s seminal dictum 
that ‘justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be 
seen to be done’.196 This concerns the appearance of impartiality, which is of 
paramount importance to courts.  In Pullar v United Kingdom,197 an elected 
Scottish local councillor was convicted of offering to take a bribe from a firm of 
architects and a firm of quantity surveyors, in return for Pullar’s influence in the 
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planning department of the local council.198 One of the 15 jurors in the trial was a 
junior staff member of the firm of architects.  The European Court of Human 
Rights found that the trial was subjectively and objectively impartial, and so 
Pullar’s claim failed.  The Court accepted, no doubt because of some of the 
reasons discussed above, that ‘it may be difficult to procure evidence with which 
to rebut the presumption’ that the tribunal was free of personal, subjective, 
bias.199 Accordingly it was the second, objective, requirement which ‘provides a 
further important guarantee’.200 The way that the Court tested whether the Court 
was objectively impartial was to determine whether the selection of the juror 
would have caused an ‘objective observer’ to doubt the impartiality of the 
tribunal.201 The Court found that it was not clear that an objective observer would 
doubt the impartiality of the jury, and so the jury was considered impartial.  
 
The ‘objective observer’ test was further considered in Gregory v United 
Kingdom.202 Gregory, a black man, was convicted by a majority verdict of robbery.  
While the jury was deliberating the judge received a note stating that the jury was 
showing racial overtones.  The judge gave a direction to the jury that they should 
put aside any prejudice.  Gregory complained to the European Court of Human 
Rights that his Article 6 rights had been breached due to a lack of impartiality, 
and argued that the judge should have discharged the jury.  The Court held that 
it must consider whether there were ‘sufficient guarantees to exclude any 
objectively justified or legitimate doubts as to the impartiality of the jury’.203 The 
Court found that the judge was not required to do more than he did to dispel 
Gregory’s fears.204 The essential point is that it is not sufficient to simply claim 
that there are doubts about the impartiality of a tribunal, there must be some 
further objective basis for doubting the impartiality of the court or tribunal in 
question.             
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The principle of the objective, or reasonable, observer is entrenched in domestic 
law.  This is the standard against which the impartiality of the Court of Appeal has 
been measured in this thesis.  Lord Goff in R v Gough,205 said that the Court 
should ask itself whether ‘there was a real danger of bias … in the sense that [the 
judge] might unfairly regard … with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the 
issue under consideration by him’.206 The requirement of a ‘real danger’ of bias, 
rather than a suspicion of bias, might suggest a slightly higher standard before 
an institution could be considered to lack objective impartiality.  Lord Hope in 
Porter v Magill207 submitted a ‘modest adjustment’ to the test to move it closer to 
the test employed by most of the Commonwealth, Scotland and Strasbourg.208 
Lord Hope’s formulation of the test was whether ‘a fair-minded and informed 
observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real 
possibility that the tribunal was biased’.209   
 
The Court of Appeal has held other parts of the criminal justice system to this 
standard.  In R v Khan and Others210 the issue in the several conjoined appeals 
and applications was whether the juries appeared to have lacked impartiality due 
to the occupation of members of the juries.  The appellants appealed their 
convictions due to the presence of police officers, members of the Crown 
Prosecution Service, and prison officers in their respective trials.  The Court said 
that if it was established that a juror was partial, or had the appearance of being 
partial, the convictions must be quashed.211 The Court dismissed all the appeals, 
finding that none of the jury members’ employment status meant they appeared 
partial towards any particular witnesses. 
   
Following this dismissal, the appellants Hanif and Khan appealed to the European 
Court of Human Rights.212 The applicants accepted that the presence of police 
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officers on the jury was not automatically a breach of Article 6, but they argued 
on the particular facts that Article 6 was breached.213 This was because police 
officers from the same force as the police jurors were called as witnesses and 
their evidence was important to the prosecution case.214 The European Court of 
Human Rights agreed, and found that Article 6 had been breached.215 This 
suggests that the test for objective impartiality is broad, and broader perhaps than 
the Court of Appeal would like it to be.  The European Court of Human Rights 
stressed the importance that courts inspire confidence in the public and one 
essential element of that confidence is impartiality.216                 
  
The test employed by the Court of Appeal when considering an allegation of bias 
is whether a fair-minded or objective observer would consider there was a 
possibility or risk of bias (lack of impartiality) after considering the facts – the test 
in Porter v Magill.  In R v Ahmed217 the appeals were dismissed because on an 
objective appraisal there was no material to give rise to legitimate fears that the 
jury lacked impartiality.218 It also applies to the conduct of the judge who must 
‘present the defendant’s case fairly and act in an even-handed and impartial 
manner’.219 In R v Cordingley220 the judge’s behaviour towards the appellant was 
described as ‘brutal’ by the Court of Appeal.221 The result was that the appellant 
felt the judge was prejudiced against him; he was not fairly tried and there was a 
failure of due process.222           
 
This thesis analyses the Court’s impartiality by determining whether particular 
selected variables are predictors of successful or unsuccessful appeals.  As 
stated in Chapter 1, this thesis addresses the question of the impartiality of the 
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Court in an incomplete manner.  The study design is based upon the exploration 
of correlations between variables and outcomes.  Any variables which are shown 
to be statistically significant predictors of outcomes must be considered carefully 
to determine what that means about the decision-making of the Court, given the 
research design.  The emergence of any such patterns in the data does not mean 
that the Court lacked impartiality, but will provide a quantitative basis for analysis 
of the impartiality of the Court’s decision-making.  Moreover, it must be asked 
whether the weight of the evidence presented in this thesis, in light of the 
strengths and limitations of the methods employed, is sufficient to lead an 
informed observer to doubt the impartiality of the Court.  In order to address this 
question, the methods themselves must be carefully scrutinised.        
 
2.8 Conclusion 
It has been shown that impartiality is a concept which permeates legal 
scholarship.  It is a central tenant in jurisprudence and legal theory; human rights; 
diversity and legitimacy.  This study is an analysis of a working Court of Appeal, 
which delivers judgments in real cases.  The decisions of the Court have 
substantial implications for the lives of appellants, applicants, complainants and 
victims and their families.  It can also have a significant influence of the 
development of the law of criminal evidence and procedure.  Thus, how the Court 
performs its functions is an important question.  The Court has a role in reviewing 
and upholding the moral authority of convictions, and giving assent, or otherwise, 
to the continued punishment of the State’s citizens.  This is an important role for 
the Court to play, in which the legitimacy of the Court confers legitimacy on the 
rest of the system.  Impartiality is an important part of the Court having legitimacy.  
But, is the belief in the legitimacy and impartiality of the Court well placed?  It is 
this question which is assessed in this thesis.  
 
It has been shown that the principle that courts should resolve litigation in an 
impartial manner is problematic one.  It is problematic because judges form a 
largely homogenous group, and so it is possible that their decision-making is not 
truly neutral, but is a particular, elite white, male, version of neutrality.  
Furthermore, judges are likely to be subject to the same internal biases as other 
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people, meaning that their judgments may not be value-free.  On the basis of 
traditional jurisprudence, judges are expected to forget their previous life 
experience and resolve disputes in a disinterested way.  It has been argued that 
modern legal theory rejects that judges can decide appeals in this way.  This is 
seen in the Article 6 jurisprudence which places an emphasis upon the 
appearance of impartiality.   
 
Whether judges decide cases impartially could be seen as an empirical question.  
In some jurisdictions, in particular the United States, this empirical question has 
been frequently addressed.  In the United Kingdom, it is far rarer that the 
impartiality of judges is questioned, and then tested in a quantitative way.  The 
next chapter outlines the theoretical frameworks and background principles of 
conducting quantitative empirical legal research on the decision-making of 
judges.      
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Chapter 3 
Mapping the Empirical Legal Studies Field 
 
Introduction  
This study is situated within the quantitative Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) field 
of legal studies.  The particular branch of ELS with which this thesis is concerned 
is ‘judicial studies’, which focuses upon the ‘theoretical and empirical study of the 
choices judges make’.223 This thesis is described as a ‘positivistic’ study of judicial 
decision-making.  This means that the study has been conducted with a view to 
being systematic and objective in the data collection exercise and analysis.  The 
positivistic study of the decision-making of judges has its roots in the American 
Legal Realism movement.  The Realists challenged the traditional functional / 
formalism view of how judges decide cases, by arguing that the law had greater 
indeterminacy than the traditional view could accommodate.  An important 
element of American Legal Realism was the intention to discover how law 
functioned in actual cases, utilising empirical methods.  American Legal Realism 
is important to this thesis, due to its empirical goals, and the movement is 
analysed in this chapter.     
 
The majority of ELS research on judicial decision-making is American.  American 
political science research since at least the 1940s has explored the decision-
making of judges, leading to the formulation and testing of various ‘models’ of 
judicial behaviour.  This chapter analyses several models of judicial decision-
making which have been tested by ELS researchers.  This study does not seek 
to directly test in a deductive manner any model of judicial decision-making, for 
the reasons explained in this chapter.  Recently, the focus in judicial studies has 
moved away from behavioural accounts, and towards more nuanced accounts of 
courts and judicial decision-making.  The norms surrounding how a particular 
court operates, which includes the law orbiting decisions, could have an important 
role in the decisions of a court.  These ‘models’ of judicial decision-making are 
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analysed in this chapter, in order to locate this study within the existing field of 
judicial studies. 
 
3.1 An explorative positivistic study of judicial decision-making 
The study of law and judicial decision-making was at one time known as 
‘jurimetrics’.  The term jurimetrics was coined by Lee Loevinger in the 1940s who 
described it as ‘the scientific investigation of legal problems’,224 such as analysis 
of the behaviour of witnesses, judges, and legislators.225  This is indicative of the 
‘behavioural revolution’ of empirical legal studies and political science which was 
taking place around that time.226  Loevinger believed that the questions of 
jurisprudence, such as ‘What is law?’, had achieved little in two thousand years.  
Moreover, he felt that the answer to such questions would serve no useful 
purpose.227  He contrasted this with the natural sciences, which he thought had 
achieved a great deal in a relatively short period of time.  He wrote that the first 
task in conducting a scientific inquiry is to ‘ask a scientific question … that can be 
answered by doing something and observing the result’.228 He defined jurimetrics 
as the testing of conclusions about law through utilising the methods of 
science.229 This ‘testing of conclusions’ through scientific methodology is heavily 
indicative of the positivist deductive paradigm in social science research.   
 
The quantitative ELS process involves moving from a set of questions which are 
to be answered; to the collection and coding of data which will answer that 
question; to the analysis of the data to decide whether the initial ideas are 
reflective of what is happening in the court according to the data.230 It will be 
discussed how this is conducted in this study in Chapter 5.  The data used to 
address the question of the Court of Appeal’s impartiality are the selected factual, 
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demographic, and legal variables gathered from the Court’s judgments.  A list of 
variables is provided in Appendix A, and the variables are evaluated in Chapter 
6.  The method of collecting the data from the appeals against conviction is a 
quantitative content analysis, and this is discussed in Chapter 5.   
 
It could be challenged how well positivism as a research paradigm can operate 
in the social sciences.  The core of the challenge is a philosophical ‘objection to 
the idea that one can explain human action in the same way as … phenomena in 
the natural world’.231 Interpretivism is one challenge to positivism; this is the claim 
that social or cultural reality is socially constructed meaning that ‘objective’ 
observation is impossible.232 A further challenge to positivism is from critical 
scholars such as feminist or critical-race scholars.  Those scholars maintain that 
the positivist or ‘objective’ version of reality is in fact a male or white-dominated 
reality and so subject to male and white bias.233 Marxist epistemology may make 
a similar claim against positivism: since the proletariat have particular insights 
into capitalist society their version of reality may differ from others.234 Whilst it is 
accepted that in certain spheres, such as criminal justice, certain concepts such 
as innocence and guilt are to some extent social constructs, there are some 
objective facts which can be observed.  It is these observable facts which form 
the variables in this thesis.      
 
Given the method employed in this thesis, a quantitative, objective and value-
neutral study of Court of Appeal judgments, a positivistic epistemology is 
appropriate for the limited section of society which is being studied.  There are no 
claims made about wider reality which need to be reconciled with the challenge 
of interpretivism; this thesis involves the collection of the information provided in 
the Court’s judgments.  It seeks to present a model of the reality of the Court, not 
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to represent reality itself.235  The variables have been selected on the basis that 
they can be discerned with some objectivity and reliability from the Court of 
Appeal judgments.  As will be explained in Chapter 6, some variables could not 
be collected entirely objectively and so required some interpretation.  This is 
considered in Chapter 6 as being a limitation of the study.    
 
The majority of empirical studies on the decision-making of judges in courts is 
necessarily quantitative and positivist.236 A quantitative approach is the most 
appropriate for the specific questions addressed in this thesis.  It is important to 
note that most of the data collected from the cases is qualitative (such as gender, 
types of offending, and so on) but is turned into numbers for quantitative analysis.  
As Hawkins points out, although this study is a quantitative one, it must not lose 
sight of the social and organisational context in which the decision-making takes 
place.237  Indeed, some parts of the ‘organisational context’ of the Court, form 
some of the variables in this study.  Qualitative social science research does not 
necessarily turn data into numbers as does quantitative research, but seeks 
instead to ‘document human experience’, typically through interviews and 
fieldwork and the analysis of documents and artefacts.238 This study draws upon 
a range of qualitative studies, such as Malleson’s239 and Roberts’s240 studies of 
the approaches of the Court.  Darbyshire’s study of the working lives of judges 
provides valuable insights into the culture of decision-making in the Court of 
Appeal.241 Following the analysis of the quantitative data collected on the Court’s 
decisions, there will necessarily be a process of qualitative assessment to 
contextualise and reflect upon the quantitative elements.       
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An important element of positivist research is that it establishes hypotheses which 
are tested by analysing the data collected from the data source.  The analysis 
employed in this thesis is in the form of hypothesis tests relating to whether the 
variables selected for analysis are statistically significant predictors of particular 
outcomes.  It is important to note what approach to hypothesis testing is adopted 
in this study.  Within American ELS research, various models of judicial decision-
making have been tested, since at least the time of Loevinger.  These studies 
argue that if a certain model is accurate certain effects will be seen in the data.  
For instance, the ‘attitudinal model’ argues that if it is true observers will find that 
judges of different ‘ideologies’ decide cases differently.  Current ELS research, 
therefore, primarily takes the form of ‘hypothetico-deductive confirmatory’242 
studies, in which a chosen model is tested by determining whether the postulated 
effect is seen in the data.   
 
The models of judicial decision-making have rarely been applied to British judges, 
and so there is no a priori reason to suppose that they are any more valid than 
the legal model.  Furthermore, there are reasons, discussed below, to doubt the 
applicability of American ELS research to the UK.  Accordingly, this study is 
explorative in nature, in order to assess initially whether patterns exist in the data.  
Some of these patterns are postulated to be ‘observable implications’ of a 
possible lack of impartiality, whilst some patterns will be indicative of impartial 
decision-making.  This study may be best considered a descriptive exploratory 
analysis of any patterns and the extent of those patterns or correlations.  This is 
in keeping with what Tukey said was the attitude of explorative data analysis: ‘a 
willingness to look for what can be seen, whether or not anticipated’.243  The 
results are then examined to determine what kinds of conclusions can be drawn 
from the data regarding the impartiality of the Court of Appeal. 
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3.2 Objectivity 
As was explained in Chapter 2, psychological research suggests that a variety of 
unconscious biases affect many of the ordinary decisions made in everyday life.   
These biases could also impact decisions made in the process of conducting 
research.  The statistician Regina Nuzzo wrote that ‘failure to understand our own 
biases has helped to create a crisis of confidence in the reproducibility of 
published results’.244 By this, she meant that there is a concern that the results of 
published research may not be able to be reproduced by later researchers 
because researchers’ biases shape how research is conducted.  If biases 
influence how research is conducted, and people’s biases are different, it may 
mean that different researchers will find different results.  This is problematic if 
the researcher makes claims, or hopes, to have found objective or general truths, 
which is indicative of positivist research.  
 
This apparent crisis of confidence has materialised due to the acknowledgement 
that honest scientists and researchers are subject to confirmation biases which 
leads them to ‘fixate on collecting evidence to support just one hypothesis; 
neglect to look for evidence against it; and fail to consider other explanations’.245 
This concern surrounding objectivity may lead to doubt whether much of the 
scientific knowledge about the world which we possess is true.  If it is true that 
researchers search for evidence which supports their conclusions and omit to 
search for evidence against it, then scientific knowledge is not objective.  This 
concern over the objectivity of knowledge is problematic for those seeking to 
produce data about the social world within a positivist paradigm.  
 
While it is impossible to exclude the possibility that biases have influenced the 
research conducted for this thesis, there have been ways to limit bias.  Standard 
statistical procedures have been employed which provide some objective 
measurement of the strength of variables as predictors.  Whilst the value of such 
measures are only as valid as the data inputted to compute them, the variables 
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were specifically selected to reduce the amount of subjectivity needed in the data 
collection.  The decision-making processes involved in collecting the variables, 
and the specific definitions of particular variables is explained in Chapter 6.  The 
aim behind such comprehensiveness is that it enables replication.  Replication is 
the best way to assess whether conclusions drawn from research are valid and 
reliable.  This thesis has sought to work to a standard to enable replication to take 
place in later studies.     
 
3.3 American Legal Realism 
The majority of empirical studies of law could be considered more or less overtly 
Legal Realist in perspective.246  Epstein, Landes and Posner take an explicitly 
Legal Realist position, in that they argued judges have to exercise discretion 
when determining difficult cases, and may have to fall back on issues of policy.247  
The reason for the Realist position in many empirical studies is that the Realists 
challenged the determinacy of law.  The Realists’ arguments surrounding the 
indeterminacy of law was a precursor to the debate between Hart and Dworkin in 
the 1970s and discussed in Chapter 2, and the Critical Legal Studies movement 
of the 1980s.  Whilst these raised jurisprudential questions, if law has some 
indeterminacy, there is also an empirical opportunity to discover whether certain 
factors play a role in decision-making.  A key component of the Realist 
programme was the aim of encouraging empiricalism in law.   
 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, American Legal Realism developed in American 
Law Schools in the late 1800s and prospered until the 1950s.248 This was in 
response to the perceived ‘formalist’ or ‘mechanical’ age of legal thought said to 
have existed during the 1800s.  It was commonly thought during this period that 
judicial decision-making was primarily based upon legal logic and analysis of 
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legal texts.  The Legal Realist Felix Cohen famously referred to this ‘functional 
approach’ as being in reliance upon ‘transcendental nonsense’.249 He criticised 
judges for seeking the answers to legal questions within the legal constructs 
themselves, rather than by reference to ‘economic, sociological, political, or 
economic questions’.250    
     
The meaning and philosophy of American Legal Realism is to some extent 
contested.  Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, who could be considered amongst 
the most prominent Realists, rejected the notion of a ‘school’ of Legal Realism.  
They said the Realists differed as much amongst themselves as they did from 
their antithesis, Christopher Columbus Langdell.251 According to Twining, part of 
the difficulty in locating a precise meaning of Legal Realism is that it was so often 
caricatured or misunderstood itself.252 The Realists’ tendency for flamboyant 
turns of phrase did not assist understanding or help to avoid this caricature.253  
 
One element of the Realist critique of judicial decision-making was to 
demonstrate the indeterminacy and discretion inherent in judicial decision-
making.  Karl Llewellyn argued that most Realists would agree that ‘in any case 
doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the available authoritative 
premises…are at least two.’254 When there are at least two authoritative 
premises, the judge by implication has to choose the most preferable outcome 
appropriate to the particular facts of the case.  The question of what, if it was not 
the simple application of law, led courts to decide in certain ways was a key 
question for the Realists.  Cohen stated that the element of choice in judicial 
decision-making meant that ‘the study of social factors that determine the course 
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of judicial decision’ should be a key skill of lawyers in order to be able to predict 
how judges would decide a particular case.255  
 
Jerome Frank argued that what constituted the law of a particular case was the 
legal rules and the judge’s perception of the facts.256 As perceptions of facts can 
differ from person-to-person the application of the law to the facts was essentially 
discretionary.  Frank said discretion and law ‘cannot be separated … They are 
so thoroughly intermingled that it is impossible to divide them’.257 Frank’s 
particular version of Realism258 placed the situation of a judge as a human being 
at the core.  Contested cases were not decided syllogistically, but instead: 
 
‘The judge’s knowledge of the rules combines with his reactions to the 
conflicting testimony, with his sense of fairness, with his background 
and economic and social views, and with that complicated compound 
loosely named his “personality”, to form an incalculable mixture out of 
which comes the court order we call his decision’.259       
  
In this sense, ‘the Realists saw legal reasoning as human reason, and traditional 
claims for the distinctiveness of legal reasoning were largely pretence’.260 The 
Realists’ arguments regarding the decision-making of judges form the 
foundations of the behavioural and attitudinal models which are discussed below.  
The ‘discovery’, however, that the law often points in both ways, and that judges 
act as human beings, could hardly be considered a revolutionary finding of the 
Realists.  As Tamanaha explains, this ‘realism’ about judging, in the observation 
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that they have to make choices, was commonplace before the Realists.261 
Epstein and her colleagues claimed that the first full articulation of a ‘realist’ 
conception of judging was made by Jeremy Bentham in the 1780s.262  Posner 
located Realism in the writing of Plato.263  Tamanaha argued that Legal Realism 
should not be understood as a movement beginning at a distinct point in time, 
around the time of Holme’s article discussed in Chapter 1, but as a generally 
shared perspective to law since at least the 1800s.264 Nevertheless, the collective 
of lawyers and legal scholars known as the American Legal Realists are important 
because they set in place the implantation of the social sciences into American 
law schools.265     
 
According to Leiter, a core claim of most scholars searching for a realistic study 
of law was that they thought ‘judges respond primarily to the stimulus of facts’, in 
that ‘judges reach decisions based on what they think would be fair on the facts 
of the case’.266 Leiter argued that the Realists believed law was ‘locally’ 
indeterminate, at least at the stage of appellate review, where law did not 
determine one right answer.267  As seen above, some Realists, such as Frank, 
suggested that the indeterminacy within law was greater than this.268 This more 
radical, or ‘Frankified’269 version of Realism may have ultimately led to the decline 
of Legal Realism as a legal philosophy.  This is because upon a ‘Frankified’ 
version of Legal Realism it becomes impossible to predict the decision-making of 
judges owing to the discretionary nature of law on that account. Indeed, Frank 
stated that due to the human element of judicial decision-making, prediction was 
impossible.270 The difficulty with this version of Realism is that many laws do 
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operate in a predictable way, and lawyers do predict the decision-making of 
judges, by, for example, deciding not to continue with litigation.      
 
Llewellyn’s more mainstream version of Realism focussed upon appellate 
review.271 Llewellyn argued that judges’ decisions are predictable because there 
were various ‘[stabilising] factors’.272 Llewellyn stressed that appeal judges are 
human beings who are ‘law-conditioned’273 and guided by ‘legal doctrine’.274 
Llewellyn argued that it was especially at the stage of appellate review the 
‘interpretation of language or the sizing up of the facts, or the choice open as 
among available divergent premises … will allow a fair technical case to be made 
either way’.275  It may be observed that a mainstream Realist conception of 
judicial decision-making is similar to Lord Bingham’s discussed in Chapter 2, and, 
as discussed below, may in fact be largely compatible with Hart’s.276   
 
The American Legal Realists held empirical goals in order to observe what 
happened when the law did not determine the outcomes of litigation.  Llewellyn 
discussed the first attempts to ‘[capitalise] the wealth of our reported cases to 
make large-scale quantitative studies of facts and outcome’.  At the time Llewellyn 
wrote those words, however, he knew of ‘no published results’.277 The Realists 
did not generally produce a great deal of empirical work themselves.  Underhill 
Moore was one of the few in the centre of the Realist movement to conduct 
empirical studies of the law in action.  His study of the effect of parking regulations 
on the behaviour of drivers in New Haven is his most famous work.278 Moore’s 
work was criticised and ridiculed as being trivial at the time,279 but has been more 
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charitably interpreted in recent years as an exemplar of law-in-action empirical 
scholarship.280 As a result of failing to conduct empirical research themselves, 
the Realists challenged the determinacy of law, but did not explain what filled the 
gap.  This meant, as Cross says, Realism took on a nihilistic look.281  
 
Perhaps as a result of this, American Legal Realism flourished during the inter-
War years, but had ‘ran itself into the sand’ by the 1950s.282 One reason for this 
may have been that some Realists’ apparent scepticism towards legal rules led 
them to moral relativism or nihilism, which was not an attractive prospect after the 
Second World War.283 They could not provide an answer to what fills the gaps in 
law.  Part of the reason for this may have been a lack of funding during the 1930s 
Great Depression or, according to Schlegel, the ‘peculiarities of the personalities’ 
of the leaders of the movement, or the protagonists simply ‘losing their nerve’.284 
White wrote that the Realists’ process of ‘debunking’ followed by ‘objective’ 
observation was a contradiction in terms.285 ‘Debunking’ stemmed from the 
seminal work of Hohfeld who sought to show that certain legal concepts are often 
indiscriminately used to convey what in fact is its ‘opposite’ or its ‘correlative’.286 
But at the same time as ‘debunking’ functionalist claims of legal objectivity, the 
Realists assumed that their (limited) empirical observations would be value-
free.287  
 
American Legal Realism received its final blow in 1961 with Chapter 7 of Hart’s 
The Concept of Law.288  Hart attributed to the Realists the claim that ‘talk of rules 
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is a myth’, and that ‘law consists simply of the decisions of courts and the 
predictions of them’.289 It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that Holmes referred to 
law as being the prediction of what judges will do.290  This could not be true, Hart 
argued, because judges are guided by the law when they make decisions.291 Hart 
accused the Realists of sometimes being a ‘disappointed absolutist’292 since, 
having discovered the ‘open-texture’ at the fringes of law they exaggerated its 
effect so as to make this indeterminacy appear part of the concept of law.293  This 
also could not be true because many rules of law, such as speed limits, or rules 
relating to the drawing of wills, are routinely applied.  Hart’s critique is said by 
Leiter to have rendered Legal Realism a ‘philosophical joke’.294 As Green says, it 
is a cliché to say that ‘we are all realists now,’ but it is also mistaken; legal 
philosophers are rarely legal realists.295 
 
Since then, Hart’s alleged misreading of the Realists has been well 
documented.296   Leiter claims that Hart was asking a jurisprudential question 
about the concept of law, whilst the Realists attempted to provide a description 
and analysis of adjudication.297 According to Leiter, the Legal Realist critique was 
lawyerly rather than philosophical, avoiding the inevitable descent into nihilism.  
Many of the Legal Realists were judges themselves (for instance Holmes; Frank; 
and Hutcheson), or senior members of the legal establishment (such as 
Llewellyn, who drafted the Uniform Commercial Code), rather than philosophers, 
which does not coalesce with the extreme scepticism about judging which Hart 
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attributed to the Realists.298  Llewellyn himself stated that Realism ‘is not a 
philosophy, but a technology’, or a method, of ‘see it fresh’.299  
 
The importance of American Legal Realism on the American legal academy, and 
for this thesis in particular, is that it gave rise to the principle of conducting 
empirical research on courts.300  As Cross argued, Legal Realism may best be 
understood as a mood within the legal academy which sought a ‘realism’ about 
judging and legal processes.301 The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether 
the variables included in the analysis are predictors of the outcome of appeals 
against conviction.  The research conducted in this thesis in an example of ELS 
research, which claims a direct link to the original Legal Realists.302 Thus, Legal 
Realism provides a jurisprudential and historical lineage to the empirical analysis 
of judges.  Within ELS research, a variety of ‘models’ of judicial decision-making 
have been developed.  This thesis works within this literature, and variables have 
been drawn from it.  These models are discussed below.    
     
3.4 New Legal Realism 
While the American Legal Realists held empirical goals but rarely acted upon 
them, modern legal scholarship contains an abundance of empirical studies on 
the behaviour of judges.  Twining argued that the debate surrounding the 
meaning of American Legal Realism should now be considered legal history, and 
‘New Legal Realism’ should free itself from such debates.303  New Legal Realism 
differs from ELS in that ELS tends to emphasise quantitative research on the 
higher judiciary, whilst New Legal Realism proposes a ‘big tent’ approach, 
incorporating a wider range of approaches, including qualitative and other social-
                                                          
298 See BZ Tamanaha ‘Legal Realism in Context’ in E Mertz, S Macaulay, TW Mitchell (eds) The 
New Legal Realism: Translating Law-and-Society for Today’s Legal Practice (Cambridge 
University Press 2016) 156. 
299 KN Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Little, Brown & Co 1960) 510.  
300 See CG Geyh, ‘Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?’ (2012) 97 Corn L Rev 191, 201. 
301 Cross (n 281) 130.  
302 See TJ Miles and CR Sunstein, ‘The New Legal Realism’ (2008) 75 U Chic L Rev 831.  
303 W Twining, ‘Legal R/realism and Jurisprudence: Ten Theses’ in E Mertz, S Macaulay, and TW 
Mitchell (Eds) The New Legal Realism: Translating Law and Society for Today’s Legal Practice 
(Vol 1) (Cambridge University Press 2016).  
71 
 
science research methods, such as ethnography.304 New Legal Realism appears 
to prefer a ‘bottom-up’ approach, with a focus on ‘how law actually works in 
people’s lives’.305 Similar to the original Legal Realists, ELS has a ‘top-down’ 
approach with its emphasis on appellate decisions.  Mertz argued that while New 
Legal Realism’s ‘big tent’ approach ‘would welcome the insights of researchers 
into judicial behaviour’ they would also insist upon such researchers ‘taking other 
forms of disciplinary knowledge into account’.306 Miles and Sunstein argued that 
ELS might best be considered as a ‘subpart of a broader conception of the New 
Legal Realism.’307  
 
There have now been many empirical studies of the outcomes of cases with a 
view to explaining judicial behaviour, and this appears to be growing.308  The 
variables utilised in these earlier ELS studies have driven the selection of 
variables in this thesis.  These studies have been largely confined to the United 
States, reflecting the great impact on Legal Realism on American scholarship.  
The work of the Legal Realists and the New Realists is not complete, as Miles 
and Sunstein say: 
 
‘We continue to know only a small amount about what might be 
learned with respect to the effects of key aspects of judicial 
background on judicial voting... How do sex and race affect [behaviour] 
in multiple areas of the law? Are female appointees more likely to be 
pro-choice? In these domains, we glimpse only the tip of the 
iceberg.’309  
 
This statement was made from the perspective of American ELS scholars who 
carry out empirical work on judges.  In the United Kingdom, the range of empirical 
study of the decision-making of judges is far less extensive.  The Nuffield Enquiry 
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on Empirical Legal Research expressed concern at the limited number of 
empirical studies on law carried out in the United Kingdom.310 As Adler and Simon 
suggested, however, when the Enquiry referred to there being a lack of interest 
in ‘empirical research’, they appear to have meant more specifically ‘quantitative 
empirical research’, in particular quantitative empirical research of judges.311 The 
Enquiry may have overlooked the many socio-legal empirical studies on the 
United Kingdom legal system (such as the police and elements of policing, and 
the jury system).312 Many of these, such as McBarnet’s research from the early 
1980s on the operation of safeguards to protect people suspected of crime,313 
McConville, Sanders, and Leng’s study into the operation in practice of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and McConville’s study of criminal defence 
lawyers,314 could well be considered classic examples of New Legal Realism, 
given their examinations of the operation of law in everyday life and their critical 
evaluations of the balance of power in society.     
 
The Nuffield Enquiry suggested there was a lack of ‘critical mass’ of researchers 
conducting empirical research in the United Kingdom,315 and it is submitted that 
this is particularly true for large-n quantitative studies of judges.  One likely reason 
that there is not a culture of quantitative studies of judges in the UK is that the 
influence of ‘old’ Legal Realism was far more limited in the UK than it was in the 
US.  There was accordingly no turn-of-the-20th-century ‘growth spurt’ in empirical 
research as there was in the US.316 In the UK there have been relatively few 
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quantitative empirical studies of the decision-making of judges.  One such study 
is Robertson’s study of the House of Lords.317  He presented a statistical model 
which was able to predict the outcomes of cases, at times with over 90% 
accuracy, based only upon which judges were hearing the case.318 Robertson 
studied ‘nearly all’ reported cases heard before the House of Lords between 1986 
and 1995.319 These were coded into SPSS with the judges themselves as the 
independent variables to determine the impact of particular judges on the 
likelihood of an appeal being successful.  He found, for instance, that in tax cases 
the taxpayer was substantially more likely to lose if Lord Templeman was on the 
bench.320  
  
Large-scale empirical scholarship of the decision-making of judges, drawing upon 
Legal Realism, accelerated during the 1960s and considered ‘behavioural’ 
explanations for judicial decisions.  This has developed to the present day with 
numerous other models of judicial decision-making, such as the attitudinal model, 
strategic model, and institutional models.  These models are not directly tested in 
this thesis but the variables analysed are derived from these models.  The next 
section analyses the study of judicial behaviour, before stating the place of this 
study within this literature.      
 
3.5 Behavioural models of judicial decision-making 
In the 1960s, Schubert emphasised the human aspect to judicial decision-
making: judges are human beings who happen to be cast in important 
adjudicatory roles.321 Thus, ‘judicial behaviouralism’322 research considers the 
role of judges’ social background or personal attributes in judicial decision-
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making.323 Judicial behaviouralism is the theory that social background and 
personal attributes ‘shape personal and policy values that directly influence 
judicial decisions’.324 Many of the studies to be discussed in Chapter 5 have 
influences of judicial behaviouralism.  One study in particular has influenced the 
methods of this study: Sisk, Heise, and Morriss’s 1998 ‘Charting the Influences 
on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning’.325 This study is 
analysed further in Chapter 5.   
 
The personal characteristics of judges have usually been found to be only mildly 
correlated with judicial decisions.326 One of the criticisms of behavioural research 
is that it may be too simplistic a method to seek to uncover important facts about 
judicial decision-making.  As Clayton and Gillman assert: ‘there are important 
questions left unanswered by narrowly focussing on how particular justices vote 
in discrete cases’.327 It is for this reason that they prefer a method which looks 
beyond personal characteristics, such as the institutional model, discussed 
below.   
 
In this thesis, a range of variables which could be considered behavioural are 
considered.  A list of the variable is provided in Appendix A.  Some of these 
variables are personal characteristics pertaining to judges, appellants, and 
complainants / deceased.  A full discussion of all variables used is provided in 
Chapter 6.  Examples of the personal characteristics analysed in this study are: 
who the individual judges hearing the appeal were; the gender of judges, lawyers, 
and complainants / the deceased;328 whether the appellant was of previous bad 
or good character, and whether appellant was under 18 at the time of the 
allegations.  These are not all the variables used in the study, and, indeed, not all 
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variables which could have been used have been used.  As discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, the omission of certain variables is a limitation of this study.  
However, it is important to emphasise, as Whittington suggested, that it is not the 
intention of this thesis to show that behaviouralism, or any other model, is 
‘right’.329 Rather, it is an initial explorative study of whether a range of variables 
are predictors of the outcome of appeals against conviction, which is argued to 
be an adequate if incomplete measurement of impartiality.     
 
The behavioural model of judicial decision-making has been extended upon by 
the attitudinal model.  The attitudinal model was developed by Pritchett, who 
observed changing degrees of dissent in the US Supreme Court, and saw that 
divisions arose between those said to be on the left and those on the right of the 
Court.330 Pritchett’s work was extended ‘in terms of depth, sophistication and 
precision’331 by Schubert in the late 1950s and 1960s.332 The attitudinal model 
has since been developed by Professors Segal and Spaeth following analysis of 
the US Supreme Court Judicial Database (USSCJD) which they developed.333 
The attitudinal model maintains that judges’ attitudes or ideology ‘is a complete 
and adequate model of the Supreme Court’s decisions on its merits’ and that the 
attitudes of judges ‘are all that systematically explain the votes of the justices’.334 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, they envisaged the attitudinal model as being a 
direct challenge to the legal model.   
 
Whilst the behavioural model of judicial behaviour has not gained high empirical 
support, the attitudinal model is dominant in the literature.335 Studies have 
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frequently found a relationship between ideology and judicial decisions.336 The 
usual proxy for ideology is the party of the President who appointed the judge.337  
For instance, Cross and Tiller338 sought to determine whether judges were 
applying the US Supreme Court ‘deference doctrine’ espoused in Chevron339 in 
the way intended by the Supreme Court, or whether judges were ‘manipulating 
the deference doctrine to achieve politically desirable outcomes’.340 They tested 
this theory by studying and coding all DC Circuit Court of Appeals cases which 
cited Chevron between 1991 and 1995. Two of the variables they coded were 
whether the outcome was liberal or conservative, and the partisan makeup of the 
Court panel (Democrat (liberal) or Republican (conservative)).341 This second 
variable was determined by the party of the President who appointed the judge.  
They found that a panel consisting of a majority of Republicans rendered more 
conservative decisions and a panel containing Democrats rendered more liberal 
decisions.342  
 
Similarly, Revesz sought to test whether the policy preferences of judges had an 
impact on how they voted in environmental cases.343 The policy preference of the 
judge was also captured by recording the views generally held by the party of the 
President which appointed the judge.344 His three central conclusions were that 
ideology influences decision-making; ideological voting is more prevalent in 
cases less likely to be appealed to the US Supreme Court; and the votes cast 
differed depending upon the ideology of other judges.345 Sunstein, Schkade and 
Ellman employed the political affiliation of the appointing President as a proxy for 
judges’ attitudes.346  They found an association between the party which 
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appointed the judge and decision-making in many areas of law including sex 
discrimination, sexual harassment and disability discrimination.  Interestingly, the 
hypothesis of ideological voting was rebutted in criminal appeals.347  It was 
suggested by them that this may be because criminal laws are clearer than other 
laws, or judges of different ‘ideology’ have fewer differences in criminal cases.348       
 
The attitudinal model has been criticised by American judges who claim that the 
model does not reflect their own experience of judging,349 and from scholars on 
the grounds of its methodology.350 As Fischman and Law point out, it is difficult 
to know whether the party of the appointing President is a valid measurement of 
ideology.351 It may be that the assumption that Democrat judges have liberal 
ideologies, and Republican appointed judges have conservative ideologies does 
not always hold.352  Segal and Cover sought to enhance the measurement of 
ideology by searching for outside evidence of judicial preferences.353 They 
content analysed leading newspaper editorials for expert opinion on the 
ideological preferences of US Supreme Court justices.  This gave each judge a 
Segal / Cover score of a conservative, moderate, or liberal ideology.  The Segal 
/ Cover method has since been utilised frequently by political scientists, but, as 
Epstein and Mershon noted, later uses of the scores may have stretched the 
scores beyond their originally intended purposes.354 More recently, researchers 
have sought to modify the Segal / Cover scores by including quantitative 
assessment of the legislature’s ideology at the time a judge was appointed.355    
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The methods of behavioural / attitudinal research have been heavily criticised by 
some.356 Despite this, the empirical evidence that judges appointed by different 
Presidents (that is, without the imputation that this demonstrates ‘ideology’) 
decide differently is strong.357 The attitudinal model does not appear to be an 
appropriate model to test deductively in this study, because, even if it is 
appropriate for studies in the United States, it does not appear applicable in 
Britain.  Although the US Constitution has a strong separation of powers ethos, 
and values highly judicial independence, this appears to be achieved via a 
‘checks and balances’ system rather than separation, at least in relation to 
appointment of judges.  For instance, justices of the US Supreme Court are 
nominated by the serving President and the nominee is confirmed by a simple 
majority vote in the Senate.  Thus, the President cannot override Congress in his 
selection of judges.  The Chief Justice is appointed in the same way.358 Thus, 
while the judges are appointed this is checked and balanced by Congress. 
 
In the UK, there is no political vote on the appointment of judges, meaning that it 
is difficult to locate a suitable proxy for judicial ideology.  Since 2006, the Judicial 
Appointments Commission (JAC) has been independently tasked with appointing 
judges, including the Lord Chief Justice.  The independence of the judiciary from 
the other branches of government is confirmed by the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005,359 which created the JAC,360 and effected the symbolic renaming of the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords to the Supreme Court.361 Hanretty 
examined whether the outcomes of cases in the House of Lords could be 
modelled according to the party in power at the time individual judges were 
appointed.362 He found that such a model did not improve upon the null model as 
a predictor of outcomes.  The political inclinations of judges are rarely disclosed 
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in public, meaning it is difficult to find any other way to measure ideology.  As Gee 
and his colleagues say, the appointment of judges in the UK, which was once 
characterised by ‘stability, secrecy and informality’,363 is now characterised by a 
long and highly formalised selection process administered by the JAC.  Although 
it was intended to be a recommending body, it now operates as an appointing 
body,364 with Lord Chancellors now seriously marginalised even for the more 
senior judicial positions.365      
 
Arvind and Stirton offered an alternative way of measuring judicial attitude in the 
UK Supreme Court.366 Rather than analysing judges on a left / right continuum 
as did Hanretty, they used a green-light / red-light continuum.  This, they argued, 
measured ‘whether they see the proper role of the courts as taking respectively 
a restrictive or permissive’ attitude towards administrative discretion.367 This was 
not a purely attitudinal measure, however, but was also a doctrinal / legal 
measure.  This is because they argued that their model captured whether the 
judges had certain attitudes towards what the law required.368 They found that 
some judges were more ‘pro-State’ (i.e. green-light) than others, and, at least 
sometimes, the ‘bench composition can still matter to how cases are decided’.369 
Arvind and Stirton have valuably shown that there are alternative measures of 
judicial attitudes and perspectives, and they can be used to study British judges.  
Owing to the nature of Court of Appeal judgments, in particular, that there is only 
ever one opinion in criminal appeals, there is no ideological ranking of judges in 
this study.  However, individual judges are used as variables, which will give an 
insight into whether individual judges are associated with particular outcomes.      
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It is becoming increasingly acknowledged that behavioural or attitudinal models 
of judicial decision-making omit some important features of adjudication.  In more 
recent years, judicial scholars and political scientists have sought broader 
analysis.  Of particular importance to this study is work which considers the 
institutional position of courts, to which attention now turns.      
 
3.6 Post-attitudinal models of judicial decision-making 
Gillman and Clayton argued that attention should be diverted away from the 
policy preferences of particular judges, and towards the ‘distinctive 
characteristics of the court as an institution, its relationship to other institutions, 
and how both of these might shape judicial values’.370 Bloom argued that legal 
scholarship entered a ‘post-attitudinal’ phase with the development of the 
institutional model, which requires looking ‘beyond judicial attitudes’.371 As Cross 
argued, one of the shortcomings of behavioural / attitudinal studies of judicial 
decision-making is the lack of any variable designed to capture the effects of the 
law on judicial decisions.372 A consideration of the law is one important element 
of post-attitudinal research on judicial decision-making.  A major criticism of 
American ELS which utilises the US Supreme Court Database373 is that it fails to 
take account of the law itself.374 In this thesis, variables which consider the 
broader institutional situation and relationships between the Court and other 
institutions are considered.  
 
As will be explained further in Chapter 4, the decision-making of the Court, and 
the ‘unsafety test’ is a product of its history and its place within the criminal justice 
system.  Thus, certain norms may have an impact on how the law is interpreted, 
and how the Court decides cases.  The norms which operate in the decision-
making of the Court of Appeal have been previously studied by researchers.  
                                                          
370 CW Clayton and H Gillman (eds) Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist 
Approaches (University of Chicago Press 1999) 3. 
371 A Bloom ‘The “Post-Attitudinal Moment”: Judicial Policymaking Through the Lens of New 
Institutionalism’ (2001) (35) Law & Soc’y Rev 219, 220. 
372 FB Cross, Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals (Stanford University Press 2007) 39.  
373 Housed at Washington University Law School, available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/ 
374 C Shapiro, ‘Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court’ 
(2009) Hastings LJ 477. 
81 
 
Some observers of the Court of Appeal are of the view that the Court has 
consistently applied and interpreted its powers in a restrictive manner.375 For 
instance, when Roberts found that the success rate in appeals raising only 
‘factual issues’ was low, she concluded that this was evidence of the Court acting 
restrictively.376 This ‘restrictive’ interpretation of the Court’s powers led to the 
observation that appellants who can point to a substantive significant error of law 
are most likely to be successful; and appellants who cannot are unlikely to be 
successful.377 Chapter 4 explains that this has become part of the meaning of the 
‘unsafety test’ and part of the law which governs appeals.    
 
In this thesis, a number of variables which could constitute ‘institutional’ factors 
are considered.  In particular, there is a variable designed to capture the law 
relating to appeals.  This measurement of the law embodies how judges perceive 
their roles, and how the ‘unsafety test’ has been interpreted.  Other variables 
which capture the institutional position of the Court of Appeal, include whether 
permission to appeal was granted by the single judge or by the Full Court, and 
whether the appeal was by way of a Criminal Case Review Commission (CCRC) 
referral. 
 
Utilising the desire to consider broader factors which could influence the decision-
making of judges, a range of other models / theories have developed in recent 
years.  Resnik developed a managerial model of judicial decision-making, which 
postulates that a primary concern of judges is to control their workload and 
calendars.378  She argued that managerial judging is problematic because it 
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appears to elevate speed over deliberation and impartiality.379  George and Yoon 
have recently explored the managerial model, and found stronger evidence for 
managerialism than for attitudinalism.380 Echoes of managerialism appear in 
some outputs from the Court of Appeal.  In the 2015 / 16 Annual Report Hallett 
LJ, Vice President of the Criminal Division, demonstrated concerns with the 
management of the Court.  She referred to the Court being ‘burdened’ with overly 
lengthy grounds of appeal, and expressed concern regarding the number of 
judges required for certain appeals.381 She expressed similar concerns in the 
previous year’s annual report.382    
 
Managerial concerns may also be relevant in the variable which has been 
designed to capture the law applying to appeals.  As will be discussed further in 
Chapter 4, the appeals process appears to favour appeals which raise procedural 
irregularities.  As Spencer noted, the leave process in appeals appears well 
suited to locating procedural errors in trials, but it is less well suited to dealing 
with claims that the jury simply reached the wrong decision.383 Carefully reviewing 
the facts of the case, and receiving fresh evidence, take time and expend energy, 
which from a managerial perspective is difficult for the Court given its limited 
resources.  This, ultimately, may feed into the ‘unsafety test’ which, like the leave 
process, appears to favour procedural irregularity appeals.   
 
Other researchers have sought to relate judicial decision-making to general 
theories of human decision-making. As was discussed in Chapter 2, some 
researchers have sought to uncover whether behavioural heuristics and biases 
influence decision-making.384 Others have focussed upon the motivations behind 
human decision-making, and how this relates to judicial decision-making. For 
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instance, Baum argued that an inherent human trait – the desire to be liked and 
respected by people who are perceived as important to them – must also apply 
to judges as they, too, are human beings.385 Baum argued that this desire leads 
to changes in behaviour, and this too may influence the decisions which judges 
reach.386 A psychological analysis of the motivations of judges is beyond the 
design and scope of this study.  It is emphasised that the study of judicial 
behaviour is now well developed, and in some countries, has moved beyond 
correlational study of the outcomes of cases.  
 
A particular area of development relevant to this study is consideration of the 
decision-making of panels of judges.387  ‘Panel effects’ refers to how the members 
of multi-member courts might influence each other, and the decisions that a court 
reaches.388  The Court of Appeal sit in panels of at least three judges, and social 
psychological research has explored how small groups reach decisions.389 In 
American studies, the study of panel effects has focussed upon what happens 
when the panel is a mix of Democrat and Republican judges.  Revesz found that 
judges were more likely to vote ideologically when they were sitting in panels with 
other judges from the same party.390 Furthermore, he found that the ideology of 
a judge’s colleagues was a better predictor of that judges vote than that judges 
own ideology.391  Cross and Tiller similarly found that the ideological composition 
of panels was related to how judges vote.392 They coupled the analysis of the 
ideological composition of panels with an analysis of legal doctrine.  They argued 
that the presence of a political minority (particularly, a Democrat judge) within a 
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judicial panel moderated the panel when the majority were intending to ‘disobey’ 
legal doctrine.393   
 
Not all studies have found panel effects.  Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman found 
no evidence of panel effects in several areas of law, including criminal appeals.394 
Moreover, even when there appeared to be panel effects they were not large.395 
The authors suggested that the minimal panel effect was due to different court 
compositions dampening the ideology of panels; the ‘disciplining effect of 
precedent and law’; and the dampening effect of legal culture.396 Kim has also 
studied panel effects.  She sought to determine whether judges in politically 
mixed panels act strategically to avoid being overruled on appeal.397 She 
postulated that strategic judges would mediate their decisions to seek to prevent 
dissent from a minority judge.398 She found mixed evidence for this strategic 
decision-making.  She found that the US Courts of Appeals panels did not seek 
to avoid review by the Supreme Court, but they did seek to avoid review by other 
Courts of Appeals panels.399 She suggested managerial reasons for this (further 
hearings by the Court meant more work for the Court),400 and reasons similar to 
those proposed by Baum: that the opinions of their Courts of Appeals colleagues 
were more important and salient to them.401       
 
It is difficult to properly assess panel effects in this study. This is because there 
is only one judgment per case in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal, and 
so it is not possible to observe what the role of each judge was in a particular 
judgment.  This, it must be noted, means an important part of the decision-making 
                                                          
393 ibid, 2173. 
394 CR Sunstein, D Schkade and LM Ellman, ‘Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A 
Preliminary Investigation (2004) 90 Va L Rev 301, 334.  Note that some of Sunstein’s other work 
did find evidence of panel effects, see CR Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Harvard 
University Press 2005).   
395 ibid, 336. 
396 ibid, 336-7. 
397 PT Kim, ‘Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical 
Exploration of Panel Effects’ (2008) 157 U Pa L Rev 1319. 
398 ibid, 1345-6.  
399 ibid, 1368-9. 
400 ibid, 1369. 
401 ibid.  
85 
 
process – collegiality and deliberation – is omitted.  One aspect of panel decision-
making which can be explored, however, is the constitution of particular panels.  
Variables have been collected for the ranks of judges, which will help to determine 
whether judges in leadership roles (such as the Lord Chief Justice and the Vice 
President of the Criminal Division) are associated with deciding appeals in 
particular ways.  This offers an opportunity to explore whether the dynamics of 
Court composition has any apparent role in decision-making.          
 
3.7 The relationship between this thesis and previous judicial behaviour 
studies  
As has been seen, in some countries, particularly the United States, scholars 
have been studying the decision-making of judges for decades.  This has led to 
the development of the models of judicial decision-making which have been 
discussed above. There are, however, legitimate reasons to doubt whether such 
models can fully account for the complexities of judicial decision-making. The 
limitations of these kinds of studies are considered in depth throughout Chapters 
5 and 6 of this thesis.  There are considerable reasons to question the 
behavioural / attitudinal models in particular.402 Furthermore, the relative absence 
of judicial studies in Britain means that the models have not been 
comprehensively tested in Britain.  Accordingly, there is no real a priori empirical 
justification for hypothesising that such models would be successful in explaining 
judicial behaviour in Britain. 
 
The research conducted in this thesis, therefore, does not seek to confirm 
whether any of these models appear to account for the decisions of judges.  
Rather, an explorative approach has been adopted. This study may be best 
understood as an explorative data analysis of a large amount of data collected 
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from Court of Appeal judgments.  In this analysis, there is an emphasis on the 
observation of whether patterns occur in the data.403 An explorative inductive 
approach is useful when the background reading on the topic ‘did not lead to an 
expectation that results should come out in a particular way’.404  
 
The relationship between this thesis and the field of judicial studies is to employ 
the methods developed by primarily American researchers, and apply those 
methods afresh in the Court of Appeal.  This has a number of advantages.  The 
study is not burdened by seeking to test whether one particular model explains 
decision-making. Furthermore, by analysing a range of variables which may to 
varying degrees be indicative of one or more model, it is possible to determine, 
in a tentative way, whether any model has sufficient traction for further analysis 
in the future.  The history of judicial studies in the United States shows that 
simplistic behavioural models were replaced by more advanced attitudinal 
versions, which have since been continuously critiqued and questioned. This 
thesis has the advantage that these critiques have already taken place, and so 
this study can take account of the methodological difficulties which have been 
uncovered.    
 
The variables which have been collected and analysed have been designed to 
capture the principle of impartiality.  An exploration of impartiality is somewhat 
more general than an exploration of whether particular models explain judicial 
decision-making.  This is a further benefit of the explorative inductive approach 
taken in this thesis.  By focussing upon impartiality rather than a particular model, 
the study transcends attachment to any model.  Rather, the variables are used to 
determine whether particular variables are associated with particular outcomes, 
to allow a discussion of what that means for the impartiality of the Court.  Lastly, 
it should be remembered that it cannot be claimed that the variables completely 
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capture the principle of impartiality.  As such, the results of this study cannot be 
conclusive of partial or impartial decision-making, but the emergence of any 
patterns in the data can provide further points to consider regarding the Court’s 
impartiality.    
 
3.8 Conclusion  
It has been explained that the principle of conducting empirical analysis on the 
decision-making of judges can claim a heritage from the American Legal Realists.  
The work conducted in this thesis is tied to the Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) 
research movement.  The majority of ELS work on the decision-making of judges 
is American, and this is likely to be due to the influence of American Legal 
Realism on the American legal academy, an influence which is much more muted 
in other jurisdictions.  As a result, quantitative, positivistic, analyses of the 
decision-making of judges, utilising more complex social science tools and 
methods, are relatively rare in Britain, and unique for the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division).  This thesis has therefore observed this gap in research and 
literature and sought to complete it with an analysis of decision-making in the 
England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).  
 
The extensive research programmes in the United States has led to the 
development, and continued critique and refinement of judicial studies.  There 
has been proposed a number of ‘models’ of judicial decision-making, which have 
been empirically tested for several decades in the United States.  These include 
the behavioural model, attitudinal model, strategic model, managerial, and 
psychological models.  Analysis of panel effects is becoming increasingly 
important.  This thesis has utilised this literature in order to commence this 
explorative study of the Court.      
 
The next chapter analyses the powers of the Court of Appeal and the background 
to the ‘unsafety test’.  It will be shown that the ‘unsafety test’ developed gradually 
in an attempt to conduce a more liberal attitude in the Court.  However, this was 
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unlikely to work in practice, because to conduce a more liberal approach the 
powers of the Court simply became more discretionary.  As a result of this 
discretion, as explained in Chapter 2, there is a possibility of partiality.  This 
makes the Court of Appeal a good candidate for empirical analysis.   
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Chapter 4 
The England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
 
Introduction  
This chapter begins by analysing the purposes of the Court of Appeal.  It has a 
dual purpose in attempting to correct miscarriages of justice by quashing the 
convictions of people who may be innocent, and upholding due process by 
quashing convictions achieved following procedural errors or breaches of due 
process.  The Court of Appeal’s review function serves an important legitimising 
purpose, in that it operates as a review of whether the convictions it examines 
have ‘moral authority’.  Moral authority pertains to the legitimacy of guilty verdicts, 
in that it should be a morally justified statement of the defendant’s 
blameworthiness and fitness for punishment.405 Moral authority will derive from 
the conviction’s factual accuracy, and its respect for the moral and political 
principles which underlie the criminal process.406  Given this function of the Court 
in reviewing the legitimacy of convictions, it is important to know whether the 
Court itself has legitimacy to render decisions.   
 
All of the cases analysed in this thesis were decided while the Court was 
operating the ‘unsafety test’.  Thus, it is important to understand how the test 
works, and this chapter provides a thorough analysis of the test.  This chapter 
briefly analyses the history of the Court’s powers.  It will be shown that the Court’s 
powers have progressively become looser and more discretionary in nature, and 
‘open-textured’.  The ‘unsafety test’ appears to provide the Court with maximum 
flexibility and discretion.  However, this flexibility is dampened to an extent by the 
Court having stipulated what is necessary for a conviction to be unsafe.  It is only 
if an appellant can meet the tests built into the ‘unsafety test’ by case law, that 
the Court can quash a conviction.  Thus, it could be said that while the ‘unsafety 
test’ appears discretionary, it is often guided by legal rules and principles.      
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4.1 Purposes and function of the Court of Appeal 
The purpose of having an appeal system is inextricably linked to the general 
overall purpose, function, or aim, of criminal justice.  Rule 1 of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules407 provides an ‘overriding objective’ that criminal cases are dealt 
with ‘justly’.  Dealing with cases justly includes a number of, often conflicting, 
principles or subsidiary aims.  The first three are most important for present 
purposes, and require, firstly, ensuring that the innocent are acquitted and the 
guilty are convicted.408 Secondly, the prosecution and the defence must be 
treated fairly.409 Thirdly, a defendant’s rights under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights should be recognised.410  
 
There are some difficulties with these aims which should be mentioned.  Firstly, 
the aim of ‘convicting the guilty’ may appear somewhat incongruous with the 
presumption of innocence.  Since all persons on trial are presumed to be 
innocent, does it make sense that the supposed aim of the trial is to ‘convict the 
guilty’, given that a person is only legally ‘guilty’ once the conviction has 
occurred?  The aim is suggestive of guilt being a condition which exists ‘out there’, 
needing only to be discovered by the trial.  At an abstract level this might be true, 
but as Nobles and Schiff argued, it is doubtful whether guilt is a thing which exists 
‘out there’, given that guilt or otherwise often concerns contested versions of past 
events, coupled with ‘legal guilt’.411        
 
Some of the aims appear to be in conflict with each other.  Even appellants who 
are in an abstract sense ‘guilty’, or those believed to be guilty, are entitled to have 
their due process rights recognised.  This raises the question of what happens 
when they have their rights abused?  Moreover, is it possible to ‘ensure’ the 
acquittal of the innocent, whilst simultaneously attempting to do justice by 
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punishing wrongdoers?  The epistemological limits of the criminal trial, in that 
belief ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ is required, and not ‘belief beyond all certainty’, 
means that error is always possible.  Is there an acceptable error rate?412  Or, is 
it not the case that only way to ‘ensure’ the innocent are always acquitted would 
be to not convict anyone?413 Moreover, can any of these principles be achieved 
whilst at the same time conforming to principle (e) of Rule 1 of the Criminal 
Procedure Rules: dealing with cases efficiently and expeditiously?  With unlimited 
time and resources the aims might be possible, but that is not the reality for the 
criminal justice system generally, and the Court of Appeal in particular.  Such 
questions go to core of the role of the Court’s institutional position in reviewing 
convictions and quashing those which it thinks are unsafe.   
 
Spencer argued that the Court of Appeal is in place to remedy two distinct ills.414  
The first is to remedy a miscarriage of justice in the sense of the conviction of 
people who are innocent; the second is to remedy a failure of due process of law, 
to an extent, irrespective of actual innocence or guilt.415 These accord with the 
general overriding objective within the Rules to do justice.  Similarly, Dennis 
argued that the fundamental function of the Court is to review the legitimacy of 
convictions.416 This requires a review of whether the conviction is factually 
accurate, carries sufficient ‘moral authority’ to justify continued punishment, and 
is ‘founded on the rule of law’.417 Convictions can only be safe if the Court is 
satisfied of these requirements.  The Court’s role is to do justice, because 
convictions failing these test could not be just.  ‘Morally authoritative’ and 
‘founded on the rule of law’ are related to the circumstances in which breaches 
of fairness or other procedures can render a conviction unsafe even if they do not 
cast doubt on the accuracy of the verdict.   
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Dennis argued that the Court has adopted a clear position in which a conviction 
will always be unsafe if the Court thinks that there is a reasonable doubt about 
the conviction’s factual accuracy.418  Furthermore, substantial breaches of the 
rule of law will always cause convictions to be unsafe, if it was such that it was 
unfair to try the appellant at all.419  He also suggested that in cases where it is 
alleged that breaches of procedure occurred, the essential question is whether 
the breach prejudiced the appellant to the extent that the outcome of the trial 
might have been different but for the irregularity.420 Dennis’s arguments will be 
analysed below, when the ‘unsafety test’ is considered in greater depth.   
 
The complexities of the functions of the Court are well illuminated by the case of 
R v Paris and others,421 also commonly known as the Cardiff Three case.  The 
three appellants were convicted of the murder of Lynette White. One appellant, 
Miller, who was mentally impaired and had a reading age of 11, confessed to the 
murder of White (who was his girlfriend).  The others had witnesses testify against 
them placing them at the scene.  The investigation occurred after the enactment 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), which provides that 
confessions gained by oppressive questioning are inadmissible.422 The 
appellants challenged the admissibility of the confessions at trial, alleging 
oppression, but the confessions were ruled admissible by the trial judge.  Two 
years later, the convictions were quashed.  In the appeal, the Court of Appeal 
listened to the tape recordings of the police interviews, parts of which had not 
been made available to the trial judge, and concluded that Miller had been ‘bullied 
and hectored’ by the police into confessing.423 He was asked the same question 
over 300 hundred times, in order to induce confession.       
 
The Cardiff Three could be considered a classic example of the Court of Appeal 
upholding due process values in quashing the convictions due to procedural 
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irregularities and misbehaviour by the authorities.  This would be such a classic 
example, except that it is now known, as far as it can be, that as well as having 
their due process rights abused, they were also innocent of the murder.  The real 
killer was convicted in 2003 and absolved them of any involvement.424 The 
witnesses against the Three were convicted of perjury and sentenced to 
imprisonment.425 The judge sentencing the perjurers noted that they were 
‘seriously hounded, bullied, threatened, abused, and manipulated by the police’ 
into making false statements against the Cardiff Three.426 A criminal case against 
the police officers concerned collapsed in 2011, after prosecution evidence 
against them disappeared.  The evidence was found a short time later in a 
cupboard.427  
 
The fact that the Cardiff Three are known to have also been innocent serves to 
obscure that the convictions were quashed not because they were innocent, but 
because the Court of Appeal found that the confession should not have been 
admitted at trial.  Naughton is critical for the Court because of this.  He stated that 
the Court did not quash the convictions because the Court wanted to correct an 
apparent wrong, the conviction of innocent people, but because of this 
irregularity.428  He said that this is evidence that the Court is not concerned with 
correcting miscarriages of justice as understood from a ‘lay’ perspective, but only 
in a legalistic sense.429 This criticism of the Court does not seem well placed.  The 
Court could not have quashed the conviction on the basis of their innocence 
because, at the time the convictions were quashed, the Court could not have 
known that they were actually innocent.  It may even be said that this case 
demonstrates the Court taking a strongly pro-active approach in seeking to 
correct miscarriages of justice because the Court quashed the conviction despite 
                                                          
424 See S Morris ‘Cardiff Three Are Completely Innocent, Says Convicted Killer of Lynette White’ 
(The Guardian, 13 July 2011). 
425 See BBC News Online ‘Three Jailed for Murder Case Lies’ 19 December 2008 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/7792501.stm. <18 August 2016>  
426 ibid.  
427 See Independent Police Complaints Commission, Destruction of Specific Documents Leading 
to the Collapse of the R v Mouncher & others trial, Report, (IPCC 2011). 
428 M Naughton, The Innocent and the Criminal Justice System: A Sociological Analysis of 
Miscarriages of Justice (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 154.  
429 ibid 151 – 4.  
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there not being conclusive proof of innocence at the time of the appeal.  The 
convictions were quashed because the breaches of rules were so obvious and 
egregious, and so clearly in flagrant disregard of PACE, that the convictions had 
to be quashed.  They lacked any moral authority.  Therefore the convictions were 
quashed not because innocence was proved, but because there was a risk that 
real injustice had been done.  It is unclear how this demonstrates that the Court 
is not concerned with correcting the convictions of the innocent.430       
 
Quashing convictions for procedural irregularities may at times appear difficult to 
justify.  One example of a case which is difficult to justify is R v Weir.431 His 
conviction for murder was quashed because the DNA evidence against him 
should have been destroyed and removed from the National DNA database, as 
required by section 64 of PACE.  The Crown’s appeal against the Court of 
Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the House of Lords because the appeal was 
lodged one day late.432 If the Crown’s appeal had been heard by the House, it is 
very likely to have been successful because the decision in Attorney General’s 
Reference (No 3 of 1999)433 held that failing to destroy DNA samples under 
section 64 did not automatically make the evidence inadmissible.  Indeed, Lord 
Steyn implied that the Court of Appeal decision in Weir was ‘absurd’434 and 
‘wrong’.435 It is therefore highly unlikely that the same decision would be reached 
now, but the case does demonstrate the conflict between protecting due process 
rights and ensuring the conviction of the likely guilty.   
 
The overall purpose of the Court of Appeal is to do justice.  Within that overall 
aim, however, there are a variety of conflicting principles and interests.  The Court 
is in a position of having to balance the overriding objective principles of ensuring 
that innocent appellants have their convictions quashed, against dismissing 
unmeritorious appeals.  Furthermore, the interest of fairness, which is afforded to 
                                                          
430 As Naughton alleged at ibid 142. 
431 R v Weir Times 16 June 2000.  
432 R v Weir [2001] 1 WLR 421. 
433 [2001] 1 AC 91. 
434 ibid, 118.  
435 ibid, 120. 
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both guilty and innocent appellants, is balanced against the interest of upholding 
the conviction of the guilty.  All these interests must then be balanced against 
maintaining the integrity of the system, in particular the finality of jury verdicts and 
the system of trial by jury in which it is the jury tasked with determining guilt or 
innocence in Crown Court trials.  There has been concern that the Court is 
balanced too far in the direction of upholding the integrity of the jury system, and 
finality, rather than doing justice in the sense of quashing the conviction of the 
innocent.  These concerns led ultimately to the ‘unsafety test’ under which the 
Court currently operates.  These issues, and the ‘unsafety test’, are returned to 
below.      
 
4.2 Criminal justice system statistics 
The most recent available complete data relating to criminal appeals is for the 
year 2016.436 The appeals studied in this thesis, however, are from the time 
period 2006 to 2010.  Data is available for this time period from a number of 
different sources.437 In 2016, 1.5 million cases were received by the magistrates’ 
court system.438 Of these, 326000 were either-way offences; 32000 were 
indictable only offences; 562000 were summary motoring offences; 539000 were 
summary offences; and 68000 were for breaches of orders.439 In 2010, 1.7 million 
cases were received by the magistrates’ court.440 The combined number of 
indictable and triable either-way offences was 410000; 590000 were summary 
motoring offences; 546000 were summary only offences; 117000 were breaches; 
and 131000 were youth proceedings.441  
 
                                                          
436 All statistics are taken from the tables contained in Criminal Court Statistics: October to 
December 2016 (main tables) available from https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-
court-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2016 (accessed 19/06/2017).  
437 See Court Statistics Quarterly January – March 2012 main tables. Available from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/court-statistics-quarterly-earlier-editions-in-the-series 
(accessed 19/06/2017).  
438 2016 data, table M1. 
439 ibid.  
440 2010 data, table 3.1. 
441 ibid.  
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In 2016, 116000 cases were received by the Crown Court system.442 46000 
related to either-way offences; 27000 were indictable only offences; 31000 were 
committals for sentence; and 10000 were appeals from magistrates’ court 
decisions.443 In 2010 the Crown Court received 152000 cases, of which 63000 
were triable either-way offences; 34000 were indictable only offences; 41000 
were committals for sentence; and there were 13000 appeals from magistrates’ 
courts.444  
   
The most recent available full year statistics on conviction rates in the Crown 
Court are from 2015.445 These show that in 2015 93000 individual defendants 
were tried (109000 in 2010).446 Of these, 64000 pleaded guilty to all counts 
(76000 in 2010).  Of those who pleaded not guilty in the Crown Court, 12000 
individuals were convicted in 2015.  The following Table shows the number of 
individual defendants convicted in a Crown Court following a not guilty plea in the 
period 2007 to 2015, thus encompassing part of the period under analysis in this 
thesis.447 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
442 2016 data, table C1. 
443 ibid.  
444 ibid.  
445 See Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly January to March 2016. 
446 ibid, table AC6. 
447 Produced from ibid.  
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Table 4.1: Number of defendants convicted in a Crown Court following not guilty 
plea 2007-2015.  
Year Number 
2007 11073 
2008 11137 
2009 11252 
2010 11957 
2011 12275 
2011 12490 
2013 11518 
2014 11121 
2015 12106 
   
It will be seen that the number has remained fairly static.  Out of a total of more 
than 1.5 million criminal cases, therefore, only a small proportion of defendants 
are convicted of the most serious crimes in the Crown Court following a not guilty 
plea.  As will be discussed further below, only a small proportion of these will 
apply for permission to appeal their convictions.  
 
There is further data available for the number of persons convicted of the offence 
of rape between 2006 and 2010.  In 2013, the Home Office produced a statistical 
bulletin on sexual offending.448 The statistics break down the offence of rape into 
several categories.  Firstly, rape is divided into rape of a male and rape of a 
female.449  Secondly, there is rape of a female over the age of 16 charged as 
rape under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and rape of a child under 
the age of 13, (charged as rape under section 5).  The statistics also show section 
1 rape of a child aged under 16 (but presumably 13 or over).  There is no separate 
offence of rape for this category; it would be charged under section 1.450 These 
same categories are provided for rape of a male.  The data also shows attempts 
                                                          
448 An Overview of Sexual Offending in England and Wales (Home Office, Ministry of Justice 
2013).  
449 ibid, Sexual Offending Overview Tables, table 4.1. 
450 ibid, see glossary. 
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of these offences.  The following Table reproduces the data relating to the number 
of persons convicted of these kinds of rape against a female.451  As they are not 
considered in this thesis, attempts are omitted.  This Table includes persons who 
either pleaded guilty or who were convicted.  
 
Table 4.2: Persons convicted of rape of a female 2006 - 2010. 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Under 13 85 91 141 143 167 
13 – under 16 219 236 241 273 271 
16 or over 384 375 382 413 445 
Total 688 702 764 829 883 
 
The following Table shows the same data for persons convicted of these 
categories of rape against a male.  The total number of persons convicted of an 
offence of rape between 2006 and 2010 is shown in Table 4.4.  These Tables 
include persons who either pleaded guilty or who were convicted.      
 
Table 4.3: Persons convicted of rape of a male 2006 - 2010. 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Under 13 32 37 33 28 46 
13 – under 16 15 23 14 15 17 
16 or over 20 16 12 14 14 
Total 67 76 59 57 77 
      
Table 4.4: Total number of persons convicted of rape 2006 – 2010. 
Year 2006 2007 2007 2009 2010 
Number 755 778 823 886 960 
  
                                                          
451 Reproduced from ibid, table 4.1. 
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This thesis has included the age of the complainant in a rape appeal and the 
deceased in a murder appeal as independent variables.  These above age 
categories are used as the ages for the independent variables.  There is an 
additional variable for those aged 16 and 17, and so who are still considered 
children.  This has the benefit that the variables used for rape are mapped onto 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  However, this does mean that these age 
categories, specifically designed for rape, are imposed onto murder appeals.  The 
specific decisions relating to the coding of the murder and rape appeals are 
returned to and analysed in Chapter 6.     
 
Statistics are also available for the number of persons convicted of murder 
between 2006 and 2010.452 The following Table reproduces this data.  This Table 
includes persons who either pleaded guilty or who were convicted. 
 
Table 4.5: Number of persons convicted of murder 2006 – 2010. 
Year Number 
2006 358 
2007 315 
2008 328 
2009 267 
2010 141 
  
Those who have been convicted in a Crown Court have an entitlement to seek 
‘leave’ (permission) from the Court of Appeal to appeal against the conviction.  
As was shown above, approximately 11000 - 12000 persons are convicted each 
year in a Crown Court following a not guilty plea.  Whilst defendants who pleaded 
guilty can, and do, occasionally appeal their convictions, it is relatively rare for 
those who pleaded guilty to do so. As is discussed below, appeals following a 
guilty plea are unlikely to be successful.   
                                                          
452 Data collected from Homicides, Firearm Offences, and Intimate Violence 2009-10 
Supplementary volume 2 (Home Office 2011) table 1.10. 
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An appellant who wishes to appeal must lodge an application to the Court which 
will initially be decided by a single High Court judge.  The single judge can either 
grant leave, or refuse leave.  If leave is refused, it can be renewed before a Full 
Court which will decide whether to grant leave.  Table 4.6 shows the number of 
applications for permission to appeal against conviction received per year 
between 2006 and 2010; the number of applications granted by the single judge; 
the number of failed applications renewed; and the number of applications 
granted by the Full Court.453 
 
Table 4.6: Applications received 2006 – 2010. 
Year Applications Granted 
Single judge 
Renewed 
Applications 
Granted By 
Full Court 
2006 1595 291 481 137 
2007 1508 288 520 125 
2007 1588 212 400 146 
2009 1435 275 477 117 
2010 1488 242 370 148 
  
A number of observations can be made about this Table.  Most applications are 
declined by the single judge – fewer than 20% of applications are granted 
permission by the single judge.  Of the unsuccessful applicants who decide to 
renew their applications, the chances of being granted permission by the Full 
Court are slightly improved.  There has also been a steadily declining number of 
applications received by the Court, and this continues to the present day.  In the 
12 months ending October 2016, the Court of Appeal received 1417 applications 
for permission to appeal against conviction.454  
 
The method of permission being granted are independent variables in this thesis.  
In particular, whether the case is heard following permission by the single judge, 
                                                          
453 Data extracted from Court Statistics Quarterly January to March 2014 table 5.7. 
454 In the Court of Appeal Criminal Division Annual report 2015-16 (2017) 27.  
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the Full Court, or the CCRC.  This variable relates to the institutional position of 
the Court of Appeal, and how the processes of the Court function.         
 
The above Table highlighted statistics relating to the permission to appeal 
process in the Court of Appeal.  Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 compared the number of 
cases heard per year between 2006 and 2010 with the number of combined 
murder and rape appeals per year.  This is reproduced here as Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7: Comparison of overall Court of Appeal workload and murder and rape 
workload (2006-2010). 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals 
Sampled Appeals 120 91 66 91 104 472 
Overall workload 572 523 438 430 496 2459 
% workload in 
sample 
20.9 17.3 15.0 21.1 20.9 19.1 
 
Since 2010, the number of cases heard by the Court of Appeal has declined 
significantly. In 2016 the Court heard only 260 appeals against conviction.455 
These data relating to the appeals heard between 2006 and 2010 are returned to 
in Chapter 7. 
 
The criminal justice statistics recounted in this section reveal a number of points.  
The Court of Appeal hears only a small fraction of all criminal cases.  If the 11000 
- 12000 defendants convicted in the Crown Court following a not guilty plea in 
2016 is the most appropriate the denominator, and the 260 appeals heard in 2016 
is the numerator, the Court heard 0.02% of cases within its jurisdiction.  The 
Court’s role is much more significant qualitatively than quantitatively.  This relates 
to, as explained in section 4.1, the role of the Court in ensuring that due process 
is adhered to, and its role in seeking to correct miscarriages of justice.  Despite 
                                                          
455 ibid, 25.  
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its quantitatively small reach, the Court is a suitable body for empirical study 
owing to the importance of the Court qualitatively.   
 
4.3 A short history of the Court’s powers 
The Court of Criminal Appeal (as the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) was 
known until 1966),456 was created by the Criminal Appeal Act 1907.  The Act 
afforded the Court the power to allow an appeal against conviction if it felt the 
conviction was, (section 4(a)): ‘unreasonable or could not be supported having 
regard to the evidence,’ or (b), or should be ‘set aside on the ground of any wrong 
decision on a question of law’, or, (c), there was a ‘miscarriage of justice’.  There 
was an additional proviso that, notwithstanding a ground was made out, the Court 
could dismiss the appeal if it was satisfied that ‘no substantial miscarriage of 
justice had occurred’.  Section 9 of the Act gave the Court wide discretion to, if 
thought to be in the interests of justice, order the production of any ‘document, 
exhibit or any other thing’ which appeared necessary to determine the case, as 
well as call any witnesses.  This afforded the Court the power to admit fresh 
evidence upon the application of an appellant.  Section 4(a) of the 1907 Act 
invited the Court to consider the factual accuracy of verdicts, and enter into the 
territory of the jury.  Allowing appeals on questions of fact was an important part 
of the 1907 Act, as ‘to say that the Court should hear arguments on points of law, 
and treat all findings of fact as conclusively established, would be to reduce the 
Court to futility’.457  
 
It will be observed that the Court’s powers under the 1907 Act were broad, yet 
fairly specific and explicit.  The textual difference between these powers and the 
single ground known as the ‘unsafety test’ is stark.  It may be said that section 4 
of the 1907 Act was a somewhat more ‘rule-based’ provision, whilst ‘unsafety’ is 
more open-textured and difficult to define.  In creating the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, it was envisaged that its role would be to correct ‘all matters such as the 
misapprehension of the judges, and the misleading of the jury, that [make] 
                                                          
456 The Court of Criminal Appeal was abolished by the Criminal Appeal Act 1966, to be replaced 
by the Court of Appeal Criminal and Civil Divisions.   
457 See Parl Deb HC 29 July 1907, vol 179, col 587-8.  
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criminal trials sometimes unsatisfactory’.458 Clearly, this envisaged some kind of 
critical scrutiny of the decisions of juries.  The Court’s powers recounted above, 
however, appeared ill-suited to this task.  In a debate on the Criminal Appeal Bill 
in 1907, concern was raised by F.E. Smith, who was later to serve as Lord 
Chancellor, that the Court’s powers would not serve its purpose.459  He noted that 
the Court’s proposed powers were based on the powers of the Court of Appeal, 
which at the time heard only civil appeals.460 He discussed the case of 
Metropolitan Railway Co. v Wright,461 in which the House of Lords considered the 
scope of review in civil cases.  In that case, the Earl of Selborne said that to 
overrule a civil jury’s decision there must be ‘such a preponderance of evidence 
… as to make it unreasonable, and almost perverse, that the jury when instructed 
and assisted properly by the judge should return such a verdict’.462 If this is what 
the Court’s powers were to be based upon, Smith argued, the Court’s powers 
would be seriously constrained.463  
 
The primary difficulty for the Court was section 4(a) which invited the Court to 
consider whether the verdict was unreasonable or not supported by the evidence.  
The controversy stemmed from under what circumstances the Court would, or 
could, decide a conviction was unreasonable or not supported by the evidence.  
The Court frequently made statements similar to that made by Earl Selborne in 
the civil context.  In the first appeal against conviction which was heard by the 
Court, the Lord Chief Justice said: ‘it must be understood that we are not here to 
retry the case where there was evidence proper to be left to the jury upon which 
they could come to the conclusion at which they had arrived’.464 In R v 
McGrath,465 Lord Goddard stated: ‘where there is evidence on which a jury can 
act and there has been a proper direction to the jury this court cannot substitute 
                                                          
458 ibid, 588. 
459 See Parl Deb HC 29 July 1907, vol 179, col 586-8 
460 ibid, col 634.  
461 (1886) 11 App Cas 152. 
462 ibid, 153. 
463 See n 459, above.  
464 R v Williamson (1909) 1 Cr App R 3 
465 [1949] 2 All ER 495. 
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itself for the jury and retry the case’.466 In an early review of the Court, Ross467 
noted that ‘so great has been the regard paid by the Court to “trial by jury” that 
cases are extremely rare in which the conviction has been quashed solely on the 
ground … [that it] was unreasonable’.468 He did note, however, that there was no 
such reluctance to put themselves in the place of the jury when deciding what 
effect a wrong decision on a question of law would have had on the jury.469 
 
By the 1950s concern began to grow that the Court was not operating as it should.  
Nobles and Schiff observe the 1950s as being the ‘high watermark of judicial non-
receptivity’ in particular in relation to fresh evidence under section 9 of the 1907 
Act.470 The only statutory question for the Court when asked to exercise its 
powers to receive fresh evidence was whether it was ‘necessary or expedient in 
the interest of justice’.  The Court created its own hurdles which an appellant had 
to surmount.  The hurdles to the admission of evidence were developed 
gradually471 and were summarised by Lord Parker in R v Parks472 as being:     
 
‘First, the evidence that it is sought to call must be evidence which was 
not available at the trial. Secondly…it must be evidence relevant to the 
issues. Thirdly, it must be evidence which is credible evidence in the 
sense that it is well capable of belief; it is not for this court to decide 
whether it is to be believed or not, but evidence which is capable of 
belief. Fourthly, the court will…consider whether there might have 
been a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the guilt of the 
appellant if that evidence had been given together with the other 
evidence at the trial’.473 
 
The operation of these rules, especially the rule requiring that the evidence was 
not available at trial, caused difficulties for appellants.  Spencer says that the 
                                                          
466 ibid, 497. 
467 RE Ross, The Court of Criminal Appeal (Butterworth & Co 1911). 
468 ibid, 88.  
469 ibid, 89-90. 
470 See R Nobles and D Schiff, Understanding Miscarriages of Justice: The Law, The Media, and 
the Inevitability of Crisis (Oxford University Press 2000) 61.  
471 See R Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844-1994 (Clarendon Press 1996), 131. 
472 (1962) 46 Cr App R 29. 
473 ibid, 32.   
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Court made its section 9 powers as narrow as possible by inventing a rule that 
fresh evidence was not fresh if it could, with due diligence, have been called by 
the defence at trial.474 Thus, fresh evidence which was missed due to 
incompetence was not fresh.  This approach to fresh evidence signalled that the 
Court was generally unreceptive to appeals based on fresh evidence or claims 
that the jury had simply made a mistake.  The Court would very frequently 
reiterate the exceptional nature of receiving fresh evidence, in order to avoid an 
appeal becoming a retrial.475    
 
The operation of the Court may have been hindered by the lack of a retrial power.  
The first major governmental report into the operation of the Court was the Tucker 
Committee.476 It was convened to consider whether the Court should be given 
the power to order a retrial, a power which was absent from the original Act.  It 
proposed by a majority that the Court should be granted the power to order a 
retrial when convictions were quashed on the basis of fresh evidence.  It was 
hoped by the majority of the Committee that providing the option of a retrial would 
make the Court more receptive to receiving fresh evidence.477  Although the 
Committee reported in 1954, it was not until the Criminal Appeal Act 1964 that 
the power to order a retrial was granted.478  
 
In 1964 the Parliamentary group JUSTICE issued a highly critical review of the 
Court, stating that ‘a very restricted view has been taken of the Court’s power’.479 
In 1965 the Donovan Committee issued its report into the constitution and 
decision-making of the Court.480 The Committee’s concerns stemmed from what 
                                                          
474 JR Spencer ‘Criminal Law and Criminal Appeals: The Tail that Wags the Dog’ [1982] Crim LR 
260, 264.  
475 For instance R v Brown (1910) 4 Cr App R 104; R v Tellett (1921) 15 Cr App R 159; R v 
Mason (1924) 17 Cr App R 160; See especially R v Rowland (1948) 32 Cr App R 29.  
Numerous other cases could just as easily have been cited.  
476 Departmental Committee on New Trials in Criminal Cases, Report, [Tucker Committee] (Cmd. 
9150, 1954). 
477 ibid, [25] 
478 Criminal Appeal Act 1964, s 1.     
479 JUSTICE Committee, Criminal Appeals (Stevens and Sons 1964) [59].  
480 Interdepartmental Committee on the Court of Criminal Appeal, Report, [The Donovan 
Committee] (Cmnd 2755, 1965). 
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it thought was a defect with the drafting of the 1907 Act.  It thought that the powers 
under section 4(a)-(c) of the 1907 Act overlapped and may have conflicted with 
each other.  As the Committee noted:  
 
‘If there was credible evidence both ways, and the jury accepted 
evidence pointing towards guilt, it is difficult to say that the verdict was 
‘unreasonable’ or could not ‘be supported having regard to the 
evidence’ or that there was a ‘miscarriage of justice’.481 
 
The Committee recommended reformulating the Court’s powers.  It also 
recommended that the Court of Criminal Appeal be abolished and the ‘Court of 
Appeal’ be split into Civil and Criminal Divisions.  Both changes were enacted by 
the Criminal Appeal Act 1966, and the changes, including the right to order a 
retrial, were consolidated by the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.  The powers of the 
Court became that it was to allow an appeal if it thought the conviction was: 
section 2: 
 
(a) unsafe or unsatisfactory; or 
(b) the judgment of the court of trial should be set aside on the ground of a 
wrong decision of any question of law; or 
(c) there was a material irregularity in the course of the trial. 
  
The ‘unsafe or unsatisfactory’ test was originally proposed as an amendment by 
F.E. Smith in the debate to the 1907 Bill, referred to above.482 The Attorney 
General rejected the amendment, due to his concern that the proposed 
amendment was ‘loose to the point of obscurity and of being unscientific, 
inasmuch as they would have no precision’.483 Nevertheless, sixty years later the 
Donovan Committee adopted Smith’s proposed wording.   
                                                          
481 ibid, [141]. 
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The Donovan Committee thought the new words were broader than the original 
formulation because it suspected that the new wording would lead to more 
convicted people applying to the Court, as they would ‘see new hope in the new 
provision’.484 It thought that even under the 1907 Act the Court occasionally ‘acted 
as a jury and come to the conclusion that on the totality of the evidence … it would 
be unsafe to allow the verdict of guilty to stand’.485 This was despite, under the 
1907 Act, it being doubtful whether they Court had that power.  The Committee 
thought that the ‘unsafe or unsatisfactory’ test would remove any doubt that the 
role of the Court is to do justice, ‘which includes the avoidance of possible 
injustice’.486  
 
The proviso allowing the Court to uphold a conviction if it was sure that there had 
been no ‘substantial miscarriage of justice’ was retained, subject to the deletion 
of the word ‘substantial’.  The Committee noted that there had been criticism 
relating to how the Court applied its powers to receive fresh evidence.487  Section 
9 of the 1907 Act became section 23 of the 1968 Act, which now provided that 
the Court had the power to receive fresh evidence if they thought it necessary or 
expedient in the interests of justice to do so.  This was coupled with the duty to 
admit evidence which was credible and relevant and there was an explanation 
for not adducing it at trial, unless it would not afford any ground for allowing the 
appeal.  The duty to admit fresh evidence if it was relevant and credible was 
recommended to conduce to Court to act in a way which would ensure ‘so far as 
possible that any miscarriages of justice will be avoided or corrected’.488   
 
There were two significant decisions shortly following the 1968 Act: R v 
Cooper,489 and Stafford v DPP.490 Lord Widgery in R v Cooper developed the 
doctrine of what is known as ‘lurking doubt’.  He stated that the new ‘unsafe or 
                                                          
484 Donovan Committee (n 480) at [150]. 
485 ibid, [148].  
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unsatisfactory’ ground meant something different to the ‘unreasonable or not 
supported by the evidence’ ground found in the 1907 Act.  The new test meant 
that if all the evidence had been before the jury, and the evidence was correctly 
summed up, the Court could still quash the conviction if they had a subjective 
sense of unease, or a ‘lurking doubt’ about the conviction.  Thus, the unsafe or 
unsatisfactory ground meant that the question for the Court was ‘whether there 
is not some lurking doubt in our minds which makes us wonder whether an 
injustice has been done’.491 The conviction in Cooper, based on disputed 
identification evidence, was subsequently quashed.   
 
Stafford v DPP492 concerned how the Court should deal with appeals raising fresh 
evidence.  The appellants argued that the Court of Appeal should be required to 
decide whether the fresh evidence might have raised a reasonable doubt in the 
mind of the jury – the ‘jury impact’ test, and argued that the Court should quash 
the conviction if they found it did.  This was said to be following Lord Parker in 
Parks (referred to above) who said that the Court was to decide whether the 
evidence was ‘credible in the sense that it is well capable of belief; it is not for this 
court to decide whether it is to be believed or not’.493 
 
This was rejected by the House of Lords, who held that the Court of Appeal is 
required to determine the impact of the fresh evidence on their own minds.  This 
is because section 2 of the 1968 Act required the Court to quash a conviction ‘if 
they think’ the conviction is unsafe or unsatisfactory.  Viscount Dilhorne doubted 
whether Lord Parker in R v Parks was laying down a rule of law that the Court of 
Appeal should consider the impact of the fresh evidence on the jury without 
considering what weight they give to the fresh evidence themselves.494 It was one 
way of determining the safety of the conviction, but the ultimate question for the 
Court of Appeal was whether they themselves thought the conviction was unsafe 
or unsatisfactory.  Viscount Dilhorne doubted whether there was a great deal of 
difference between the ‘jury impact’ test and the more ‘subjective test’, noting: ‘if 
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the Court has no reasonable doubt about the verdict, it follows that the Court does 
not think the jury could have one’.495      
 
The case was controversial.  Lord Devlin was particularly critical of the decision, 
arguing that it blurred the boundary between the judge and jury.496 The issue 
arises primarily in unsuccessful appeals, as it meant that some people were 
serving periods of imprisonment despite a jury having not heard all of the 
evidence.  Instead, judges had heard additional evidence, never seen by a jury, 
and decided that it could not have impacted the outcome of the trial.  This was 
seen as an infringement of the primacy of the jury.  It also appeared to be at odds 
with the Court’s own stated reluctance not to retry appellants and reach decisions 
of guilt or innocence themselves.  There appeared to be an uncomfortable 
divergence of positions – where the Court was prepared to ‘usurp’ the role of the 
jury and take it upon themselves when considering whether fresh evidence made 
a conviction unsafe or unsatisfactory, while at the same time stating that it was 
not their role.  This added to the increasingly confusing issue of the proviso, the 
‘lurking doubt’ principle, and the Court’s new powers of retrial.    
 
The 1983 Report by JUSTICE condemned the approach of the Court, summing 
it up as so:  
 
‘The Court has tied its own hands so that only a bad mistake by the 
trial judge in summing-up, some legal technicality, or fresh evidence, 
as narrowly defined by the 1968 Act, will result in the upsetting of a 
conviction’.497    
 
It was during the operation of the 1968 Act that the ‘greatest disaster to have 
shaken British justice’498 occurred.  This ‘disaster’, or ‘crisis’,499 was a series of 
high-profile miscarriages of justice which had not been rectified by the Court of 
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Appeal.  It culminated in numerous quashed convictions for very serious offences 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
The crisis peaked with the quashing of the convictions of the Birmingham Six.500 
Their convictions were quashed when fresh evidence revealed that the tests 
carried out by Home Office scientists could not distinguish between explosive 
nitro-glycerine, and chemicals found in every day products, such as cigarettes, 
playing cards and, possibly, the soap used by the scientists to clean their 
porcelain bowls.501 The day the Six were released from prison, the Home 
Secretary convened the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ).502 The 
RCCJ commissioned empirical research into the operation of the unsafe or 
unsatisfactory test under the 1968 Act, which was conducted by Kate Malleson.503 
She identified the particular problem areas for the Court as being its dealing with 
fresh evidence,504 the lurking doubt principle505 and the proviso.506  She analysed 
the first 300 cases decided in 1990 and found that only four convictions were 
quashed on the basis of fresh evidence.507 Most grounds of appeal were 
procedural grounds regarding errors which occurred at trial.508  In particular there 
was concern that cases with fresh evidence were often rejected or treated with 
great caution by the Court.509 Malleson found that, regarding fresh evidence, the 
Court took a subjective approach to assessing it despite the criticisms levelled 
towards Stafford.510 The amendments to the Court’s powers in the 1960s had led 
to no great change in approach, which she considered to be unduly restrictive.511 
She argued that the Court’s preoccupation was in preserving finality, which could 
be best served by rarely reopening factual issues.512   
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The RCCJ’s terms of reference were to ‘examine the effectiveness of the criminal 
justice system in England and Wales in securing the conviction of those guilty of 
criminal offences and the acquittal of those who are innocent’.513 Clearly, by its 
power to quash convictions, the Court has a key role to play in this.  The RCCJ 
was concerned that the Court appeared reluctant to consider whether the jury 
had reached a wrong decision when an appellant could point to no procedural 
irregularity as having occurred at trial.514 This was based partly upon Malleson’s 
empirical research which showed that appeals based on fresh evidence or lurking 
doubt (i.e. appeals not raising procedural irregularities) were unlikely to be 
successful when compared to procedural irregularity appeals.   
 
The Commission’s recommendations led to the enactment of the ‘unsafety test’, 
via amendment of the 1968 Act by the Criminal Appeal Act 1995.  The 1995 Act 
also created the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), as recommended 
by the Commission.  The CCRC has the power to refer appeals back to the Court 
of Appeal if it thinks there is a ‘real possibility’ that the Court will find the conviction 
to be unsafe.515  The Court’s power to receive fresh evidence is now contained in 
section 23 of the 1968 Act (as amended), which states that the Court has the 
power to receive fresh evidence if it thinks it is in the interests of justice to do so.  
When deciding whether it is in the interests of justice the Court should consider, 
(section 23(2)(a)), whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of 
belief; (b) whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground 
for allowing the appeal; (c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in 
the proceedings from which the appeal lies; and (d) whether there is a reasonable 
explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings.  Finally, 
the ‘proviso’, which allowed the Court to dismiss an appeal if it thought no 
miscarriage of justice had occurred, was abolished.    
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4.4 Analysis of the ‘unsafety test’ 
Dennis516 argued that the fundamental function of the Court since the enactment 
of the ‘unsafety test’ is to review the legitimacy of convictions.517 In particular, this 
means that the operation of the test is based upon whether the particular judges 
hearing the appeal, at the particular time that the appeal is heard, are sure of the 
factual accuracy of the conviction; its moral authority; and that the conviction is 
grounded in the rule of law.518  It is only if the Court can answer all of these 
questions affirmatively that convictions can be safe.   
 
As can be seen from the history of the Court discussed in the previous section, it 
has been by design that the Court’s powers have become progressively less 
explicit and somewhat more vague or open-textured.  Under the 1907 Act, the 
Court was constrained to only allow appeals in the absence of procedural 
irregularities if there was no evidence upon which a jury could have convicted.  
Since the jury did convict, it may be understood why this was hardly ever 
applicable.  If the jury convicted when there was insufficient evidence, this may 
constitute an error of the trial judge for not stopping the case on the basis of no 
case to answer.   
 
The RCCJ called upon the Court to generally be more ready to reverse jury 
verdicts than had been previously, and the ‘unsafety test’ was the way chosen to 
permit the Court the powers to do so whenever it thinks it just.519 Thus, whilst the 
‘unsafety test’ was designed to give the Court more general powers, it was done 
so with a proviso, or a hope / expectation, that it would exercise that discretion in 
a particular way; namely, in a more liberal way.  As will be explained below, this 
hope appears to have failed, as the test itself does not constrain the judges to 
deciding cases in a liberal way.  The test may be considered so ‘open-textured’ 
that it is has been necessary for the Court to interpret what it means, and to 
impose certain rules within its operation.  The extent to which the Court then 
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follows those rules in the operation of the test, is how the law governing appeals 
has been measured in this study.            
  
There have been two empirical studies of the Court since the enactment of the 
‘unsafety test’.  Roberts’s research was structured in ‘the qualitative method in 
conjunction with a purely descriptive quantitative analysis’.520 She presented a 
number of factors which could indicate the approach of the Court.  These were: 
the success rate of appeals; the numbers of applications for leave which were 
granted; how the Court dealt with fresh evidence and lurking doubt appeals; its 
approach to procedural irregularity appeals, including issues under the Human 
Rights Act 1998; and the use of its powers to order a retrial.521 She found that a 
falling overall success rate, and the low number of successful appeals on fresh 
evidence and lurking doubt appeals to be some evidence of a restrictive 
approach.522 She found that despite the RCCJ’s view that the Court of Appeal 
should be more open to quashing convictions in the absence of procedural 
irregularities, such appeals were rarely successful.523 Across her sample, only 
one appeal was allowed on the basis of the Court finding a ‘lurking doubt’, and 
only nine were allowed on the basis of fresh evidence.524  She concluded that 
attempts to liberalise the Court’s practice had failed, owing to the Court’s function 
of reviewing convictions rather than retrying appellants.525    
 
Heaton’s study526 reached similar conclusions.  He also found that fresh evidence 
and lurking doubt appeals were rarely successful.527 He found that the Court 
appeared to use the fresh evidence provisions in a restrictive way, ‘thus limiting 
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the number of successful appeals’.528 He further contended that the Court of 
Appeal ‘explicitly eschews interest in innocence in a significant number of cases.  
It also, by its reluctance to adopt a less restrictive approach to the receipt and 
evaluation of fresh evidence, represents a significant obstacle to those asserting 
innocence’.529   
 
These studies of the Court of Appeal’s decision-making has evaluated the Court 
from a particular perspective – what may be called the ‘wrongful conviction’ or 
‘miscarriage of justice’ perspective.530 Naughton argues that writers from the 
miscarriage of justice community can ‘identify the key difficulties … [for] the 
delivery of justice for innocent victims of wrongful convictions’ and form a 
‘counter-discourse on the existing arrangements’.531 In relation to the Court of 
Appeal, the difficulty is that it is said to have continued to have adopted a 
restrictive approach following the enactment of the ‘unsafety test’.  Although the 
Court has been criticised for not adapting its approach following the adoption of 
the ‘unsafety test’, it was suggested above that it should not have been surprising 
that the test does not appear to have liberalised the Court’s approach.   
 
This thesis approaches the analysis of the Court of Appeal from a differing 
perspective to previous studies.  This study is embedded in the ELS community.  
It may be said that this research complements, and is complemented by, previous 
research, but they ask different questions.  Previous studies have sought to 
discern the Court’s approach to determining appeals; this thesis asks whether the 
Court has the legitimacy to render decisions at all by holding the Court to a 
standard of impartiality.  Moreover, whilst previous research suggests that a 
‘restrictive approach’ is what leads some appeals to be allowed and some to be 
dismissed, this thesis asks whether there is an association between a range of 
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variables and outcomes.  It is discussed in Chapter 8 whether the concept of an 
‘approach’ is a solid enough foundation for empirical research.     
        
This study is not concerned with the same aspects of the Court’s decision-making 
as are some previous studies.  This thesis is not concerned with analysing 
decisions of particular cases and determining whether the outcomes of appeals 
are right or wrong.  Moreover, it does not address the question of how well the 
Court performs in correcting miscarriages of justice, or what its approach to 
correcting miscarriages of justice is.  What is involved in this study is a 
‘broadening of the traditional analytical approach’.532 This entails foregoing the 
ability to judge the nuances of particular cases in favour of a broad perspective 
on fact patterns and decision-making.533 It is not necessary to provide a definition 
of a miscarriage of justice, because whether a miscarriage of justice occurred or 
was rectified (or not) in a particular appeal is irrelevant to the analysis conducted 
here.  As such, there is no definition of a miscarriage of justice offered, and this 
thesis is neutral as to how well the Court performs in correcting miscarriages of 
justice, and has not sought to directly discern evidence of the Court’s approach.   
 
The previous research on the Court of Appeal is useful in explaining the 
institutional position of the Court.  Studies which analyse courts from the 
perspective of the ‘institutional model’ are interested in the extent to which the 
institutional norms of a court mediate judges’ preferences, and also how the law 
guides decision-making.534 In the Court of Appeal, the law which guides decision-
making is the interpretation of ‘unsafety test’.  There has been a considerable 
amount of jurisprudence from the Court of Appeal as to the meaning of unsafety 
and its relationship with other concepts, such as unfairness.  It is these norms 
which are captured within the legal variable which is analysed in the binary logistic 
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regression models shown in Chapter 7.  The remainder of this chapter analyses 
the ‘unsafety test’.    
 
4.5 The meaning of unsafety 
As will be explained below, some kinds of appeals are automatically unsafe.535  
For the rest, and this is the majority, the unsafety test is an example of 
counterfactual reasoning.536 This means that the Court must take what did 
happen (all the circumstances of the trial and conviction), and decide what would 
have happened if some other hypothetical events had occurred.  For instance, if 
an error had not occurred, or if the ‘fresh evidence’ had been available at trial.  
The Court must determine whether what went wrong at trial leads them to believe 
that the conviction is unsafe, and the usual way to do this is to ask whether they 
think a guilty verdict would still have been returned if the error had not occurred 
or the jury had heard the fresh evidence.  Thus, the Court frequently will operate 
a ‘jury impact’ test, despite the Court frequently reiterating that its test is the 
‘unsafety test’.  The ‘unsafety test’ could be understood as a hypothesis test 
similar in character to those employed in this thesis.  In appeals against 
conviction, the null hypothesis is that the conviction is safe.  The conviction will 
only be unsafe if there is sufficient doubt that the conviction is just or legitimate.  
 
The word ‘unsafe’ appears to carry little independent meaning itself.  Cohen 
famously referred to the ‘thingification’ of legal concepts.537 By this he meant that 
legal concepts, such as property, do not create rights themselves but ‘merely 
[recognise] a pre-existent Something’.538  As the review of the history of the Court 
showed, the ‘unsafety test’, as well as the previous tests, was introduced to seek 
to assist the Court in achieving the inchoate ends of doing justice.  This appears 
to ‘thingify’ the concept of doing justice in individual cases.  The ‘unsafety test’ 
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appears open-textured, but the discretion of judges is not wholly unfettered.  If 
the unsafety test did offer unfettered discretion, judges would be able to decide 
cases however they wished, and the law would play little role.  This would be 
indicative of, as attitudinal researchers argued, the law being a ‘cloak’ for judges 
pursuing policy goals.  However, as discussed below, the discretion is tempered 
by rules.  
 
The jurisprudence of the Court provides guidance, based upon legal rules, as to 
how the test should be exercised in certain circumstances.  Mantell LJ in R v 
Davis, Rowe, and Johnson539 (the case of the M25 Three), said that the Court 
should apply the principle from Stirland v DPP540 when determining whether a 
conviction is unsafe.  Stirland was authority for how the ‘proviso’ should be utilised 
under the 1907 and 1968 Acts.  The House of Lords in Stirland applied the proviso 
and upheld the conviction because ‘there was an overwhelming case proved 
against the appellant … no reasonable jury, after a proper summing up, could 
have failed to convict the appellant’.541 In Woolmington v DPP542 the House of 
Lords declined to apply the proviso and the conviction was quashed, because 
‘we cannot say that if the jury had been properly directed they would have 
inevitably come to the same conclusion’.543  
 
To apply the proviso the Court had to be sure that ‘no reasonable jury could have 
failed to convict’ or be sure that the jury would ‘inevitably come to the same 
conclusion’.  Mantell LJ in Davis adopted this test and stated that the Court had 
to consider ‘would a reasonable jury have been bound to return verdicts of 
guilty?’544 Under the proviso, if the only reasonable verdict was one of guilty the 
proviso would be applied and the conviction upheld; under the ‘unsafety test’ the 
conviction will simply be safe.  Thus, whilst the test for the Court is always whether 
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the conviction is unsafe, the Court often in effect must place itself in the position 
of the jury and try to predict what the outcome would have been.    
 
An early case decided under the ‘unsafety test’ is R v CCRC ex parte Pearson.545 
Lord Bingham acknowledged that ‘trials by judge and jury may on occasion result 
in wrongful convictions’546 and that the Court of Appeal ‘exists to correct such 
errors in appeals brought before it’.547 The expression ‘unsafe,’ he said, ‘does not 
lend itself to precise definition’ but:  
 
‘In some cases unsafety will be obvious, as (for example) where it 
appears that someone other than the appellant committed the crime 
… or where a conviction is shown to be vitiated by serious unfairness 
in the conduct of the trial or significant legal misdirection … Cases 
however arise in which unsafety is much less obvious: cases in which 
the Court, although by no means persuaded of an appellant's 
innocence, is subject to some lurking doubt or uneasiness whether an 
injustice has been done.  If … the Court entertains real doubts whether 
the appellant was guilty of the offence, the Court will consider the 
conviction unsafe’.548 
 
From this passage, it will be seen that if the Court thinks somebody else 
committed the offence, i.e. ‘is innocent’, or even merely entertains ‘real doubts’ 
or a ‘lurking doubt’ about guilt, the conviction will be unsafe.  This shows that the 
Court clearly does have an interest in determining whether an appellant is 
innocent.  Naughton is critical of this passage and suggests that Lord Bingham’s 
statement is a ‘highly misleading form of judicial communication to the public’.549 
He utilises the cases of Stefan Kiszko and Sean Hodgson as evidence of the 
Court taking a legalistic approach rather than an approach focussed upon 
correcting the conviction of the factually innocent.550 Naughton states that these 
convictions were not overturned because they were factually innocent, but 
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because they were able to show a breach of process or produce fresh evidence 
that was not available at the time.   
 
This argument is not persuasive as Naughton does not appear to appreciate that 
the convictions were quashed because the fresh evidence proved (as far as 
possible) the appellants were innocent at the time of the appeal.  In Lord Judge 
in Hodgson551 stated that there was no police misconduct, no untruthful or 
mistaken witnesses, and nothing done by anybody at trial could be criticised.552 
The conviction was quashed because fresh DNA evidence destroyed any 
possible link between Hodgson and the murder victim, leading to the conclusion 
that somebody else must have been the killer.553 This is in contrast with Davis, 
where at the time of the appeal their innocence was not proved, and so the 
conviction had to be quashed only on the basis of the police malpractice.        
 
It will be observed that Lord Bingham’s understanding of the unsafety test means 
that convictions can be unsafe for a wide variety of reasons, including belief in 
innocence, unfair trials, or a lurking doubt.  All these grounds for finding a 
conviction unsafe adhere to Dennis’s argument that the judges must be satisfied 
in the legitimacy of convictions if they are to be safe.  With this general 
understanding of the ‘unsafety test’ in mind, the next section explains under what 
circumstances convictions will be unsafe on the basis of unfairness or procedural 
irregularities.     
 
4.6 Procedural irregularities and unfairness 
Although the concept of a fair trial far predates 1998, the Human Rights Act 1998 
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into English law.  The 
effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 is that a breach of Article 6 can be argued 
in British courts, for instance, as a ground for quashing a conviction.  This raises 
the question of the relationship between unsafety and unfairness.  It is 
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uncontroversial that convictions can be unsafe even if a trial was fair.554 This can 
arise when the Court has any lurking, or greater, doubt about the factual accuracy 
of the verdict (or is sure that it is factually inaccurate).  As stated in Hodgson, 
discussed above, under such circumstances the conviction will be unsafe, even 
if the trial was entirely properly conducted and fair.   
 
The question of whether a finding that a trial was unfair trial will always render a 
conviction unsafe is far more complex.  As Dennis explained, the Court initially 
answered this question in four different ways.555  The case of R v Forbes556 
adopted an ‘absolutist’557 position, in that it was stated that if ‘a defendant’s right 
to a fair trial has been infringed, a conviction will be held to be unsafe’.558 A ‘quasi-
absolutist’559 position was adopted by the Court of Appeal in R v Togher.560 In 
Togher the Court of Appeal said ‘if a defendant has been denied a fair trial it will 
be almost inevitable that the conviction will be regarded as unsafe’.561 ‘Almost 
inevitable’ represents a retreat from the absolutist position, but suggests that an 
unfair trial will be likely render a conviction unsafe.  In Togher, the reason that the 
unfairness did not make the conviction inevitably unsafe appears to be that the 
appellants had pleaded guilty to the offence, and the unfairness did not influence 
their decision to plead guilty. There was thus no reason to doubt the factual 
accuracy of the verdict. 
 
Some cases adopted a more cautious approach, in which whether an unfair trial 
made a conviction unsafe was contingent upon all the circumstances of the 
case.562 An example of this ‘contingent position’ is R v Davis, Rowe and 
Johnson.563  In that case, the appellants had received a ruling from the European 
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Court of Human Rights that the trial had been unfair.564 In the Court of Appeal, 
Mantell LJ said it was the nature and degree of the unfairness which determined 
whether the conviction was unsafe and this would depend upon the 
circumstances of the particular case.565 He explicitly ‘[rejected] … the contention 
that a finding of a breach of Article 6(1) by the ECHR leads inexorably to the 
quashing of the conviction’.566    
 
The fourth and final position identified by Dennis is that there is no relationship 
between unsafety and unfairness unless the unfairness leads to doubt about the 
factual accuracy of the verdict.567 This is derived from Auld LJ’s judgment in R v 
Chalkley,568 which was decided prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998.  The appellants had pleaded guilty based on recordings obtained when 
covert listening devices were illicitly placed in their homes.  The trial judge 
accepted that the instillation of the listening devices was illegal.569 Auld LJ said 
that, despite the ‘unsafety test’ being designed to induce the Court to be more 
liberal, ‘the new provision … may be … narrower than before’.570 He held that the 
deletion of the ‘unsatisfactory’ part of the test meant that the Court now ‘has no 
power to allow an appeal if it does not think the conviction unsafe but is 
dissatisfied in some way with what went on at the trial’.571 Accordingly, the appeal 
was dismissed because ‘by their guilty pleas, they intended to admit their guilt, 
and that their convictions are, therefore, safe.’572   
 
The decision in Chalkley could be considered a narrow interpretation of the test.  
It meant that the Court would have very little power to oversee the conduct of 
State officials.  This is despite, in R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court ex parte 
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Bennett,573 Lord Griffiths accepting on behalf of the judiciary the ‘responsibility for 
the maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a willingness to oversee 
executive action’.574 The decision in Chalkley must now be considered to have 
been decided incorrectly on principle.   The Court of Appeal in R v Mullen575 held 
that a conviction can be unsafe even if the Court is sure of its factual accuracy, 
because ‘for a conviction to be safe, it must be lawful’.576 Mullen was convicted 
of conspiracy to cause explosions due to being part of an IRA cell, and was 
sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.  After serving ten years imprisonment, he 
discovered that he had been illegally extradited from Zimbabwe (to where he had 
fled) following collusion between the British and Zimbabwean secret services.  
The Court found this to be a ‘blatant and extremely serious failure to adhere to 
the rule of law’ and so quashed the conviction’.577 
 
Dennis argued that the relationship between unfairness and unsafety is that if the 
unfairness is so severe that the conviction loses its legitimacy, such as Mullen, 
the conviction will be quashed.578 Most appeals do not concern irregularities as 
serious as this, and so are concerned with the effect of a violation on the question 
of the safety of the conviction.579 In particular, the effect must be that the outcome 
of the trial could reasonably have been different.580 As was stated above, this 
involves an element of counterfactual reasoning as to what would have happened 
if the irregularity had not occurred.  Thus, whilst the ‘unsafety test’ provided the 
Court with a level of discretion to determine its own powers, it has indicated the 
circumstances in which unfairness or irregularities will render a conviction unsafe.  
This, it is argued, is now part of the unsafety test.  
 
Some procedural irregularities, if found to have occurred, as a matter of logic 
must render convictions unsafe.  If the error is of a type that the trial should have 
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been stopped before a verdict was reached, it follows that any verdict must be 
unsafe.  This applies when, for instance, the Court decides that the trial judge 
should have accepted an application of no case to answer, or should have 
accepted an application to stay the proceedings.  In R v Smith581 Mantell LJ 
opined that if the Court decides that the trial judge should have accepted an 
application of no case to answer made after the completion of the prosecution 
case, the conviction must be quashed, even if something is said later which 
proves the appellant’s guilt.582 In R v Broadhead583 a conviction for murder was 
quashed because ‘it follows that, but for the ruling, the jury’s verdict would have 
been different.  It would have been to acquit the defendant on the direction of the 
judge’.584             
 
For procedural irregularity errors which are not presumptively unsafe, or do not 
make the trial unfair, the Court exercises a higher degree of discretion under the 
unsafety test.  It must also operate the ‘jury impact’ test.  If a procedural 
irregularity is found to have occurred, the conviction is only prima facie unsafe.  
A further step is required; it must be decided whether ‘the outcome of the trial 
might have been different but for the irregularity’.585 The same approach is 
observed by Spencer, who notes that usually the Court ‘will uphold the conviction 
if it is convinced that the defendant is really guilty, and would still have been 
convicted even if the irregularity had not taken place’.586    
  
The Court has frequently reiterated that this is a two-step process: if an error was 
found the Court must still usually decide whether the error makes the conviction 
unsafe.  This two stage test can be seen in R v Beedall where the appeal against 
a conviction for rape was dismissed as ‘no injury was done’ to the safety of the 
conviction by the trial judge’s error in summing up.587 In R v Jheeta, where the 
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Court found that the appellant was wrongly advised by his legal advisors to plead 
guilty to rape, the conviction was safe as the Court ‘entertained no reservations’ 
that he was, in fact, guilty of rape and his guilty plea reflected that fact.588 In R v 
Dada589 the appeal against convictions for rape was dismissed despite there 
being a ‘number of unsatisfactory features about [the] case’ as ‘none of these 
matters bear on the safety of the conviction, they are concerned with the proper 
conduct of the trial.’ 590 The relationship between the finding of an error and the 
outcome of an appeal against conviction is an important consideration in this 
thesis.  This is because the presence of an error, and its effect on the safety of a 
conviction, has been utilised as a measurement of the law orbiting appeals.   
 
4.7 Fresh evidence appeals  
Fresh evidence appeals raise different issues to appeals based upon procedural 
irregularities or an unfair trial.  This is because they are based upon factual 
evidence which a jury has never seen.  In R v Pendleton591 the House of Lords 
affirmed the subjective Stafford approach was the correct way to assess fresh 
evidence.592 In Pendleton appellant argued that ‘it is not permissible for appellate 
judges … to make their own decision on the significance or credibility of the 
evidence’.593 He had argued that the Court should always allow an appeal if it 
thought the fresh evidence might raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury.  
This ‘jury impact’ test might be considered a more liberal test because it may 
prevent the judges dismissing appeals if they personally remain sure of guilt when 
credible fresh evidence is produced.  It may also be said that the jury impact test 
preserves the normative position of the jury, by requiring convictions to be 
quashed if credible fresh evidence, never seen by a jury, is uncovered.     
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Lord Bingham rejected that the ‘jury impact’ test should be used to determine 
fresh evidence appeals.  He pointed out that it is ‘anomalous for the Court to 
quash a conviction if it raised no doubt whatever in their minds but might have 
raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury’.594 However, he suggested 
that recourse to the ‘jury impact’ test might be appropriate in certain 
circumstances:  
 
‘it will usually be wise for the Court of Appeal, in a case of any difficulty, 
to test their own provisional view by asking whether the evidence, if 
given at the trial, might reasonably have affected the decision of the 
trial jury to convict. If it might, the conviction must be thought to be 
unsafe’.595 
 
This could be considered a narrower interpretation of the fresh evidence 
provisions, because it could be argued that Lord Bingham sought to reduce the 
scope of the ‘jury impact’ test by limiting its use to ‘cases of difficulty’.596 This 
criticism is unwarranted because it is difficult to foresee many contested cases in 
the Court of Appeal which would not be a ‘case of difficulty’.597  Lord Bingham 
allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction because, although the Court of 
Appeal had applied the correct test:  
 
‘In the light of … this fresh psychological evidence it is impossible to 
be sure that this conviction is safe, and that is so whether the members 
of the House ask whether they themselves have reason to doubt the 
safety of the conviction or whether they ask whether the jury might 
have reached a different conclusion … In holding otherwise the Court 
of Appeal strayed beyond its true function of review and made findings 
which were not open to it in all the circumstances. Indeed, it came 
perilously close to considering whether the appellant, in its judgment, 
was guilty’.598  
                                                          
594 ibid.  
595 ibid. (Emphasis added). 
596 See SJ Heaton, A Critical Evaluation of Using Innocence as a Criterion in the Post-Conviction 
Process (DPhil Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2013) 194.  
597 See H Blaxland and P Wilcock ‘Fresh Evidence in Criminal Appeals – Pendleton Revisited’ 
(2006) Arch News 4.  
598 Pendleton (n 591) [28] (Emphasis added). 
126 
 
It appears that Lord Bingham was conferring a power upon the Court to quash 
convictions on the basis of fresh evidence if it is not satisfied that the jury would 
still have convicted.  It can reach this conclusion either because the fresh 
evidence causes the Court to think the conviction is unsafe, or because it thinks 
it may have impacted the jury.  What Lord Bingham was emphasising in 
Pendleton is that, however the decision is reached, the primary test for the Court 
is unsafety.  The confusion which arises is that whilst judges avoid admitting to 
utilising the jury impact test in fresh evidence appeals, the jury impact test, as 
discussed above, is integral to the unsafety test itself.  This is concomitant with 
the counterfactual nature of the ‘unsafety test’ – the judges must decide what 
would have happened if some counterfactual state had occurred.  In the case of 
fresh evidence, this will often mean the judges must decide what would have 
happened if the jury had been aware of the evidence in order to decide whether 
it is unsafe.    
 
Lord Hobhouse in Pendleton said that ‘in my judgment it is not right to attempt to 
look into the minds of the members of the jury … it is for the Court of Appeal to 
answer … do we think that the conviction was unsafe?599 He agreed that the 
conviction should have been quashed, but this was not due to the fresh evidence 
but because the verdict was inconsistent with the directions of the trial judge.600 
While Lord Bingham left open the ‘jury impact’ test (at the same time clarifying 
that it was not the sole test), Lord Hobhouse rejected the appellant’s position that 
he was ‘seeking to escape from the verdict of a jury merely upon the possibility 
(which will exist in almost every case) that the jury might have returned a different 
verdict’.601 
 
Lord Hobhouse’s view appeared to have been followed in a number of cases.  In 
Dial and Dottin v Trinidad and Tobago,602 Lord Brown stated that: ‘the primary 
question is for the Court itself and is not what effect the fresh evidence would 
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have had on the mind of the jury’.603  He added that ‘the question arising for the 
Appeal Court's determination is whether [the fresh evidence] realistically places 
the appellant's guilt in reasonable doubt’.604  It could be argued that this is 
narrower, because the Court stressed the subjective approach and may have 
relegated the ‘jury impact’ test to an ‘optional safeguard’.605 As Blaxland and 
Wilcock argued, this statement appears to contradict Lord Bingham’s statement 
in Pendleton that the Court’s role is to assess safety, not guilt.606 It is submitted, 
however, that Dial is consistent with Pendleton and that both adopt the jury impact 
test.  As Lord Brown in Dial stated: ‘if the Court regards the case as a difficult 
one, it may find it helpful to test its view “by asking whether the evidence, if given 
at the trial, might reasonably have affected the decision of the trial jury to 
convict”’.607 This clearly does not rule out the ‘jury impact’ test. 
 
Dial was a majority decision, with Lord Steyn in the minority, stressing that the 
question for the Court was what the jury would have made of the fresh 
evidence.608  The dispute between the majority and the minority in Dial was not 
the nature of the test, which both endorsed Lord Bingham’s statement in 
Pendleton, but what factors will make a case a ‘case of difficulty’.  It is submitted 
that majority found that it was not a case of difficulty because the fresh evidence 
did not realistically place the appellants’ guilt in any reasonable doubt (i.e. they 
were sure the jury would still have convicted), while the minority thought it was a 
case of difficulty and the fresh evidence could have impacted the decision of the 
jury.   
 
As Ashworth and Redmayne say, while it may appear that ‘all is chaos’,609 the 
law is clear.  It can appear to be chaos, but that is because the outcomes of 
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appeals depend upon the opinions of the judges as to the overall strength of the 
case.610 As they state, if the Court is sure of the safety or unsafety of the 
conviction, it will not need to apply the ‘jury impact’ test.611 It is submitted that this 
is the correct approach for the Court to take, if fulfilling its role in reviewing 
whether it is satisfied that the conviction is factually accurate, and this is what it 
does do.       
 
Recently, the Court of Appeal in R v Garland612 has reaffirmed Pendleton.  
Namely, Lloyd Jones LJ stated that ‘the ultimate question for our consideration is 
whether the material causes us to doubt the safety of the conviction’.613 However, 
in addressing the question of unsafety, they had ‘regard to the question of what 
impact the withheld material might have had on the jury’.614 Whilst this may 
appear to be further reducing the scope of the ‘jury impact’ test, as Blaxland noted 
most cases in which fresh evidence is received must be considered ‘cases of 
difficulty’ at least requiring consideration of what impact the fresh evidence would 
have had on the jury.615     
 
The controversy regarding the Court’s reception of fresh evidence is perhaps best 
explained by Hughes LJ’s comments in R v Ahmed.616 In this case Hughes LJ 
explained clearly why the ‘jury impact’ test cannot be the determinative test in 
fresh evidence appeals, but should instead be a confirmatory test of the judges’ 
views.  If the ‘jury impact’ test means that the Court should quash the conviction 
if the fresh evidence might have influenced the jury, then it is likely that all fresh 
evidence appeals would be successful.  This is because ‘it will be impossible to 
be 100% sure that [the fresh evidence] might not have had some impact on the 
jury’s deliberations, since, ex hypoethesi the jury has not seen the fresh 
material’.617 Thus, as Blaxland states, the correct test must be whether the jury 
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might reasonably have not convicted if they had received the fresh evidence.618 
This is, as seen, the ‘unsafety test’ as explained by Mantell LJ in Davis, and 
discussed above.     
 
Before deciding the effect of any fresh evidence the Court must decide whether 
to formally receive it.  This is quite an artificial process because the judges will 
usually hear the evidence de bene esse before formally deciding to admit it.  The 
Court has the power to receive fresh evidence if it thinks it is ‘necessary in the 
interests of justice’, by section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.  In determining 
whether it is in the interests of justice, the Court is required to consider: 23(2)(a) 
whether the evidence is capable of belief; (b) whether the evidence may afford a 
ground for allowing the appeal; (c) whether the evidence would be admissible; 
and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for failing to adduce the 
evidence at trial.  These tests are not determinative of whether it is in the interests 
of justice to receive the evidence but are designed to assist the Court in deciding 
whether it is in the interests of justice.619 As was made clear in R v Erskine, if the 
Court thinks that the fresh evidence makes the conviction unsafe it will always be 
in the interests of justice to receive it, even if it was technically not ‘fresh’.620   
 
4.8 Lurking doubt appeals  
When the concept of quashing convictions on the basis of a ‘lurking doubt’ was 
created by Lord Widgery in R v Cooper, 621 it was envisaged that the Court would 
consider whether there was some ‘subjective sense of unease … which makes 
us wonder whether an injustice has been done’.622  Recently, the Court of Appeal 
in R v Pope623 expanded upon the doctrine.  Lord Judge said that:  
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‘It is not open to the Court to set aside the verdict on the basis of some 
collective, subjective judicial hunch that the conviction is or may be 
unsafe ... “lurking doubt” requires reasoned analysis of the evidence 
or the trial process, or both, which leads to the inexorable conclusion 
that the conviction is unsafe’.624    
  
This was based on Leigh’s article which suggested that the phrase ‘lurking doubt’ 
was actually little more than a rhetorical flourish on the unsafety test.625 Leigh 
argued that in cases purporting to have been successful on the basis of an 
‘inchoate hunch’ (a ‘lurking doubt’) were in fact explainable on other grounds.626 
Leigh argued that it was ‘more principled’ for the Court to take a narrower 
approach which respects the position of the jury.627  
 
As discussed above, research on the decision-making of the Court has found that 
appeals based on ‘lurking doubt’ are unlikely to be successful.  If the ‘unsafety 
test’ is understood as requiring counterfactual reasoning it becomes clearer why 
this is the case.  The unsafety test requires the Court to decide whether, given 
what the Court now knows by the time of the appeal, it is sure that the jury would 
still have convicted.  In lurking doubt appeals, the Court does not know anything 
that the jury did not know, i.e., there is no ‘counterfactual’ for the Court to 
consider.  Indeed, it could be argued that the Court knows considerably less than 
the jury because it does not see or hear all the witnesses.  The appellant is unable 
to point to any concrete reason why the jury might have made a mistake.  If the 
Court was to begin to be more liberal in allowing appeals on the basis of lurking 
doubt, this could begin to undermine confidence in most convictions, as it is 
almost always theoretically plausible that the jury could have made a mistake.  
The Court must strike a balance between undermining the jury in this way, and 
seeking to correct injustice.       
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4.9 Conclusion 
The ‘unsafety test’, under which the Court of Appeal has now operated for twenty 
years, is a product of the Court’s chequered history in dealing with miscarriages 
of justice.  The ‘unsafety test’ appears to provide the Court with broad discretion, 
but the Court has provided relatively clear guidance as to when a conviction will 
be unsafe.   It has been argued that the essence of the unsafety test is whether, 
if the jury had known what the Court knows by the time of the appeal, all things 
considered, could a different verdict have reasonably been delivered?  This 
means that the Court must first decide whether the position is any different at the 
time of appeal than it was at the time of trial, and, if so, whether that means the 
verdict could have been different.  Whilst this does entail a degree of discretion, 
the Court has explained what circumstances will lead to convictions becoming 
unsafe.  The ‘legal model’ of judicial decision-making, therefore, could be said to 
stipulate that the Court should apply the test in this way, as explained by the 
Court’s jurisprudence.  The Court is not entirely unconstrained in how it deals with 
appeals against conviction, but the ‘unsafety test’ itself entails certain principles 
which must be followed.  This understanding of the ‘unsafety test’ forms the basis 
of the ‘legal variable’ discussed in the remaining chapters of this thesis.  If this is 
how the Court is designed to operate, and this is how it in fact operates, this is a 
counterweight to the factual and demographic variables used, and is a measure 
of the legal model.       
 
The remainder of this thesis is concerned with the empirical analysis of the 
Court’s decisions.  The next two chapters explain methods employed in the 
analysis, and the variables collected from each appeal in the study.  The 
significant limitations of these methods are expressed.  These chapters are 
important because they explain the measures of impartiality, which will allow for 
evaluation of how successful this thesis has been as measuring that concept.  As 
was discussed in Chapter 3, the approach adopted in this thesis is quantitative 
and positivistic, and seeks to adhere to a replication standard.  It is explained in 
the next two chapters how this is achieved.   
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Chapter 5 
Study Design, Data Collection and Methods of Analysis 
  
Introduction 
This chapter explains how impartiality has been captured, on the basis of its 
‘observable implications’. Data have been collected from Court of Appeal 
transcripts by a process of quantitative content analysis.  These have then been 
converted into independent variables.  As this study is an empirical analysis of 
the concept of impartiality, it must be asked whether, or how far, the measures 
are valid, reliable, and replicable.  This thesis employs hypothesis testing in 
exploring whether the variables are associated with the decisions of the Court.  
This chapter explains what is meant by hypothesis testing, p-values and statistical 
significance, and how this helps to overcome some of the problems caused by 
the ‘fundamental problem of causal inference’.  It will be explained that this thesis 
is concerned with correlation, not causation, and the limitations of this approach.     
 
The study conducted in this thesis concerns only murder and rape appeals.  The 
decision to only include these offences is explained in this chapter.  Summary 
statistics relating to the murder and rape appeals in the sample, and how these 
relate to variables in the study, is provided.  Finally, the binary logistic regression 
analysis procedure is explained, and it is shown how this is the appropriate 
procedure to address the research question raised in Chapter 1.    
 
5.1 Quantitative content analysis  
In order to explore the Court’s decision-making, the information in Court of Appeal 
judgments is converted into numbers (i.e., ‘coded’) for analysis.  This is done 
following a process of a quantitative content analysis.  Riffe, Lacy and Fico define 
quantitative content analysis as being the:  
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‘systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, 
which have been assigned numeric values according to valid 
measurement rules and the analysis of relationships involving those 
values using statistical methods … to draw inferences’.628   
 
Quantitative content analysis ‘[reduces] communication phenomena into 
manageable data (e.g. numbers)’ which can then be examined statistically.629 
Three terms from the above definition are crucial to quantitative research: 
‘systematic’, ‘replicable’, and ‘valid measurement’. This study has been designed 
to conform to these standards to allow for the analysis of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision-making.  The extent to which this has been achieved is a key component 
of this thesis.   
 
‘Systematic’ quantitative content analysis ‘requires identification of key terms or 
concepts involved in a phenomenon, specification of possible relationships 
amongst concepts, and generation of testable hypotheses regarding the potential 
relationships.630 The key concept under analysis in this thesis is impartiality, 
which was defined and explained in Chapter 2.  The ‘phenomenon’ under analysis 
in this thesis is that some appeals are allowed and some are dismissed.  This 
thesis seeks to explore the relationship between independent variables as a 
measurement of whether the Court appeared to have decided appeals 
impartially.  The data collection is systematic because a set of hypotheses have 
been developed in relation to the possible relationship between independent 
predictor variables and the outcome of appeals against conviction.  The 
hypotheses and variables used in this study are fully explained in Chapter 6.    
 
‘Replicability’ is an essential component of quantitative analysis.  It requires an 
‘exactness’ to the research definitions and operations so that later readers can 
fully understand what was done.631 In relation to Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) 
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concerning judges, Epstein and King argued that ‘good empirical work adheres 
to the replication standard’, in that another researcher should be able to 
‘understand, evaluate, build on, and reproduce the research without any 
additional information’.632 It is only by following this standard, Epstein and King 
argue, that it is possible to know that the research is not biased and so can 
present knowledge about the court under observation.633  
 
‘Valid measurement’ (or ‘validity’) in quantitative content analysis means that the 
data collected must accurately represent what is being measured.634 In relation 
to this study, this means that the measures used (the independent variables) 
must accurately capture the underlying concept of impartiality.635 Epstein and 
King argued that to produce reliable and valid inferences, researchers should, 1) 
invoke theories that produce observable implications, 2) extract as many 
implications as possible, and 3) delineate how they plan to observe those 
implications.636 As discussed in Chapter 1, the variables collected in this study do 
not completely capture the principle of impartiality; the measures do not, 
therefore, have full validity.  This limits the strength of conclusions which can be 
drawn regarding the Court’s impartiality.    
 
As Hall and Wright argued, content analysis appears particularly appropriate as 
an ELS methodology, because it resembles what lawyers and legal scholars 
already do.637 ‘Black-letter’ legal scholars frequently read a series of cases, 
collect information, and discuss their significance.  Content analysis can bring a 
systematic rigour to the analysis of cases, which provides ‘a way of generating 
objective, falsifiable, and reproducible knowledge about what courts do and why 
they do it’.638 They argued that content analysis is more useful for some kinds of 
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legal analyses than for others.  They note four different uses of content analysis 
in empirical legal research:  
 
1) projects investigating the bare outcomes of legal disputes,  
2) projects investigating the legal principles of case outcomes,  
3) projects investigating the facts and reasons that contribute to case outcomes, 
and  
4) ‘jurimetrics’ that attempt to predict the impact of facts on litigation.639  
 
They argue that content analysis can work well for the first three, but that 
jurimetrics overreaches the epistemological aims of content analysis.640      
 
This study could be considered ‘jurimetric’, but it is important to note that there is 
no attempt to predict future decisions.  It would best be considered research of 
category 3.  As Hall and Wright say, their third category is suggestive of research 
which seeks to ‘document trends in case law and the factors that appear 
important to case outcomes’.641 Category 3 research can be contrasted with 
‘jurimetrics’, which seeks to ‘predict the likely outcome of litigation or appeals 
based on real-world or trial-record views of the facts’.642 This thesis does not seek 
to predict the outcome of future litigation but seeks to discover which variables 
are ‘predictors’ of the outcomes of appeals which have already been decided.  As 
Hall and Wright note, to predict future cases it would need to be assumed that 
the information provided in judgments is a complete reflection of everything which 
contributed to the decision.  This is an assumption which is unlikely to hold.643     
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The quantitative content analysis of Court of Appeal judgments was the method 
of collecting the data.  These data are designed to offer some measurement of 
the impartiality of the Court.  The principles behind the measurement of is now 
considered.  The particular variables designed to provide a measurement of 
impartiality are discussed in Chapter 6.  The variables are also listed in Appendix 
A, readers who wish to review the variables earlier may want to turn to Appendix 
A.      
  
5.2 Measuring impartiality  
Epstein and Martin argued that conceptual questions can be answered indirectly 
by stating what the observable implications are of the concept which is being 
addressed.644  The observable implications of a theory are what would be 
expected to be seen in the data if the theory was true. The observable 
implications then help form hypotheses which are tested by the study.  Stating 
what would be expected to be seen if the Court of Appeal was impartial allows 
impartiality to be tested by determining whether those expected observable 
implications did occur in the data collected.  It is by ensuring that the variables 
under analysis derive from these hypotheses which test the normative question 
that one can ensure that research is theory-driven.645 By stipulating the 
observable implications of the concept, it is possible to identify objective 
measurements of the concept.   
 
In order to understand how the observable implications of impartiality were 
developed it is helpful initially to see the design of social science research 
projects as following a process.  It is by following a research design process that 
it is possible to ensure that the normative question can be addressed as closely 
as possible. Black suggested the following research design process:646  
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1. State questions and hypotheses, identify variables 
2. Determine design structure 
3. Identify population and sample 
4. Select statistical tests for assessing hypotheses 
5. Carry out, plan, and collect data 
6. Analyse, draw conclusions, and evaluate 
 
The researcher can go back to previous stages as the research progresses, for 
instance to modify the research questions, or to formulate new, or modify, 
hypotheses and so on.  The research process must first begin with an overall 
question or problem which calls for evaluation, which then becomes a specific 
research question.  As stated in Chapter 1, the research question addressed in 
this thesis is whether the Court of Appeal appeared to have determined the 
sampled appeals in an impartial manner.  This question leads to the development 
of hypotheses which are tested.  There is an overall null hypothesis (H0) that the 
Court of Appeal is impartial, and this is analysed using a series of null hypothesis 
tests and modelling.  The alternative thesis hypothesis (H1) is that the Court 
appeared to have determined appeals in a partial manner.  The research design 
of this study means that it will not be possible to conclude that the Court lacked 
impartiality, as a finding of a lack of impartiality would require extraordinary 
evidence which is beyond the limits of this study.  What can be tested is whether 
variables which are more indicative of impartiality or partiality show the strongest 
association with the outcome of appeals.      
 
5.3 Impartiality and its ‘observable implications’ 
The selection of variables used in this study has been driven by the kinds of 
variables used in earlier studies of judicial decision-making.  In Posner and de 
Figueiredo’s study entitled ‘Is the International Court of Justice Biased?’647 ‘bias’ 
was measured by assessing whether judges in the ICJ were more likely to vote 
in favour of countries similar to their own.  They did this by categorising countries 
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into blocs according to their relative region, wealth, culture, military and political 
alliances, and other such factors, to determine whether judges voted for countries 
in the same bloc as their home States.648 This acted as an imperfect but (they 
argued) suitable proxy for the concept of bias.  Their observable implication of 
bias was that ‘a judge votes in an unbiased way if he or she is influenced only by 
relevant legal considerations…and not by legally irrelevant considerations’.649 
‘Legally irrelevant considerations’ include variables which are captured by the 
behavioural model, and includes some variables used in this thesis.  For instance, 
the gender of the judge cannot be a legally relevant consideration.  Such 
variables therefore may be an observable implication of a lack of impartiality.    
 
In Voeten’s study of impartiality in the European Court of Human Rights,650 there 
were three observable implications of impartiality, which he termed ‘theoretically 
plausible sources of bias.’651 These plausible sources of bias were cultural bias; 
bias incentivised by the judge’s career prospects; and personal policy 
preferences.652 To capture these three theoretically plausible sources of bias, 
Voeten analysed data relating to, for instance, whether the judge originated from 
a common law or civil legal order; whether the judge’s State was formally 
socialist; and whether judges were expecting to retire at the end of the term.653 
The hypotheses he tested were, for instance, that judges expected to retire 
shortly would be more likely to vote against their governments.  He concluded 
that ‘the overall picture is mostly positive’ for the impartiality of the judges in that 
Court. 
 
Numerous studies have shown that factual and demographic details appear to 
have an impact on outcomes.  These are variables drawn primarily from 
behavioural or attitudinal research.  Rachlinski and Wistrich concluded that 
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behavioural factors appear to have a greater association with judicial decisions 
when that demographic is an issue in the case.654 For instance, Perisie found that 
female judges of the US federal appellate courts found for plaintiffs in sex 
discrimination and sex harassment cases more than male judges did.655  
Moreover, she found an indirect effect of gender as male judges were more likely 
to find for plaintiffs when there was a female on the bench.656 Research 
conducted in Canada by Stribopoulos and Yahya suggests that gender may have 
more of an influence in certain fields of law. 657  They found that:  
 
In criminal cases involving sexual or domestic violence…there is a 
statistically significant tendency on the part of female judges to favour 
the interests of complainants and mothers. The converse of male 
judges voting in favour of the interests of accused persons and fathers 
is also true.658  
  
It is theoretically plausible that for the offences of rape and murder, and especially 
rape, gender could be considered an issue.  It is particularly pertinent, therefore, 
that gender is considered in this study.  
 
Race / ethnicity has also been considered as a variable in American studies and 
found to be associated with particular decisions.659 Boyd found that female judges 
were more likely to find for plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases and black judges 
more likely to find for plaintiffs in race discrimination cases.660 Other behavioural 
variables include the religion of judges.  Several studies have found that judges 
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holding certain beliefs determine appeals in certain ways.661  For instance, Pinello 
found that variations in how judges decided cases in gay rights cases was 
associated with different religions.662     
 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the judicial studies branch of ELS is increasingly 
looking beyond behavioural variables, and so some scholars have tested whether 
legal factors are related to the outcome of cases.663 These variables have been 
tested over a variety of areas of law, such as immigration664 and crime.665 One 
study which utilised a large range of variables, including behavioural and legal 
variables, is the Sisk, Heise, and Morriss study.  That study is similar in approach 
to the present study.  They sought to determine whether the outcomes of appeals 
relating to a new sentencing rule varied depending upon a variety of different 
variables.  They found that many factors, such as the gender of the judge,666 race 
of the judge,667 and his or her law school,668 were not associated with the outcome 
of cases.  From this, they were able to conclude that ‘the law remains the alpha 
and omega of judicial decision-making.’669  
 
Conversely, they found that several factors were statistically significant in 
explaining the outcomes of cases.  They found that previous experience as a 
criminal defence lawyer increased the tendency of the judges to vote the law 
(which was tough on criminal defendants about to be sentenced) 
unconstitutional.670 They expressed the concern that ‘the attitudes developed in 
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criminal [defence] practise appear to have persisted to the bench.’671 They also 
found that the criminal workload of the judge was a significant determinant of the 
outcomes of cases in their study.672  The higher the workload of the judge, the 
less likely he or she was to find the law unconstitutional. They speculated that the 
reason for this might be that the sentencing guidelines under review would 
streamline the sentencing process, and would be a ‘[labour]-relieving measure’ 
for the judges if the rules remained constitutional.673 This is heavily indicative of 
the managerial model of judicial decision-making, which was discussed in 
Chapter 3.   
 
The Sisk, Heise, and Morris study used a range of variables indicative of a 
number of models of judicial decision-making.  They used a wide range of 
personal background factors as variables.  This study also utilises personal 
background factors as variables.  For instance, the gender of the parties to the 
appeal, and the judges and lawyers are used as variables.  The age of appellants, 
and complainants / the deceased are also used as variables.  Ethnicity was 
considered as a variable, although it ultimately was not viable as a variable owing 
to difficulties in collecting the data from the judgments.  Personal background 
variables are a measure of impartiality because they would appear to be legally 
irrelevant factors and so if they are associated with outcomes this would be more 
likely indicative of a lack of impartiality.   
 
As is discussed below, however, it is not possible to conclude from this study 
whether the judges were ‘influenced’, as opposed to there simply being a 
relationship between variables and the outcome of appeals.  Whilst background 
factors were used in this study, there are personal background characteristics 
which were not considered as variables.  Further background variables could 
have included the previous experience of the judges, their educational 
background, personal interests and beliefs, and so on.  These were not collected 
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in this study because the intention was to use data from the transcripts only, whilst 
collecting this data would have required searching beyond transcripts.  The 
reason for restricting the data collection to the transcripts was to ensure that the 
data source was reliable.  The omission of such variables is a limitation of this 
study.  Personal characteristic variables may be a good measure of impartiality, 
and so by omitting some the final models may be a less successful model of 
impartiality.          
 
Cross attempted a comprehensive analysis of the US Courts of Appeals (as 
opposed to the US Supreme Court).674 He utilised the Songer database,675 
containing data relating to several thousand reported decisions of the US Courts 
of Appeals.  Cross considered the power of judicial ideology on outcomes, 
alongside personal characteristics, and a measure of the law.  He found ideology 
to have less of an association with outcomes than seen in previous studies.  At 
times, ideology was shown to have extremely limited value as a predictor of 
outcomes.  He found that most factors explained only a small amount of variation 
in outcomes.676 He found that the explanatory power of the models improved 
when legal variables were analysed.677 Cross’s study therefore added significant 
evidence that it is not personality, politics, or ideology which determines 
outcomes but judges following and applying the law.  This thesis follows many of 
Cross’s lessons, namely, that there is a measure of law, and appropriate cautions 
are expressed given the limitations of observational studies of courts.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, since the 1970s American legal scholars and political 
scientists have analysed US Courts and decision-making.  This has provided a 
well-developed literature on methodology, and large datasets, which scholars can 
utilise.  The present study is not a study of an American Court, but rather is an 
assessment of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).  
Studies of UK Courts or judges are relatively sparse and there is no similar study 
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on the Court of Appeal in this country.  In recent years, there has been some 
studies of judicial (or quasi-judicial) decision-making in Britain, employing an ELS 
perspective.  Thomas and Genn employed case simulation to explore decision-
making in tribunals.678 They examined numerous factors, such as whether the 
tribunal was in paper form or an oral hearing; whether the members of the tribunal 
were legally qualified; and the impact of panel member background.679 They 
found that oral hearings were much more likely to lead to a successful 
outcome,680 and there was no statistically significant association between the 
background of the panel members (including their gender, age, household 
income, ethnicity, and religion) and their decision-making.681 This study is 
noticeable because it may be said that it comes close to replication of 
experimental conditions, in that the same case was sent to different tribunals with 
certain features amended whilst the rest were held constant.  
 
Cahill-O’Callaghan utilised the psychologist Shalom Schwartz’s personal values 
model to determine whether judge’s personal values influences their decisions.682 
She used this model to determine whether the personal values identified by 
Schwartz (self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, 
conformity, tradition, benevolence and universalism)683 were demonstrated by 
particular Supreme Court Justices in a hard case, R (on the application of E) v 
JFS Governing Body.684 She found that the judges in the majority demonstrated 
universalism while those in the minority demonstrated tradition.685 Thus, it 
appeared that the personal values of the judges in the JFS case did influence the 
legal decision.686 Cahill-O’Callaghan’s work could be considered attitudinal in 
nature.  Cahill-O’Callaghan discusses some of the studies of what she calls ‘overt 
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characteristics,’687 such as gender and ethnicity, some of which have been 
discussed above.  She highlights the value in also considering personal values 
which she says can be tacit influences.688  
 
Utilising the same Schwartz model, she later extended her previous study and 
examined the values expressed by individual Supreme Court Justices.  She found 
that different judges did express different personal values,689 and those 
expressing the same values tended to reach the same decisions.690 It is unlikely 
that the research Cahill-O’Callaghan conducted on the UK Supreme Court could 
be conducted on the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).  This is because there 
is only ever a single judgment, making it impossible to determine which individual 
judge’s ‘personal values’ are being expressed.  It cannot be assumed (indeed, it 
is likely to be false) that the judge delivering the judgment is the only judge who 
had any input in crafting it.  Thus, only ‘overt’ characteristics of the judges can be 
collected, but this is sufficient for the purposes of this analysis of which factors 
are, and are not, statistically significant predictors of the outcomes of appeals 
against conviction.  This has the benefit that there is no attempt to impute 
particular values onto judges based upon what they say in judgments but the 
focus is upon objective measures and demographics.       
 
Perhaps the single greatest presently available source of data on the decision-
making of judges in Britain is the Crown Court Sentencing Survey.  This was a 
data collection exercise administered by the Sentencing Council, in which judges 
in many thousands of criminal cases completed forms to indicate the factors 
taken into consideration when issuing a sentence.691 Other information, such as 
gender, was also recorded.  This resulted in large datasets, giving, importantly, 
the thoughts of the sentencing judge him or herself.  Research based on the 
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database is beginning to emerge.  Pina-Sanchez and Linacre sought to explore 
the level of consistency in sentencing for assault cases.692 They noted that 
‘consistency’ entails that ‘like cases are treated alike’,693 and so is accordingly a 
principle similar to impartiality, conferring legitimacy and public confidence.  They 
found that there was a substantial degree of consistency in sentence lengths 
across courts in England and Wales, contrary to concerns of inconsistent 
sentencing.694         
 
Thus, it is submitted, the appetite for ELS studies of judges in Britain may be 
beginning to grow.  This is to be welcomed, because users of courts and tribunals 
in Britain are far behind users of courts and tribunals in the US, when it comes to 
understanding how judges reach decisions.  As was discussed in Chapter 4, there 
has been previous research on the decision-making of the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division), but this has focussed upon how well it performs in correcting 
miscarriages of justice.  This thesis addresses an alternative question, regarding 
the relationship between a range of variables and the decision-making of judges.     
 
5.4 The role of law in the decision-making process  
In order to be able to make strong claims regarding the Court’s decision-making, 
it would be beneficial if it could be shown that the variables analysed influenced, 
or caused, particular outcomes.  For the reasons explained below, this cannot be 
shown by this study.  Moreover, any allegation that factual and demographic 
factors, such as judicial attitudes or gender, influence outcomes, needs to 
surmount the claim that it was the law which determined the outcome.  Judges 
are lawyers, well trained and experienced in applying the law.  Judgments are 
usually framed in terms of the rules laid down by precedents or whether the court 
below correctly applied statutes.  Lawyers make legal arguments to judges based 
on the law.  If judges appear, and claim, to be deciding appeals based on the law 
applicable to the case, it must be evaluated whether this is reflected in the data.  
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As was discussed in Chapter 3, more recent and advanced judicial studies 
research has sought to look beyond judicial attitudes and attributes, and towards 
the institutional situation of courts, including its approach to considering the rules 
of law.  Moreover, the ‘legal model’ of judicial decision-making postulates that 
decisions are reached by impartially applying the law, and it is important that this 
model is tested.    
 
As Cross says, the ‘daunting’ task of measuring ideology has been surmounted 
by researchers, but rarely has the task of measuring the law.695 The difficulty is 
caused by the unfeasibility of finding some measure of a whole body of law and 
then determining whether the case under analysis applied the law rather than 
ideology to reach a decision.  In order to do this, one would need to determine in 
some objective manner what the law is.  But this is made difficult by the fact that 
every case is different, and as such the law will be applied differently in different 
circumstances.  This is further complicated by the question of how to determine 
whether the case under analysis was decided ‘correctly’ in light of the law.  This 
makes the legal model difficult to frame as a falsifiable hypothesis.696  In contrast, 
the attitudinal model, for example, has developed a measure of ideology (the 
party of the appointing President), which can give rise to a falsifiable hypothesis.  
In Edwards’s and Livermore’s critique of attitudinal studies they point to the 
difficulty in coding precedent as being a significant pitfall.697 This is because each 
precedential case would need to be coded in some way to indicate its 
precedential value.  This inevitably requires some interpretation of the cases, 
rather than an objective assessment.   
 
Cross’s study of the US Courts of Appeals represents one attempt to measure 
law in empirical studies.698  He sought to test how often US Courts of Appeals 
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gave deference to certain trial courts’ decisions.  He found that judges’ decisions 
which, according to the application of law, would be due more deference from 
appeal courts were indeed shown more deference.  This, Cross argued, was a 
measurement of the law governing the case.  He found that the law, as it was 
measured by him, significantly improved his ability to model outcomes.  
Furthermore, his measurement of the law consistently out-performed attitudinal 
or demographic factors as predictors of outcomes.699  This adds support to the 
claim that any attempt to model judicial behaviour which ignores a measure of 
the law is likely to be deficient.   
 
In the study presented in this thesis, there is a measure of the law: the ‘Did Error 
Occur?’ variable.  In Chapter 4 it was explained that the unsafety test requires 
the Court to consider whether it thinks the jury would still have convicted if they 
had known what the Court knows by the time of the appeal.  It is only by being 
sure of this that convictions can have moral authority.     
 
Frequently, appellants will argue that the law was wrongly applied by the lower 
court.  The law governing the case includes the rules which state what the law is, 
in order to allow the Court of Appeal to decide whether it was correctly or 
incorrectly applied, and whether that makes the conviction unsafe.  The ‘Did Error 
Occur?’ variable is coded ‘yes’ when the judges decide that an error occurred in 
the proceedings, requiring consideration of whether the error made the conviction 
unsafe.  It is coded ‘no’ when the judges decided that no error occurred in the 
proceedings.  This acts as a measurement of the law because in deciding 
whether an error occurred, the judges have to decide what the law is.  If they 
decide that an error occurred in applying the law, the judges then have to decide 
what the effect of the error is.  If this is how the judges determine appeals, it would 
suggest that the judges apply the unsafety test as interpreted by the Court.  By 
including this variable in the analysis, it is possible to observe the relationship 
between the finding of an error and the outcome of appeals.   
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Whilst this measurement of law may mitigate some of the limitations of studies 
which do not measure law it is only partial, in the sense of being incomplete.  It 
may be thought obvious that the Court will be more likely to quash convictions 
when an error occurred, and so this is bound to improve the accuracy of the 
models.  Previous research on the Court of Appeal has shown that if the Court 
finds that no error occurred in the proceedings, appeals are unlikely to be 
successful.  It is this finding which gives rise to the claim that the Court is 
restrictive due to being slow to quash convictions which only raise questions of 
fact.  It is therefore an a priori hypothesis that the question of whether an error 
occurred will be a strong predictor of the outcome of appeals.  All previous 
research indicates that this will be the case, and so will not be surprising to the 
legal community.   
 
The better question may be not whether this variable is a predictor, but what 
interpretation can be given to the finding.  Whilst previous research used this 
finding to suggest that the Court is not receptive to claims raising factual issues, 
the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable is used in this thesis as a measurement of the law 
governing the case.  This is because the ‘unsafety test’ has been interpreted by 
the Court of Appeal as meaning that appeals are likely to be successful when 
errors occurred, and unlikely to be successful when no error occurred.  Whilst it 
may be questionable whether this is a suitable way for the Court to apply its 
powers, this is how the test has been applied.  This variable, therefore, tests 
whether judges follow this interpretation of the test.  Including a variable which 
captures the law is important for the capturing of impartiality.  This is because the 
‘legal model’ stipulates that decisions are reached by judges impartially applying 
the law.  The extent to which that appears to be the case can only be assessed 
by including some measurement of the law relevant to the case.                 
 
5.5 The fundamental problem of causal inference 
This study analysed the decision-making of the Court of Appeal through a 
quantitative content analysis of Court of Appeal decisions.  Much social science 
research, and observational social science in particular, suffers from what is 
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known as the ‘fundamental problem of causal inference’, which occurs because 
researchers can only observe the factual and not the counter-factual.700 This 
means that a researcher can only observe what happened, and what the 
demographic and factual details were in cases which were actually decided.  It is 
not possible to see what actually would have happened if any of these factors 
had been different, and they cannot be controlled.  Accordingly, it is not possible 
to say that a particular variable causes particular outcomes; it is correlation and 
not causation.  The best way to impute causation is in randomised controlled 
experiments, in which everything except the variable of interest is held constant.  
Moreover, causation can only be reliably inferred if the same results have been 
demonstrated in replication studies.   
 
This empirical study of the Court of Appeal using appeal judgments suffers from 
the fundamental problem of causal inference.  This means that the research has 
been designed to be correlative, and not causal.  Therefore, the analysis can 
show only association between variables and outcomes, not a cause and effect 
relationship.701  The transcripts analysed in this study were not designed to be 
studied in this way, but were designed to provide answers to real appeals in the 
Court of Appeal.  This highlights a further difficulty with correlational research: 
that the factors which in fact influenced a decision in one particular case might 
not have influenced the decision in any other case.702 This means that, whilst 
correlational studies can be useful in locating patterns in the data, a great deal of 
evidence is needed before it can be suggested that there is a true substantive 
relationship. 
    
Often in social science research the materials analysed were created directly for 
the research project.  For instance, data is generated by surveys, interviews, or 
simulations, which will address, or the researcher hopes will address, the specific 
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question he or she is studying.  In some kinds of studies, especially experiments 
or simulations, variables can be controlled, giving the possibility of drawing causal 
inferences.703  In empirical legal research of the kind conducted in this study, the 
judges giving judgment did not know their judgments would later be analysed 
statistically.  The study is therefore observational and non-reactive.  The 
judgments were delivered for the specific purpose of providing reasons for their 
decisions, to be read by lawyers, scholars, and other interested parties.  They 
were not designed for the purpose of statistical analysis.  It is for this reason that 
content analysis is necessary to extract the required data.  This means there is 
no direct answer provided in the judgments to the question ‘Was this case 
decided impartially?’ or ‘Did the gender of the judge impact the outcome of this 
case?’ and so on.       
 
This is what gives rise to the fundamental problem of causal inference; the 
problem that it is very difficult to design a study from which causal inferences can 
properly be drawn.  In a true experiment, the researcher can control the possible 
causal variables.  It is not possible in this study to run any kind of experiment to 
determine whether the judges were in fact impartial or whether other factors in 
fact caused particular outcomes, or what other factors influenced appeals.  The 
research must be designed observationally by isolating the factual and 
demographic details of cases which have been decided, and by analysing them 
to determine whether certain factors appear to lead to statistical variations in 
outcomes.704 It is through the use of hypothesis testing that it is possible to 
calculate the chance that a particular variable has some effect on the outcome 
variable.  The problem of causal inference inherent in the methods of this study 
means that this study is strictly concerned with the analysis of statistical 
association.  It cannot show whether a variable caused a particular outcome, or 
whether judges were influenced by a particular factor.  This method is useful, 
however, in explorative studies such as this one.  As there have been very few 
previous studies of this nature in Britain, it is important to discover whether there 
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are statistical relationships between the variables analysed and the outcome of 
appeals.     
  
5.6 Hypothesis testing, the p-value, and statistical significance  
The purpose of null hypothesis statistical testing is to determine the likelihood 
that the null hypothesis, that is, that the variable has no relationship with the 
dependant variable, is true, by determining how far the data corresponds with 
what would be expected if the null hypothesis was true.  This is established by 
calculating the degree and strength of any association between combinations of 
particular independent variables and the outcome of appeals.  It can be analysed 
how likely it is that the null hypothesis is true by observing the p-value of each 
independent variable in a binary logistic regression analysis.  A p-value is a 
percentage, between 0 and 1, which allows for some measurement of the 
strength of the predictive ability of the variables considered in the model of the 
Court’s decisions.  It is important to note that, for the reasons discussed below, 
the smaller the p-value, the stronger the association between the variables and 
the outcome of appeals.   
 
In March 2016, American Statistical Association (ASA) issued a statement on 
statistical significance and p-values.705 The ASA stated that ‘while the p-value 
can be a useful statistical measure, it is commonly misused and 
misinterpreted’.706 These concerns regarding p-values and significance testing 
were also raised by Nuzzo in 2014.707 The principles behind the p-value and 
significance testing are summarised by the ASA as so: 
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‘A p-value provides one approach to summarizing the incompatibility 
between a particular set of data and a proposed model for the data … 
The smaller the p-value, the greater the statistical incompatibility of the 
data with the null hypothesis, if the underlying assumptions used to 
calculate the p-value hold. This incompatibility can be interpreted as 
casting doubt on or providing evidence against the null hypothesis or 
the underlying assumptions’.708     
 
There are a number of essential components to these principles which must be 
considered.  The p-value summarises ‘the incompatibility between a particular 
set of data and a proposed model for the data’.  What the p-value does not show 
is whether the null hypothesis is true, or the probability that random chance 
produced the data.709 The p-value shows the level of ‘statistical incompatibility of 
the data with the null hypotheses’.  Independent variables with larger p-values 
suggest that the data is consistent with the null hypothesis and so the null 
hypothesis could be true, i.e. the predictor variable under consideration has no 
or limited measured relationship with the outcome variable.  Smaller p-values can 
indicate that there is greater statistical incompatibility in the data than the null 
hypothesis would predict.  Smaller p-values may therefore give some reason to 
doubt the null hypothesis.710  
 
The ASA statement noted that the concept of ‘statistical significance’ is an 
arbitrary figure.  By convention, a p-value of lower than or equal to 0.05 is 
considered ‘statistically significant’, and a p-value of higher than 0.05 considered 
non-significant.  This represents the 5% level of significance.  The ASA was 
particularly critical of the position that null hypotheses are ‘rejected’ and 
alternative hypotheses ‘accepted’ if the p-value is statistically significant.711  The 
apparent flaw in this kind of reasoning is that if the null hypothesis is actually true 
but a variable is shown as statistically significant due to random chance, the 
person accepting the alternative hypothesis and rejecting the null is wrong.  
Therefore, a p-value of less than 0.05% means only ‘that the data are not very 
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close to what the statistical model (including the [null] hypothesis) predicted they 
should be’,712 and a higher p-value ‘indicates that the data are much closer’ to 
the null hypothesis prediction.713 Thus, whilst smaller p-values may allow for the 
null hypothesis to be rejected, there is still a chance that the decision to reject the 
null hypothesis is mistaken.  
 
One further important point to note in relation to the understanding of p-values 
and statistical significance is that a larger p-value does not mean that the variable 
had no predictive power at all.  As Greenland and colleagues noted, it is only if 
the p-value is exactly 1 that it could be stated that the variable has no predictive 
value or relationship at all.714  This is because in calculating the p-value it is 
assumed that the null hypothesis is true.  Any p-value below 1, however slight, 
means that the variable did have some association.  This reiterates that p-values 
are not able to distinguish between actually true and actually false null 
hypotheses and alternative hypotheses.  However, variables with larger p-values 
can show that the data only deviate slightly from what would have been predicted 
if the null hypothesis was true, and so a researcher may be more likely to be 
mistaken in rejecting a null hypothesis with a larger p-value.         
 
Thus, the use of p-values and null hypothesis significance testing has difficulties.  
This thesis has utilised p-values and null hypothesis testing when considering the 
impartiality of the Court of Appeal.  As the ASA statement has made clear, 
however, a statistically significant finding at the 5% level is only weak evidence 
against a null hypothesis.  Whilst the ASA’s view was that p-values provide weak 
inferential evidence against the null hypothesis, it did agree that p-values can be 
useful in summarising data.715  Some contributors to the ASA statement noted 
that p-values are less controversial, and more useful, in explorative studies as 
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summary statistics for sets of data.716 P-values do, therefore, have value in a 
study such as the present.  They provide a quantification of variables which have 
a stronger relationship with the dependant variable.  This thesis recognises the 
arbitrary character of statistical significance testing and so has been careful to 
present all the data and p-values found in the statistical tests.  It is important to 
note that one key limitation of this study is that a p-value must be carefully 
interpreted, and that a finding of ‘statistical significant’ is an inherently tenuous 
measure of whether a null hypothesis is true.   
 
The results of the analysis conducted in this thesis is not contingent upon the p-
values alone but also the effect they have on the ability to correctly classify 
successful and unsuccessful appeals against conviction.  This thesis also uses 
summary statistics, classification tables, R2, and confidence intervals as 
measurements of how well this study has captured the principle of impartiality.  It 
is important to note that the ASA did not state that p-values are invalid, but the 
statement was related to definitional issues and the amount of confidence 
researchers can have in relying upon them, and the accurate communication of 
statistical results.  The primary concern of the ASA is that policy decisions are 
made, such as whether to continue with a clinical trial, based on statistical 
significance, and that publishers only tend to publish statistically significant 
findings.717  Given that statistical significance is an arbitrary figure, it may not be 
appropriate to reach clinical decisions based upon statistical significance.  
Clearly, this issue does not arise in this study.  Necessary caution has been 
expressed throughout this thesis about the results of this study, given the 
observational nature of the data collection which could not replicate experimental 
conditions.  Despite the reservations recently issued by the ASA, null hypothesis 
significance testing is an important and useful method of determining the 
predictive ability of independent variables against dependent variables, as long 
as these limitations are observed and heeded.    
                                                          
716 See DA Berry, ‘P-Values Are Not What They’re Cracked Up To Be’ a contribution to the ASA 
statement roundtable, submission No 5; MJ Lew, ‘Three Inferential Questions, Two Types of P-
Value’, submission 14.   
717 See RL Wasserstein and NA Lazar (n 705). 
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5.7.1 Parameters of sampled appeals 
The cases analysed in this thesis are the whole population of available murder 
and rape appeals against conviction decided between January 2006 and 
December 2010.  This is a sample of the total workload of the Court of Appeal.  
Each case was downloaded and read alongside a template.  The template was 
designed to allow as many features of the case to be identified with a Yes / No 
answer, or for qualitative data to be coded into dichotomous items labelled as 0 
and 1 for the purposes of subsequent analysis.  This template is reproduced and 
discussed in Chapter 6.  The variables were extracted from each case by marking 
appropriately the sections on the template.  Once a case was read it was 
immediately coded into SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics, v. 24 2016, IMB Inc.).  Only 
cases where an appellant was appealing a murder and / or rape conviction were 
included in the study.  The precise parameters of the scope of ‘murder’ and ‘rape’ 
needs some attention, this is discussed below.   
 
There were 472 full appeals against conviction included in the final dataset, 241 
murder appeals, and 231 rape appeals.  The offences of murder and rape were 
chosen for specific reasons.  It would have been possible to follow previous 
studies and read the first 300 judgments from one year, or all cases from one 
year, or a random sample of cases, or all cases from a number of years.  The 
latter option was excluded as the numbers involved would quickly become 
unmanageable for this study.  The decision was made to focus on specific 
offences in order to explore decision-making in those offences.  Since previous 
studies have already provided sufficient detail on the general decision-making of 
the Court of Appeal, it was decided that it focussing only on certain offences 
would offer new insights into the decision-making of the Court.  This means that 
there is no attempt in this thesis to generalise the findings to other offences 
decided in the Court of Appeal.  This provides opportunities for further replicative 
research on different offences.                
 
The specific offences of murder and rape were carefully chosen.  They are 
amongst the most serious offences known to the law, and they are both 
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indictable-only offences.  This is important because it means that any murder and 
rape convictions which are appealed can only be appealed to the Court of Appeal.  
Offences which are tried in the Magistrates’ Courts are appealable to the Crown 
Court.718  By focusing on indictable-only offences it is possible to be sure that all 
murder and rape convictions appealed will be included in the sample.   
 
Attempted murder and attempted rape were not included in the sample.  This is 
because these are separate offences to completed murder and rape, and the 
intention was to keep the offences under analysis as homogenous as possible.  
Further, applications for permission to appeal were omitted from the sample.  
There are several reasons for this.  The primary reason is that the outcome of 
appeals and applications for permission is different.  In full appeals against 
conviction, the outcome is that the conviction is quashed or upheld, while in 
applications for leave to appeal the outcome is that the grounds of appeal are / 
are not reasonably arguable.  When permission is refused this is equivalent to 
dismissing the appeal, but when permission is granted there is still a long way to 
go before the conviction is quashed.  This meant it was difficult to subsume the 
applications for leave within the full appeals’ dataset.  As the dataset was already 
sufficiently large it was decided the problem could be avoided by simply omitting 
to include applications for leave to appeal in the sample.   
 
It should also be noted that applications for permission to appeal are treated very 
differently; it is not comparing like with like.  Often applicants will be 
unrepresented, and it frequently appears that renewed applications are add-ons 
in appeals against sentences.  It is also much more difficult to extract data from 
renewed applications; transcripts are rarely longer than 4 or 5 pages.  Finally, 
applications were excluded because it appears that most renewed applications 
are not available on the legal databases.  This then raises the question of why 
some are available and some are not, potentially leading to biased data. 
 
                                                          
718 Magistrates Court Act 1980, s 108. 
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As was explained in Chapter 4, age categories of complainants / the deceased 
have been mapped onto the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  This is with the addition 
of a further category which is absent from the 2003 Act – the 16 – 17 age group.  
This is included as a separate group in order to separate adult complainants / 
deceased from those aged 16 and 17.  As the sample size for the 16 – 17 age 
group is relatively small, it should not have a large impact on any further analysis.  
Table 5.1 shows the age profile of the complainants / deceased in the sample.      
 
Table 5.1: Age profile of complainants / deceased in sample. 
 Murder Rape 
Under 13 11 97 
13 – under 16 4 29 
16 – 17 15 19 
18+ 211 85 
    
As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, relatively few deceased in murder 
appeals were children, whilst the majority of rape complainants were children.  
The effect of this is that the variables for age is more relevant to rape than murder.  
The following Table shows the cases in the sample categorised by gender. 
 
Table 5.2: Appeals in sample by gender. 
 Murder Rape 
Male 171 70 
Female 19 212 
 
As can be seen, there is a similar effect in murder appeals, in that one group is 
more common to one offence than the other offence.  Namely, in the murder 
appeals, there are relatively few female deceased.  The effect of this is that the 
variable which considers the association between the gender of the complainant 
/ deceased and the outcome of appeals is more relevant to rape appeals as there 
is greater variation.   
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5.7.2 Parameters of sampled murder appeals against conviction 
Murder is defined as the intentional unlawful killing of another human being.719  
Murder provides no particular definitional difficulties relevant to the data collection 
exercise, subject to the following point.  If a person was charged with murder, but 
convicted of manslaughter this is excluded from study, simply because this is not 
a conviction for the offence of murder.  Offences such as infanticide are excluded 
because this is not the same as murder.   
 
A significant current issue within the law of murder relates to ‘joint enterprise’.  
Joint enterprise murder occurs when the principle offender (A) and the secondary 
offender (B) agree to commit crime A, but in the process of which (A) commits 
murder.  The extent to which (B) is liable for the murder if he only foresaw that 
(A) may commit murder, rather than having intended that (A) commits murder, or 
encouraged him to do so, has been a problem area for the law of murder.720  It 
has generated many appeals which are included in this study.  The case of R v 
Jogee; Ruddock v R721 has recently stated that the law of joint enterprise murder 
had taken a ‘wrong turn’ in the case of Chan Wing-Siu v R.722 Chan Wing-Siu 
stated as a matter of principle that foresight that (A) might commit murder could 
be sufficient for joint enterprise murder.723  Jogee decided that foresight may be 
evidence of encouragement, but would not be sufficient by itself for (B)  to be 
guilty of murder.   
 
The murder appeals included in this study may be heavily impacted by this 
conclusion of the Supreme Court.  Of the 241 murder appeals in the sample, 109 
(45%) were ‘joint enterprise’, in that one or more person was charged and / or 
convicted of the murder acting jointly.  (Note that this does not mean all these 
appeals were joined appeals; it may be the case that only one member of the 
                                                          
719 See BJ Baker, Textbook of Criminal Law (3rd edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) Chapter 11.  
720 If (B) did intended or encourage (A) to commit murder the rules of accessory liability under the 
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 would likely apply and (B) would likely be guilty of murder.  
721 [2016] UKSC 8, [2016] UKPC 7.  
722 [1985] AC 168. This was followed, with some modification, on numerous occasions, see Hui 
Chi-Ming v R [1992] 1 AC 34; R v Powell; R v English [1999] 1 AC 1. 
723 Chan Wing-Siu, ibid, at 175. 
159 
 
‘joint enterprise’ appealed).  Only 15 (13%) of these ‘joint enterprise’ appeals 
were successful.  The conclusion of the Supreme Court in Jogee that Chan Wing-
Siu had resulted in an ‘over-extension of the law of murder’724 may be reflected 
in the low number of joint enterprise murder convictions quashed.  The Supreme 
Court in Jogee725 and the Court of Appeal in R v Johnson and others726 have 
intimated that it is unlikely appeals will be revisited in light of Jogee. 
 
The question of whether the offence was said to have been committed by ‘joint 
enterprise’ is not used as a variable in this thesis.  The reason for this is that joint 
enterprise in murder entails the specific issues discussed above which rarely 
apply in rape appeals.  It may be possible in future work to broaden out the legal 
variables, in order to include the particular legal issues arising in individual 
offences.  This is a limitation of this study, because the question of joint enterprise 
in murder is a significant issue in the law of murder, and following Jogee, is likely 
to become more important.  The proportion of joint enterprise murder convictions 
quashed by the Court of Appeal is much lower than the overall proportion of 
murder convictions quashed.727 One plausible explanation is that this is what the 
law required, as the joint enterprise doctrine of foreseeability was firmly 
established in law,728 stare decisis would require appeals to be dismissed if the 
judge directed the jury correctly as to foreseeability.  If this is the case, however, 
there were strong allegations that the law was unjust.729 A complete analysis of 
joint enterprise is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is intended as an 
exploration of the decision-making of the Court of Appeal in all murder and rape 
appeals.  There is, however, scope for further empirical enquiry outside the scope 
and remit of this thesis.   
 
                                                          
724 Jogee [83].  
725 ibid, [100] 
726 [2016] EWCA Crim 1613. 
727 See Chapter 7.  
728 Especially by the House of Lords in Powell, see note 722 above. 
729 See W Wilson and D Ormerod, ‘Simply Harsh to Fairly Simple: Joint Enterprise Reform’ (2015) 
Crim LR 3, and B Crewe, A Liebling, N Padfield, G Virgo ‘Joint Enterprise: The Implications of an 
Unfair and Unclear Law’ (2015) Crim LR 252. 
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Most of the appellants appealing a conviction for murder were convicted only of 
one count of murder, but 11 (4%) were convicted of more than one count.  The 
number of counts of which an appellant was convicted, and whether an appellant 
was convicted of more than one offence of murder or rape, is a variable which is 
analysed in this study.  Most appellants (79%) in murder appeals were 
represented by at least one Queen’s Counsel, and this is also considered as a 
variable.  62% of murder appeals were heard by a judge of at least the rank of 
Lord Justice, sitting with two High Court judges.730  The corresponding figure for 
rape was 49%, meaning that more circuit judges, recorders and retirees were 
used in rape appeals.  The ranks of the sitting judges are also variables utilised 
in this study.     
 
5.7.3 Parameters of sampled rape appeals against conviction 
Rape provides some substantial definitional problems, and this has impacted 
upon how this study has been conducted. The definition of rape for this thesis 
includes rape charged under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and rape 
charged under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and rape of a child 
under the age of 13 charged under section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  
Defendants are charged under the 1956 Act if the alleged offending occurred 
before 1 May 2004.  The 2003 Act defines section 1 rape as being where (A) 
intentionally penetration of the vagina, anus, or mouth of another person (B), 
where (B) does not consent and (A) does not reasonably believe that (B) 
consents.  Section 74 of the Act provides that consent means that the act was 
agreed to by choice, having the capacity to make the choice.  The offence under 
section 5 of the 2003 Act does not require a lack of consent, and it is no defence 
that the appellant believed the complainant to be 13 or over.731 As discussed 
below, this has obvious implications for the nature of the defence raised at trial.  
Section 1 of the 1956 Act defined rape as having sexual intercourse (vaginally or 
anally) with a person who does not consent and that the suspect was reckless as 
to whether the other consented. 
                                                          
730 Including Lord Chief Justice, Vice President of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, and 
President of the High Court.  
731 See R v G [2009] 1 AC 92. 
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What may now be known as anal rape under section 1 of the 2003 Act was 
sometimes charged as ‘buggery’; section 12 of the 1956 Act.  This is included in 
the sample as it appears indistinguishable from what it now termed anal rape.  
Sexual offences relating to animals are omitted.  Offences relating to photographs 
/ images are omitted.  In the rape appeals, 105 appellants (45%) were convicted 
of one or more offence of rape, and 166 appellants (71%) were convicted of more 
than one offence type.  Multiple counts is included as a variable in this study.  The 
outcome variable for this thesis relates to the rape conviction: so if the conviction 
for another offence is quashed but the rape conviction stands, this is recorded as 
an unsuccessful appeal.  The same holds for murder if, for instance, a conviction 
for weapons offences is quashed but the murder conviction is upheld. 
 
As was highlighted in Chapter 4, whilst there are only three sections which charge 
the specific offence of rape (2003 Act sections 1 and 5; 1956 Act section 1), there 
are numerous different kinds of rape.  Historical sexual offences are often 
charged under the 1956 Act.  It will be observed that the primary difference 
between the Acts is that what is now charged as oral rape may not have been 
rape under the 1956 Act, but may have been charged as indecent assault (section 
14 of the 1956 Act), or some other offence.  For the purposes of the data 
collection exercise the charging decision of the prosecutor was followed.  This 
means that if what could now be charged as rape was charged as another offence 
under the 1956 Act, it is not included in the dataset as the appellant was not 
convicted of rape at the time.  For the purposes of this thesis, it makes no 
difference that the appellant could now have been charged with rape.   
 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides a number of definitional challenges.  Its 
overlapping sections are well documented.732  Other offences which could be 
considered as essentially identical to rape, such as section 2 assault by 
penetration, or section 9 sexual activity with a child, are not included.  Again, the 
charging decision of the prosecutor will be adhered to, rather than stating what 
                                                          
732 JR Spencer, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003’ (2004) Crim LR 347. 
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the appellant could have been charged with.  The reason for this is that there 
could be important reasons why particular charges were placed; it would not be 
appropriate to begin second-guessing the charging decisions of the prosecutors. 
 
Section 1 of the 2003 Act is silent as to any age requirement, whilst section 5 
relates to children under the age of 13.  Thus, offences relating to children aged 
13 to 16, and offences against anybody over the age of 16 are all charged under 
section 1.  This study has also utilised a variable for these categories, and for 
when the complainant was aged 16 or 17, or over the age of 18.  There is a 
qualitative and quantitative difference between an offence committed against a 
person aged over 18 (i.e. and adult) and a child; an offence against a child aged 
under 16 (16 being the age at which consent can legally be given), and those 
aged 13 to under 16.  These differences are highlighted by statistics relating to 
conviction rates for different age groups of complainants.  Thomas found that 
different categories of rape had different conviction rates in Crown Court trials. 
Trials alleging rape of a female under the age of 13 resulted in conviction 58% of 
the time, but 75% of the time for rape of a male under 13.733 Rape of a female 
aged 16 or over had a conviction rate of 47%, whilst rape of a male 16 or over 
had a conviction rate of 58%.  It is not clear whether it is the female complainant 
which leads to these differences, however, as rape of a female aged under 16 
had a conviction rate of 62%, which is higher than the conviction rate for rape of 
a male under 16 (51%).            
 
Table 5.1, above, provided the number of cases which featured the different age 
categories in the murder and rape appeals.  Appeals against convictions for rape 
against complainants aged 13 – under 16, and 16 – 17 both had success rates 
of 42%, but note that the number of appeals for these categories was relatively 
small.  The success rate for offences against children under the age of 13 was 
35%, and 30% for adult complainants.  These figures show some difference but 
this is not particularly large.  The 42% success rate is likely to be impacted by the 
                                                          
733 C Thomas, Are Juries Fair? (Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/10, 2010) 32. 
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smaller sample size.  The age category of the complainant is included as a 
variable in this study, and so will be returned to in Chapter 7.  
 
An additional component which is analysed in this study is whether there is a 
relationship between the nature of the defence offered at trials, and the outcome 
of appeals against conviction.  Again, the different categories of rape (by age) 
have an impact on this.  Only a small number of appellants attempted to deny 
mens rea (consent or belief as to age) in offences against children under the age 
of 13 – this is obviously because this is not a defence to that offence.  89% of 
appellants denied the actus reus for this offence.  As the age of the complainant 
increases, appellants were more likely to have denied mens rea: 37% denied 
mens rea in the 13 – under 16 group; 57% in the 16 – 17 group; and 63% in the 
over 18 group.  Clearly, therefore, the nature of the offence has an impact upon 
the nature of the case at trial, and by implication the kinds of appeals which are 
likely to be successful in the Court of Appeal.  However, as the success rate 
across the age categories are relatively similar (as discussed in the previous 
paragraph) this by itself does not appear to have a close relationship.     
   
The inbuilt age categories, the division of complainants between genders, and 
the 1956 Act may lead to the conclusion that there is not only one offence of rape, 
but several.  In this thesis, all these rape offences have been coded as one 
offence: rape.  An alternative approach would have been to separate the different 
categories of rape into individual offences, in order to determine whether 
particular variables have relationships with outcomes in particular kinds of rape.  
Whilst this may be an avenue for further exploration and analysis in the future, 
this approach is not taken here.  This is because the focus of this thesis is to 
explore the relationships between variables and the broad offences of rape and 
murder.  To the extent that further refinement of the offence categories would 
have been beneficial, this is a limitation.  However, all of the categories of rape 
offences are still broadly the offence of rape, and so using the single offence is 
justifiable.      
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5.8 Binary logistic regression 
Regression analysis in its general form is a statistical procedure which seeks to 
model the value of an outcome variable by one or more independent predictor 
variables.734 In simple linear regression models, where there is a continuous 
outcome variable and one continuous independent variable, the regression 
equation takes the following form: 
 
𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 +  𝜀𝑖 
This means that the outcome (Y) is modelled by β0, the point at which the line 
intersects the Y axis (i.e., the constant), and β1 representing the slope of the line 
(the coefficient), and X representing the value of the independent variable, plus 
an error term.  This is a simple (single independent variable) linear regression 
equation.  This may be predicting a person’s age by their height, or vice versa.  
In multiple regression models, there can be any number of independent variables, 
so the regression model would take the following form: 
 
𝑌 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 +  𝛽2𝑋2+. . . + 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛 +  𝜀𝑖  
     
The above equation may, for instance, be a model of house prices (Y) = the 
constant, plus the house footprint (B1, X1), plus number of windows (B2, X2), 
plus size of the garden (B3, X3), and so on (Bn, Xn).  In the above formulas for 
simple and multiple linear regression, there is an assumption of a linear (i.e. along 
a straight line) relationship between the outcome and the independent variables 
and normally distributed continuous variables.     
 
                                                          
734 See A Field, Discovering Statistics Using IMB SPSS Statistics (4th ed, SAGE Publishing 2013), 
Chapter 8.  
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These assumptions are violated when considering the kinds of relationships and 
variables evaluated in this thesis.  The outcome variable is not a continuous 
number (quantitative) but is a categorical binary outcome (there are two options; 
the appeal is successful or unsuccessful).  As a result, binary logistic regression 
is appropriate.  In binary logistic regression, rather than showing a linear 
relationship between the outcome variable and the independent variables, it 
seeks to predict the odds that a case will fall in a particular category given the 
values of the independent variables.  The independent variables can be 
continuous quantitative data, categorical data, or a combination of both.  The 
majority of the independent variables in this thesis are binary categorical 
variables generally in the form of an answer to the question: ‘Did this variable 
apply? Yes or No’.  The logistic binary regression formula is shown below: 
 
𝑃(𝑌) =  
1
1 + 𝑒− (𝑏0+ 𝑏1 𝑋1+ 𝑏2𝑋2+⋯+ 𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑛) 
 
 
Where P(Y) is the predicted outcome of a case.  It will be seen that the part of 
the model in brackets is identical to the multiple linear regression model shown 
above.  The binary logistic regression equation allows the testing of whether any 
of the variables are statistically significant predictors of the outcome of appeals 
against conviction.  Based upon the value of the combination of independent 
variables, each case is given a predicted value.  The predicted value is 
represented by P(Y), and is measured on a continuous scale between 0 and 1.  
A predicted value of 0.50 and below results in that case being predicted to have 
been a dismissed appeal; any predicted value above 0.50 results in the case 
being predicted to be an allowed appeal.  It is then possible to compare the 
predicted values computed by the model with actual observed outcomes in the 
data in order to determine how well the model fits the data.  
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The binary logistic regression model also produces an ‘odds ratio’ (OR), which 
quantifies the strength of the association between each predictor variable and the 
outcome variable.  The odds ratio is the chance of success with a characteristic 
present and the chance of success without that characteristic present.  Variables 
which have no ability to predict outcomes will have an OR of 1 because the 
probably of success will be the same whether the variable is present or not.  As 
explained above, this will be extremely rare because all variables will show some, 
however small, predictive ability and this will prevent ORs of 1.  Any departures 
in either direction, to +ve or –ve infinity, indicates the strength of the predictive 
power of that independent variable and the outcome variable.  If the confidence 
interval of an OR crosses 1, the variable will not be statistically significant 
because it would not be possible to know whether the true figure is 1.  The further 
away from 1 the stronger the association; which in turn allows the p-value to be 
calculated.  The further away from 1 the confidence interval range of OR is, the 
more likely it is to be statistically significant.  An OR of greater than 1 indicates 
that the variable in question is associated with increased odds of being 
successful; lower than 1 indicates reduced odds of being successful.      
 
As discussed above, p-values and statistical significance cannot explain overall 
how valuable the model is in predicting outcomes.  It should also be recalled that 
this thesis does not seek to ‘predict’ future cases, but reference to ‘predicting’ is 
reference to the binary logistic regression model procedure which seeks to predict 
what the outcome of the appeals was.   
 
In addition to p-values, further tests allow for greater scrutiny of the overall 
predictive power and fit of the binary logistic regression models.  This is done by 
scrutinising various outputs: the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test; 
classification tables; and pseudo R2 statistics.  The Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness of fit test evaluates how well the predicted outcomes match the actual 
observed outcome.  Classification tables show which proportion of appeals 
against conviction were correctly classified as being either allowed or dismissed.  
There are two pseudo R2 statistics: the Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke.  R2 
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statistics present the amount of variation in outcomes which is explained by the 
model.  The Cox and Snell is incapable of reaching 1 (i.e. 100% of variation 
explained by the model), and so is always the lower of the two, while the 
Nagelkerke is capable of reaching 1 and so is always higher.  These two pseudo 
R2 statistics represent an upper and lower bound respectively of the amount of 
variation in the outcome variable which is explained by the binary logistic 
regression model.  This provides a measure of how many cases are correctly 
modelled.     
 
These various measures of goodness of fit and predictive power of the models 
are utilised to quantify how strongly the variables predict outcomes.  This relates 
to the difference between statistical importance and substantive importance.  A 
variable could have statistical significance (i.e. have a low p-value) but if the 
overall fit or predictive power of the model is low it cannot be sustained that the 
variable in question plays any great role in decision-making.  Conversely, if a 
variable has a higher p-value but good predictive power it may have higher 
substantive value.  Thus, no particular measure can be used to determine the 
value of models or variables but the various measures should be considered 
together in a careful assessment of the models.          
 
Binary logistic regression in SPSS provides the option of a ‘forced entry’ or a 
‘stepwise’ method.  In forced entry, all the selected variables, statistically 
significant or otherwise, are retained in the final model.  The predictive power is 
than assessed for significance using the Wald statistic which can then be used to 
determine whether the pre-defined hypothesis (i.e. the null hypothesis) is 
accepted or rejected.  There are two kinds of stepwise regression: backwards 
and forwards.  In backwards stepwise binary logistic regression the model starts 
at step 1 with all the independent variables included in the model and then 
removes the variables one at a time based on their p-value and Wald statistics 
until the best fitting model is created.  In forward stepwise regression, step 1 starts 
with no variables in the model and variables are included one at a time until 
adding further variables adds no improvement to the model.   
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Standard ‘forced entry’ binary logistic regression is used to construct the models 
in this thesis.  Field notes that the alternative, either backwards or forwards 
stepwise logistic regression, is inappropriate for hypothesis testing as it has the 
goal of finding the most parsimonious model to fit the data.735  Croes is critical of 
the use of stepwise regression when the intention is to determine what kinds of 
factors have what kind of association with outcomes, rather than when one is 
seeking the most efficient or parsimonious model.736 Fitting the most efficient or 
parsimonious model is not the intention behind this analysis; but to find which 
variables are associated with outcomes and which are not.  Once the models had 
been constructed, however, the model is checked using forwards and backwards 
methods to check for confounding or supressing variables.        
 
As an alternative to binary logistic regression, discriminant function analysis could 
have been used to evaluate the data.  As is discussed in Chapter 6, the 
dependant variable used in this thesis is binary, but it may have been possible to 
code the dependant variable with four levels.  If this had been done, discriminant 
function analysis may have been appropriate.  Discriminant function analysis 
seeks to discriminate between two or more groups using predictor 
(discriminating) variables.737 Discriminant function analysis is best used when 
there are more than two groups to the outcome variable, rather than the binary 
allowed or dismissed categories used in the present study.  Discriminant function 
analysis also has more exacting assumptions, such as an assumption that each 
group is drawn from a population which has a normal distribution.738 Such 
assumptions are violated in the present study and are not necessary for binary 
logistic regression analysis.  For this reason, logistic regression analysis was 
selected as the most appropriate method of analysing the data, particularly where 
a large proportion of the considered variables are categorical in nature. 
 
                                                          
735 Field (n 734) 322-4. 
736 MT Croes ‘Explaining the Dealings of Dutch SMEs with Potential Legal Problems: A Plead for 
a Theory-Driven Approach’ (2013) Int J Law in Context 239, 243. 
737 Field (n 734) 654.  
738 WR Klecka, Discriminant Analysis (Sage Publications 1980) 10. 
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In many areas in this thesis, the data collected from the cases is summarised in 
the form of percentages, frequencies, tables and graphs.  This is useful for 
several reasons.  Firstly, this thesis considers only murder and rape offences, 
meaning that any statistical information gathered is new information.  The 
dissemination of this information in summary form helps to provide details about 
how such appeals are dealt with in the Court of Appeal.  This helps to understand 
decision-making in the Court of Appeal.  Secondly, the use of graphs and tables 
makes the findings more easily comprehendible to the non-statistical readership 
which is the majority of the audience of this thesis.  Thirdly, summary statistics is 
primarily what has been provided in previous studies of the Court of Appeal.  This 
thesis replicates in part previous research on the Court of Appeal.  By following 
the same procedures it is easier to compare and contrast the offences of murder 
and rape with the findings of the earlier studies.             
 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the data collection exercise and the principles behind 
the statistical analysis conducted on the dataset of appeal cases.  The intention 
is that, when read together with the next chapter, sufficient details have been 
provided to allow later replication of the study.  The observational nature of the 
study has been discussed.  This study could not have been designed so as to 
replicate experimental conditions.  It is only in properly conducted and replicated 
randomised controlled trials that any kind of causation can begin to be inferred.  
Accordingly, the proper limits of this study should be understood.  What is sought 
to be explored is whether the independent variables which are collected from 
each case are shown to be statistically significant predictors of successful 
appeals.  The logic behind this is that if the Court was to be presented as having 
appeared impartial, certain variables, in particular the factual and demographic 
variables, should not be predictors of the outcomes of appeals in the Court of 
Appeal.  This is because if a variable is a predictor of outcomes there is an 
implication of an association between the variable and the outcome.   
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The next chapter provides a complete list of the variables collected from each 
case, and evaluates the data collection template.  Chapter 7 presents the findings 
of the study.  This includes a descriptive analysis of the grounds of appeal argued, 
which replicates previous studies of the Court of Appeal, and the binary logistic 
regression analyses of the Court’s decision-making.  It is by carefully considering 
the outcomes of the next chapter that it will be possible to conclude whether the 
Court does appear to have determined appeals in an impartial manner.  
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Chapter 6 
Evaluation of Variables and Methods of Study 
  
Introduction 
An important original contribution made by this thesis is the development of a 
measurement of the impartiality of the England and Wales Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division), and the collection and coding of cases to create a dataset.  In 
developing the dataset, many pieces of factual, demographic, and legal variables 
were collected from each case.  It has been sought to capture the principle of 
impartiality by collecting a range of variables, and by testing whether relationships 
exist between variables and the outcome of appeals.  As has been discussed 
previously in this thesis, how successful this has been is a key question, and this 
will be addressed in Chapter 8.  By explaining the variables which measure the 
principle of impartiality, it can be examined how well the concept has been 
measured.  In this chapter, full details of the variables included in the study and 
how they were collected and coded is provided.  The data collected from the 
appeals includes factual and demographic details relating to the case, the judges 
and the appellants and complainants / deceased.  The grounds of appeal have 
also been collected from each case.  A legal variable which captures the Court’s 
approach to dealing with grounds of appeal and the ‘unsafety test’ was also 
captured.  This data collection exercise has sought to draw upon previous 
examples of quantitative judicial studies and Empirical Legal Studies (ELS), 
utilising the models discussed in Chapter 3.          
 
The data from each appeal against conviction was collected utilising quantitative 
content analysis with the aid of a template.  The template has been presented 
below, followed by an explanation of the decision-making process relating to the  
collection of the dependant variable and the independent variables.  The 
effectiveness of the data collection process is evaluated in this chapter. Finally, 
this chapter summarises the strengths and limitations of the methods employed 
in this study.  In particular, the limitations of this study are highlighted.  It is 
important to highlight the strengths, but also acknowledge the limitations of the 
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study, in order to evaluate how well or closely the principle of impartiality has 
been captured, and so what sort of claims can be made about the impartiality of 
the Court of Appeal.    
 
6.1.1 The dependant variable 
This is collected as an answer to the question: ‘Was the appeal successful?’  It is 
answered yes (coded 1) whenever a conviction for murder or rape was quashed, 
including when the appellant remains convicted of other offences.  The 
dependent variable is coded 0 when the appeal was dismissed.  An appeal is 
coded as being dismissed if the appellant’s appeal against either murder or rape 
was unsuccessful but appeals against other convictions were successful.  This 
means that the dependant variable relates specifically to the murder or rape 
convictions.  The outcome of appeals against conviction are considered to be 
binary in this thesis, and is coded accordingly. 
 
This decision to code the outcome of appeals in a binary fashion could be 
challenged.  This is because if an appeal is successful the Court has a number 
of options available to it.  It can quash the conviction and enter an acquittal; it can 
order a retrial; or can substitute a conviction for an alternative offence.  It could 
therefore be argued that there are four levels to the dependant variable, and not 
two, as so: 
 
1. Appeal dismissed 
2. Appeal allowed, acquittal entered 
3. Appeal allowed, retrial ordered 
4. Appeal allowed, offence substituted 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the treatment by the Court of the 135 successful appeals in the 
sample.   
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Figure 6.1: Treatment of successful appeals. 
 
Across the whole dataset of 472 appeals, therefore, 55 (11%) appeals had retrials 
ordered, 20 (4%) had offences substituted, 60 (13%) had convictions quashed 
and no further action, and 337 (72%) of appeals were dismissed.  There was no 
variation in the proportion of successful rape and murder appeals that were 
ordered to be retried (50% of successful rape appeals were retried, and 50% of 
successful murder appeals were retried).  Only two successful rape appeals had 
a conviction for an alternative offence substituted, whilst 18 murder appeals did.  
The obvious reason for this is that having a murder conviction quashed invites a 
conviction for manslaughter to be substituted, and this is often the case when the 
reason for the successful appeal is a finding of diminished responsibility.739           
 
There was some variation in the post-success decisions relating to different kinds 
of appeal.  For instance, only two of the 23 appeals (8%) which were successful 
following a CCRC reference were ordered to be retried, whilst 22 (39%) of the 59 
appeals which were successful on the basis of fresh evidence were ordered to 
be retried.  The reason for this discrepancy can be explained by the power of the 
Court of order a retrial.  The Court can only order a retrial if it thinks it is in the 
interests of justice to do so.740 Owing to the nature of CCRC referrals the cases 
are often old and will have been appealed previously, meaning it is less likely to 
                                                          
739 See, e.g. R v Erskine; R v Williams [2009] EWCA Crim 1425. 
740 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (as amended) s. 7. 
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be in the interests of justice to retry the case, whilst the uncovering of fresh 
evidence may increase the impetus to have the issue retried.      
 
Thus, there may be differing considerations for certain kinds of appeal as to which 
of the successful appeal outcomes to apply in the case.  It would have been an 
alternative option to code the outcome of appeals with these four levels rather 
than two.  The dependant variable has been coded as a binary outcome in this 
study because the question of whether to order a retrial, substitute a conviction, 
or enter an acquittal, comes after the decision to allow the appeal. The Court 
must first have decided that they are going to quash the conviction, and the 
question primarily considered in this study is whether the independent variables 
are associated with that decision.  Dividing the dependant variable into four levels 
is an alternative that could be pursued in future research.  As this is an alternative 
way of coding the dependant variable, it must be borne in mind that the 
conclusions are related to the binary outcome, and so some of the complexity of 
appeals is potentially obscured.   
 
6.1.2 Factual and demographic variables  
There follows a complete list of the independent variables included in the study.  
Note that there is no particular qualitative significance or order to the variables in 
this list.  These variables in combination are the ‘observable implications’ 
impartiality, or a lack of it, which are employed in this thesis to incompletely 
measure the concept.  Each variable has a null hypothesis that it is not a predictor 
of the outcome of appeals against conviction, and this is what is tested in the 
binary logistic regression analyses presented in Chapter 7.  The process of null 
hypothesis testing was discussed in Chapter 5.  It was noted that that the null 
hypothesis is essentially a hypothetical state in which the variable has no 
association with the outcome of appeals.  It is unlikely that any of these null 
hypotheses will be true, and so the interest in this thesis is to explore and observe 
the strength of any association, in order to consider what this means about the 
impartiality of the Court.     
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 Date variables:  Each day of the week and month of the year was an 
individual variable, coded 1 if the appeal was handed down on that day, 0 
otherwise.  Most appeals are ex tempore (see below).  In non-ex tempore 
appeals the date is the date the appeal was handed down.  
 
 Ex tempore: Coded 1 when all the indications from the case are that 
judgment was delivered immediately following the hearing, 0 otherwise.   
 
 Joined Case: Coded 1 when the appeal involved more than one appellant, 
no 0 when the appeal concerned only one appellant.    
 
 Multiple rape or murder: This was coded 1 if the appellant was convicted 
of multiple offences of either rape or murder. 
 
  Convicted of other offences: Coded 1 if the appellant was convicted of 
other offences in addition to rape or murder.  
 
These three variables relate to the number of persons involved in each appeal 
and the number of offences of which the appellant had been convicted.  These 
variables are designed to reflect the overall level of criminality the appellants in 
the sample were convicted of being involved in.   
 
 QC Appellant Only: Coded 1 when the appellant was represented by 
Queen’s Counsel and the Crown was not represented by a QC, 0 
otherwise.   
 
 QC Crown Only: Coded 1 when the Crown was represented by Queen’s 
Counsel and the appellant was not, coded 0 otherwise.   
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 Female Counsel Appellant: Coded 1 when the appellant was represented 
by female counsel, 0 otherwise.   
 
 Female Counsel Crown: Coded 1 when the Crown was represented by 
female counsel, 0 otherwise.  
 
 Female Judge Present: Coded 1 if there was a female judge on the bench, 
0 otherwise.   
 
 LCJ Present: Coded 1 if the Lord Chief Justice at the time was sitting as a 
judge on the case.  
 
 VP Present: Coded 1 if the Vice President of the CACD was sitting as a 
judge on the case. 
 
 President Present: Coded 1 if the President of the Queen’s Bench Division 
of the High Court was sitting as a judge on the case.   
 
 Circuit judge present: Coded 1 if any of the judges in the case was a circuit 
judge at the time of the appeal.   
 
 Recorder Present: Coded 1 if any judge on the bench was a Recorder at 
the time of the appeal.  
 
 Retired judge present: Coded 1 if any judge on the case was a retired 
judge, 0 otherwise.  
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 Trial judge Sat in CA: Coded 1 when the trial judge has sat in the Court of 
Appeal either very frequently in the past or in the recent past, in the sample 
of cases. It is also answered yes when the trial judge was an influential or 
famous judge, or held advanced positions.741 
 
 Individual Judges: There were 11 judges who heard at least 20 cases in 
the sample of cases.  Each judge was a variable which was coded 1 if that 
judge sat on the case, No otherwise.   
 
 White British Appellant: This states the ethnicity of the appellant.  This 
variable was coded 1 if the appellant was White British, and 0 otherwise, 
according to any statement of ethnicity made in the judgment.  As this 
information was rarely disclosed, the decision was made to also search 
press reports.742   
 
 Sentence severity: It was hoped to examine whether particularly high or 
particularly low sentences were associated with the outcome of appeals.  
The sentencing for murder and rape are very different (murder generally 
much higher) so they could not be simply compared numerically.  Instead, 
they were coded categorically by sentence severity.  The categories are: 
 
Rape:  
0 – 60 months – Low 
61 – 120 months – Medium 
121 – 180 months – High 
                                                          
741 Missing data complicated the collection of this variable.  The variable was not always able to 
be collected as the trial judge was not always named, accordingly, this variable was not used in 
the study.  
742 This also did not prove to be sufficiently reliable, meaning data collection complicated this 
variable.  Ultimately, missing data was such that this variable could not be utilised in this study.  
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181 + (including life sentences) – Very high 
 
For IIP sentences the term is doubled to give the notional determinate sentence 
equivalent (as per the sentencing rules) for coding.  Other sentences such as 
(rare) community orders, are low.  
  
Murder: 
Under 12 years – Low 
13-20 years – Medium 
21-29 years – High 
30+ years (including whole life orders) – Very high 
 
These were then coded as dummy variables with the variable coded 1 if it applied 
to that case, 0 otherwise.743 These categories could be challenged.  It may have 
been possible to categorise these sentences differently, and alternative 
categories may lead to different results.  There is an element of subjectivity within 
these categories.  An alternative way of categorising the data would have been 
to attempt to map more clearly into the sentencing guidelines for the offences.  
The Sentencing Council guide provides starting points for sentencing rape,744 and 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides minimum term starting points for tariffs in 
murder.745 These starting points were not used as categories in this study 
because the starting points, especially in rape, overlap with each other.  
Moreover, since the sentencing judge’s sentencing comments were not available, 
it was often not possible to know which category the judge placed the offence, 
which is the main determiner of the sentence.  
  
                                                          
743 Missing data complicated the collection of this variable. This is discussed further in Chapter 7.  
744 Sentencing Council, Sexual Offences Definitive Guideline (Sentencing Council 2016) 10, 29. 
745 Criminal Justice Act 2003, Schedule 21.  
179 
 
Accordingly, these categories were derived by first noting the sentence which 
was handed down before observing the spread of sentences and constructing the 
categories to be used in the study.   
 
 Appellant Good Character stated: Coded 1 if the transcript refers to the 
positive good character of the appellant, no otherwise.   
 
 Bad Character Stated: This was coded strictly according to whether the 
transcript explicitly stated that the appellant had bad character. If the 
transcript was silent this was coded 0. If the transcript stated that the 
appellant had any previous convictions, this was always coded 1. All 
convictions, however minor, were treated as bad character. However, 
given the nature of the offences it was rare that very minor offences were 
referred to by the judges.   
 
The subjectivity needed in collecting the data for this variable should also be 
noted.  As the data was derived from the information provided in the Court of 
Appeal transcripts, it is possible that relevant information was not provided.   
  
 Denial of actus reus: This was coded 1 if the appellant denied committing 
the actus reus of the offence.   
 
 Denial of mens rea: This was coded 1 only if the appellant admitted 
committing the actus reus but claimed either consent in rape appeals, or 
a defence in murder appeals. If the defence was complete denial it was 
answered No, because denial of mens rea was not the only defence.   
 
 Historical offence: Coded 1 if the alleged offence occurred 10 or more 
years before the appellant was convicted of it, 0 otherwise. For murder this 
180 
 
is the date of the death.  For a series of rape this is when the first instance 
alleged offending is said to have started.   
 
 Appellant child: This variable is coded 1 if the appellant was under the age 
of 18 at the time of the alleged offence, or when the offending was said to 
have begun.   
 
 Child deceased / complainant age range: This variable was coded into 
dummy variables, with each coded 1 if the deceased / complainant fell into 
that category, 0 if not. Note that for a series or multiple rapes the age 
counted is the age of the youngest complainant when the offending is 
alleged to have first started.  In murder appeals, the age is the age of the 
deceased at death.  As was discussed in Chapter 4, the age categories 
have been developed by mapping primarily onto the Sexual Offences Act 
2003.  The age categories are: 
 
Age under 13 
Age 13 – under 16 
Age 16 – 17 
Age 18+ 
 
 Drink or drugs: This variable was coded 1 if either the victim and/or 
appellant was drinking / taking drugs at the time of the alleged offence.  It 
was coded 0 if there is no evidence of drink or drugs in the transcript.  It 
was coded 1 if drugs were involved in a murder (e.g. drug gang related).   
 
 Victim male: This variable was coded 1 if the victim was male, by 
implication if this was coded 0 the victim was female.   
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 Known victim: This variable was coded 1 if the victim / complainant was 
known to the appellant, 0 otherwise.  The following kinds of relationship 
were always be coded as being ‘known’: family, partners, friends and 
friends of friends, those living in the same street or block, and work 
colleagues, members of same / rival gangs etc.  This is unless it is 
otherwise stated in the judgment.  Strangers are cases where the victim / 
complainant was completely unknown to the appellant before the day / 
night that the offence was alleged to have occurred.   
 
From the above list, it can be observed that a range of factual and demographic 
variables are included in the study.  Some variables can be considered to be 
behavioural in nature, in that they relate to personal characteristics of the judges, 
lawyers, and deceased / complainants.  Some of the variables relate to how the 
case was run at trial, in order to determine whether decisions made a trial are 
associated with decisions on appeal.  Some of the variables in the above list may 
be considered to have attitudinal implications, such that certain attitudes may 
underlay the variable.  For instance, the bad character variable is designed to 
explore whether the judges might have a certain attitude towards appellants who 
have previous bad character and who are now appealing convictions. 
 
These variables capture in an incomplete way the impartiality of the Court of 
Appeal.  One question to be addressed in this thesis is how well this concept has 
been captured.  The variables analysed are not all the variables which could have 
been collected.  For instance, behavioural studies have explored a range of 
judicial background factors to test the theory that a person’s social background 
influences their behaviour.746 There are some judicial background  variables 
included in this list, such as their gender and their ranks, but there are other 
factors which could be considered, for instance their educational background; 
ethnicity; the area of law they practised in, and so on.  This means that the 
variables used to measure impartiality in this thesis is omitting variables which 
                                                          
746 For example, TE George, ‘From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the Supreme 
Court’ (2008) 86 NCL Rev 1333. 
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could be relevant.  This means that the results of this study do not allow strong 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the impartiality of the Court of Appeal one way 
or the other.  However, it must be recalled that the intention behind this study is 
to be explorative in nature, and to begin to observe any patterns in the data.  It is 
not intended that this study will resolve the question of the impartiality of the 
Court.  As will be discussed in Chapter 8, this means that the concept of 
impartiality has not been fully captured by the variables analysed, but further 
research using the dataset can help to capture it more fully.           
 
6.1.3 Grounds of appeal raised 
In addition to the factual and demographic variables detailed above, the legal 
arguments raised in the appeals were also collected from each case.  In Chapter 
7, the relationship between the grounds of appeal and the outcome of appeals is 
discussed.  The grounds of appeal raised in appeals against conviction are clearly 
an important component of decision-making in the Court.  As was explained in 
Chapter 4, the Court has developed a clear method of how it deals with appeals.  
For appeals raising procedural irregularities, the Court must determine whether 
the error occurred, and if so, determine whether the error means the jury might 
not have convicted if the error had not occurred.  In fresh evidence appeals, the 
Court must broadly consider whether they think the fresh evidence renders the 
conviction unsafe, usually by asking whether the jury might not have convicted if 
they had heard the evidence.  In ‘lurking doubt’ appeals, the Court is being invited 
to consider whether the circumstances of the conviction lead them to have a 
doubt. 
 
The grounds of appeal were collected in order to analyse which grounds of appeal 
were most likely to be successful in murder and rape appeals.  This follows 
previous studies of the Court by Roberts747 and Heaton.748 These variables are 
                                                          
747 S Roberts ‘The Decision-Making Process of Appeals Against Conviction in the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) (DPhil Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009). 
(Hereafter Roberts (2009)). 
748 SJ Heaton ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Utility of Using Innocence as a Criterion in the Post 
Conviction Process’ (DPhil Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2013). (Hereafter Heaton (2013)).  
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legal factors which could have an impact on the decision-making of the Court, 
however they are not included as individual variables in the regression models.  
There are several reasons for this.  Firstly, if certain grounds of appeal are 
associated with particular outcomes, this would say little about whether the Court 
was partial or impartial.  As discussed in Chapter 4, for some grounds of appeal 
if the Court finds that that error occurred, the conviction will be automatically 
unsafe.  For instance, if the Court finds that the judge incorrectly refused an 
application to stay the trial due to an abuse of process, or finds that the judge 
should have discharged the jury or accepted an application of no case to answer, 
the conviction is necessarily unsafe.  This is a logical requirement flowing from 
how the ‘unsafety test’ works, because if the judge should have discharged the 
jury or accepted a claim of no case to answer, the appellant should never have 
been convicted.  If the Court finds that the trial was unfair it is highly likely that 
the conviction will be unsafe.   
 
Other grounds of appeal, however, do not follow the same logic – indeed this is 
the core of the unsafety test.  For instance the summing up and evidential 
discretion grounds will usually require the two-step decision-making process 
discussed in Chapter 4.  This two step-process can be seen in the data which is 
presented in Chapter 7.  This means that the grounds of appeal raised do not 
show that the Court is following the law or the legal model, because the question 
for the Court is what effect the grounds of appeal have upon the safety of the 
conviction.  The grounds of appeal themselves would not be a useful 
measurement of impartiality because it would not mean that the Court followed 
the law if certain grounds of appeal were shown to be statistically associated with 
certain outcomes.         
 
An alternative approach has been taken in this thesis to measuring the extent to 
which the Court follows the law and the ‘unsafety test’.  The ‘Did Error Occur?’ 
variable (discussed further below) broadly measures the relationship between the 
interpretation of the law and the outcome of appeals.  This, it is submitted, is a 
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better approximation of the legal model, and so impartial decision-making, than 
including individual grounds of appeal.       
 
This section provides definitions of the grounds of appeal raised and how they 
were coded.  Each ground was coded 1 if it was raised as a ground of appeal, 0 
if not.   
 
 Fresh evidence raised: Coded 1 if the appellant raised fresh evidence. 
 
Fresh evidence and how it is dealt with by the Court of Appeal is an important 
consideration in this thesis.  Fresh evidence is not included as a variable to 
capture the impartiality of the Court because fresh evidence appeals raise 
specific issues.  The relationship between fresh evidence and the outcome of 
appeals against conviction is discussed in depth in Chapter 7.    
 
 Misdirection / defective summing up: Refers to all complaints relating to 
the summing up or directions provided by the judge.  It includes complaints 
that the judge did not respond accurately to jury questions, or that the 
summing up omitted parts of evidence or certain directions.  It also 
includes complaints that the summing up was generally defective, 
unbalanced or unfair.  
 
 Judicial intervention: Relates to the specific claim that some in appropriate 
intervention by the trial judge made the conviction unsafe.  
 
 Prosecution disclosure: this relates to any claim that evidence was not 
disclosed to the defence. 
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 Prosecution errors, not disclosure: relates to any alleged errors in 
procedure not relating to disclosure.  For instance, late applications.  
 
 Inconsistent verdicts: This was coded 1 whenever the appellant claimed 
that inconsistent verdicts make the conviction unsafe.  
 
 Police irregularity: This was coded 1 when the appellant claimed some 
impropriety of irregularity by the police.  For instance: breach of PACE, 
insufficient investigation. 
 
 Jury irregularity: relates to claims that there was an irregularity with the 
jury – for instance the jury was biased due to the membership of the jury, 
or the jury was rushed into reaching a verdict, etc.  
 
 Not able to mount defence: This was coded 1 when it was alleged that for 
any combination of reasons the appellant was unable to mount an effective 
defence and this makes the conviction unsafe.  
 
 Claim of lawyer error: This was coded 1 when the appellant claimed that 
his legal team made errors at or before trial.  This includes, for example, 
not calling certain witnesses, general incompetence or not making an 
application before the judge. 
 
 Other: This captures procedural irregularities which are not captured in 
any above categories, for instance: problems with the indictment.  
 
Certain grounds of appeal related to the exercise by the judge of his or her 
discretionary powers.  These are: 
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 Misuse of evidential direction: This variable was coded 1 whenever it was 
alleged that the judge should, or should not, have allowed a piece of 
evidence to be admitted.  It also includes decisions such as allowing cross 
examination. 
 
 Refused severance: This was coded 1 if it was alleged that the judge 
should have severed the indictment.  
 
 Abuse of process, stay, discharge: This was coded 1 if it was alleged that 
the judge should have stayed, or discharged the jury due to an abuse of 
process.  This includes stays of proceedings due to delay, unfair trial, etc.  
Includes a claim for a discharge of the jury for any reason. 
 
 Refused no case to answer: This was coded 1 if it was alleged that the 
judge should have accepted an application of no case to answer.  
Alternatively it is coded 1 if it was alleged that the judge should have 
stopped the trial due to NCTA, even if a submission of NCTA was not 
made.  
 
 Unfair trial as ground of appeal: This was coded 1 when the appellant 
claims specifically that an unfair trial made the conviction unsafe, or 
breaches of Article 6 means the conviction is unsafe.  It is coded 0 if the 
appellant refers to an unfair trial but does not specifically state that the trial 
was unfair.  
 
 Insufficient evidence, lurking doubt, generally unsafe: This was coded 1 if 
the appellant claimed that the court should quash the conviction on the 
basis that there was insufficient evidence, a Lurking Doubt, or is Generally 
Unsafe.  
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6.1.4 Legal and institutional variables   
This thesis includes a general measurement of the law governing appeals.  As 
was discussed in Chapter 3, in recent years the study of judicial behaviour has 
increasingly sought to include legal variables, in order to study the Court more 
broadly as an institution.  The grounds of appeal discussed above are legal 
factors but they are not included as individual variables.  The law governing the 
case has been captured by the following variable:  
 
 Did error occur? This is coded 1 if, in the opinion of the Court, an error 
occurred in the proceedings.  Furthermore, it is coded 1 if, in the opinion 
of the Court, any error occurred even if it was not argued as a ground of 
appeal.  An error means that the Court have to consider whether the error 
made the conviction unsafe. Accordingly, minor blips do not necessarily 
constitute an error for the purposes of this variable.    
 
At the outset, there is strong evidence to suppose that the answer to this question 
will be a strong predictor of the outcome of appeals against conviction.  Firstly, 
previous research has shown that if the Court finds that no error occurred in the 
proceedings appeals will usually be dismissed.749 Indeed, this is a core of the 
complaint relating to the allegedly restrictive approach the Court has adopted to 
exercising its powers.  Additionally, previous research has shown that procedural 
irregularities are what usually leads the judges to deciding that convictions are 
unsafe.750 If the Court finds that an error did occur, there is a presumption that 
the conviction will be quashed, unless the Court is sure of the factual accuracy of 
the verdict.751 Accordingly, the null hypothesis of this variable is that it is a 
predictor of the outcome of appeals.  This variable could be considered an 
indicator of the ‘legal model’.  As was discussed in Chapter 2, the legal model 
entails a belief in impartial judges fairly applying the law.  As such, this variable 
                                                          
749 See Roberts (2009) 149. 
750 See ibid, and K Malleson, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Review of the Appeal 
Process, Research Study No 17 (HMSO 1993). 
751 See e.g., JR Spencer ‘Quashing Convictions for Procedural Irregularities’ (2007) Crim LR 835. 
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adds as a counterweight to the behavioural factual and demographic variables 
which were discussed above.    
 
Other variables, in addition to the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable, are designed to 
capture the broader behaviour of the Court, including its relationship with the 
CCRC and the application of its leave process.  
 
 CCRC: This is coded 1 if the case is a CCRC referral, 0 if not.  The CCRC 
variable captures the institutional relationship between the CCRC and the 
Court of Appeal.  The CCRC case statistics shows that CCRC referrals 
have a 66% success rate in the Court of Appeal, in terms of the percentage 
of successful appeals.752 Thus, if the other variables do not account for the 
variation in outcomes, it is highly likely that this variable will be a predictor 
of the outcome of appeals.  This variable acts as an additional 
counterweight to the factual and demographic variables, as the CCRC 
referrals undergo a lengthy review process by the CCRC.        
 
 Leave granted by single judge: This is coded 1 if leave was granted by the 
single judge, 0 otherwise.  By implication, if the above variable and this 
variable are answered No, leave must have been granted by the Full Court 
or by the trial judge.  This is a further potential institutional variable 
because it covers the relationship between the permission process in the 
Court of Appeal and the decision-making process.  It may be supposed 
that appeals which were granted permission by the single judge are more 
likely to have obvious procedural irregularities because the single judge 
granted permission on the papers at the first instance.  This variable may 
capture, therefore, the strength of the grounds of appeal and the extent of 
the irregularities. 
 
                                                          
752 https://ccrc.gov.uk/case-statistics/ (accessed 4/7/17). 
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 Verdict unanimous: This variable was coded 1 if it is stated that the 
decision of the jury was unanimous, 0 if it is stated that the decision was 
by majority.  Due to a high level of missing data when this variable was 
originally collected, this variable was constructed on the assumption that 
any missing data was a unanimous verdict.  The assumption behind this 
lies in the fact that 80% of convictions are unanimous.753  The problem 
with this assumption is that those with majority verdicts may be more likely 
to appeal.  For that reason this variable must be considered with caution.  
This variable might not be considered an indicator of a lack of impartiality 
because the strength of the evidence against an appellant is an important 
part of the ‘unsafety test’.  One measure of the strength of the evidence is 
whether the whole jury were convinced of guilt.  Instead, this variable acts 
as a measure of the extent to which the Court considers the strength of 
the jury’s belief in guilt when determining whether a conviction is safe.    
 
 Number of Cases cited: This variable was a count of the number of cases 
cited in the judgment. Each case is only counted once, and it includes any 
sub references (e.g. references to cases made by the trial judge, or 
another judge in a different case).  It is also counted as a reference to a 
case when a certain principle named after a case is discussed (e.g. a 
Lucas direction).   
 
 Offence Rape: This was coded 1 if the offence was rape.  By implication 
No means the offence was murder.  This is coded as a legal / institutional 
variable because these two particular offences raise particular issues 
which are relevant to appeals.  For instance, in murder appeals it is usually 
apparent that an offence has actually occurred, whilst in rape appeals this 
is often the core issue.  Thus, this variable tests whether particular legal 
elements of these offences are associated with outcomes.      
   
                                                          
753 See Court Statistics (Quarterly) Jan – March 2014, main tables, table 3.17.  Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2014 
<accessed 5 July 2016>. 
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6.2 Data collection template 
In order to ensure systematic, and so replicable, data collection, the appeals 
against convictions were analysed with the aid of a template.  After consulting the 
earlier empirical research on judicial decision-making a list of potential 
‘observable implications’ of impartiality was initiated.  The observable implications 
were formulated to be answered in the form of a Yes / No question, in which the 
template was marked ‘yes’ if the variable applied to the case, and ‘no’ otherwise.  
A pilot study was conducted in order to determine what kind of information could 
be extracted from most appeals, with the minimum amount of subjectivity needed 
in the data collection.  Based upon the pilot, previous experience of reading Court 
of Appeal judgments, and previous research, the list of independent variables 
(observable implications) was finalised.  The template shown below was then 
created to ensure that each variable was collected methodologically from each 
appeal.  The template used is shown below, in order to aid analysis of the data 
collection methods.  The template and data collection is then evaluated.   
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Part 1: The Case 
1) Case Name: 
2) Official Citation:  
3) Date of judgment:  
4) Number of female judges:  
5) Ranks:  
6) Names: 
7) Conviction Quashed?  Yes:  No:    
8) Leave granted by: 
Single Judge  
Full Court  
CCRC  
Trial judge  
9) Offence:    Rape:  Murder:     
 
 
 
 
Number of cases cited:  
Counsel:  
Ex-Tempore:  
No. of grounds of appeal:  
Successful ground(s) of appeal:  
 
Part 2: The Appellant 
10) Age at appeal:    Under 18:  
Adult 18-59:     
60+:   
Not stated   
Counts: 
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11) Age at time of offence:   
Under 18:    
Adult 18-59:    
60+:  
Not stated:   
  
12) Gender – (Assumed Male): Female:    
  
13) Bad character:   Yes:   No:  Not stated:       
 
14) Good Character:   Yes:   No:  Not stated:      
  
15) Ethnicity:   
  
16) White_Brit?    Yes:   No:  Not stated:  
 
Part 3: The Trial 
17) Convicted by unanimous verdict? Yes:     No:  Doesn’t state:       
18) Trial Judge Gender:  Male:        Female:   Doesn’t state:     
19) Trial judge name:  
 
 
Part 3a: Rape 
20) Rape sentence:  Months. 
 
21) Sentence: Doesn’t state:     
 
22) Sentence: Life:  Years:  
 
23) Sentence: Extended Sentence: Yes:  No:   Years:   
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Offence:  
24) Historical Offence?  Yes:    No:      
25) Nature:    Known:    Stranger:    Doesn’t state  
26) Defence:    Denial:      Consent:    Doesn’t state  
27) Familial?   Yes:    No:      
28) Prostitute?   Yes:    No:   
29) Drink / Drugs   Yes:    No:         
Complainant   
30) Gender: Single female:      
31) Gender: Single Male:   
32) Gender: Multi female:     
33) Gender: Multi Male:    
34) Gender: Both genders:       
35) Victim / Complainant a child? Yes:     No:      Doesn’t state  
a. All Children?  Yes:  No:   
b. Age of youngest C at time alleged offences is said to have begun:  
 
 
Part 3b: Murder 
Offence:  
36) Historical Offence?  Yes:  No:    
37) Min Term:    Doesn’t state:    
 
38) Nature / context:   
Known:   
Random attack:  
Gang:   
Joint Enterprise:   
 
39) Weapon:   Gun:  
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Knife:  
Other:   
40) Details:  
   
41) Defence:    Denial  
42) Defence:   Cut throat  
43) Defence:   Accident:  
44) Defence:    Lack of intent:  
45) Defence:   Positive defence:    
46) Drink / Drugs   Yes:    No:         
 
Victim 
2)  Gender: Single female:   
3)  Gender: Single Male:      
4) Gender: Multi female:    
5) Gender: Multi Male:    
6)  Gender: Both genders:     
7) Victim / Complainant a child? Yes:  No:      
a. All Children?  Yes:  No:   
 
Part 4: Grounds of Appeal 
Fresh Evidence 
47) Fresh Evidence Raised?   Yes:    No:         
48) Reference to R v Pendleton?  Yes:   No:    
49) Fresh evidence admitted?   Yes:   No:   
50) Interest of justice passed?   Yes:  No:  Not Stated:  
51) Why evidence not admitted?  
52) Capable of Belief?    Yes:    No:   
53) Ground for quashing conviction?  Yes:  No:     
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54) Nature of FE: 
 
Lurking doubt 
55) ‘Lurking doubt’ Raised / residual discretion / insufficient evidence / 
generally unsafe?  Yes:  No:          
 
 
Procedural Irregularity Grounds:754  
Misdirection / Defective / Unbalanced Summing Up: Yes:  
Judicial intervention:  Yes:   
Non-disclosure of evidence:  Yes:  
Prosecution errors (not disclosure):  Yes:   
Inconsistent Verdicts:  Yes:  
Police Irregularity / Misconduct:   Yes:  
Jury irregularity claimed:   Yes:  
Biased tribunal:    Yes:  
Not able to mount effective defence: Yes:   
Claim of lawyer error: Yes:   
Unfair trial / breach of Article 6: Yes  
Other:  
 
56) Evidence wrongly included / excluded  
 
Expert Evidence    
Witness Testimony    
Witness statements    
PACE       
a. S. 78    
                                                          
754 Grounds of appeal modified from, Roberts (2009) at 64. Some of the categories have been 
modified.  
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b. Confessions   
 
ii) YJPOA 1999    
a. S. 41     
iii) CJA 2003      
a. Hearsay    
b. Previous Convictions / bad character:  
 
Other evidence wrongly included/excluded:    
Refused application for severance: Yes:   
Refused abuse of process / stay / discharge: Yes:  
Refused claim No Case to Answer? Yes:  
Permitted Questioning:     Yes:  
 
57) Did an error occur? Yes:  No:    
 
58) Did error make a difference?: Yes:   No:  
 
 
Fair trial 
59) Fair trial / fairness / human rights considered? Yes:    No:     
 
 
Part 5a: Quashed Convictions: 
Quashed because of Fresh Evidence?      
Quashed because of Lurking Doubt?   
Quashed because of procedural irregularity?    
Jury might not have convicted / verdict may have been different:  
Trial was unfair:  
Retrial ordered: Yes:  No:      
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Part 5b: Upheld Convictions: 
Court’s reason for dismissing appeal: 
 
Error did not occur:  
Error made no difference:  
Trial was not unfair:  
Strong prosecution evidence:  
Fresh evidence not admitted:  
Fresh evidence not capable of belief:  
Fresh evidence made no difference to safety:  
Jury would still have convicted:  
No lurking doubt  
No doubt as to safety / sure conviction is safe:  
 
-- End of Template --  
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6.3.1 Evaluation of data collection  
As each case was studied, tick marks were placed in the appropriate boxes.  The 
options for each variable corresponds with the coding in SPSS, with yes answers 
coded as 1, no answers coded 0, and not stated coded as -99.  Some fields have 
only one box, which was ticked if the appropriate answer was yes.  In these 
circumstances, all the other options were presumed to be answered ‘no’ and were 
coded accordingly in SPSS.  Variables which are not usually binary, such as the 
names of judges, were made binary.  For instance, judges’ variables became the 
answer to the question ‘Did Judge X appear in the case? Yes / No’.  By designing 
the template in this way, the data collection exercise was simplified and so less 
prone to the likelihood of human error.  The benefit of attempting to restrict the 
independent variables to binary response variables was seen most clearly here.  
Since the majority of variables were ‘yes / no’ answers, the possibility of 
disagreement over the correct answer is low.  Although there is always the 
possibility of coding error, when there is a large amount of data it does not cause 
significant problems.  This is because any coding error is likely to be random and 
so such errors cancel themselves out over time.755     
 
The settling of the final variables to be collected using the template was not an 
immediate process, but was developed whilst the data collection took place.  It 
was only when the data collection began properly that it could be known whether 
the template was working as intended, whether more data could be collected, or 
whether there were difficulties with certain variables.  The template provided 
above is the final version of the template, which superseded earlier versions.  
When it was found that the template was not working as intended, for instance it 
was realised that a variable was being poorly collected, the variable was 
amended and the data collection process had to be redone for that variable.  As 
discussed below, this occurred in, for instance, the ethnicity variables.     
 
                                                          
755 The same point is made by A Juliano and SJ Schwab, ‘The Sweep of Sexual Harassment 
Cases’ (2001) (86) Cornell L Rev 548, 557. 
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The template was not used to collect all variables, but some variables were 
created only once all the data had been collected.  For instance, whether the trial 
judge had sat in the Court of Appeal was used as an independent variable, but 
does not appear on the template.  This was because until all the cases were read 
it could not be known whether the trial judge did sit in the Court of Appeal.  
Additionally, some of the data collected on the template was ultimately coded in 
a different way in SPSS.  For instance, the age of the complainant in rape appeals 
was collected as a continuous number, but was then categorised in SPSS. 
 
For many of the variables the data was available in every case.  For instance, it 
was possible to see who the judges and counsel were; the genders of the judges, 
appellants, complainants and the deceased; the offences the appellant was 
convicted of; when the convictions and the events in question took place, and so 
on, for every case.  Importantly, the outcome variable – whether the appeal was 
allowed or dismissed – was always able to be captured uniformly.756  This meant 
that many of the variables were collected for all cases in the dataset in a uniform 
manner.  This means that overall the dataset was a clean dataset, with relatively 
little missing data or subjectivity needed.  Variables which required greater 
subjectivity were discussed above.  The selection of variables for analysis was 
designed to allow for the clean collection of the variables across all the cases.    
 
As discussed above, the coding of some of the independent variables, and the 
dependant variable, could be challenged.  Decisions had to be reached during 
the data collection process as to how particular variables would be coded in a 
way suitable to the study.  This creates a limitation to the weight which can be 
given to the results of the study.  The results must be interpreted in a cautious 
manner because different coding decisions may lead to different results.  As an 
initial explorative study of the decision-making of the Court this is not a great 
difficulty because the primary purpose of this study is to observe whether patterns 
                                                          
756 As was discussed above, in this thesis appeals where any conviction for murder or rape was 
quashed was counted as being a success, so there were no questions regarding ‘partly 
successful’ appeals.   
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exists between the variables and outcomes in the way that they have been coded.  
However, it reduces the extent to which it can be said that the variables are a 
valid measurement of the Court’s impartiality.  An important sub-question within 
this thesis is how well the concept of impartiality has been measured.  These 
weaknesses in the data collection template and the range of independent 
variables clearly mean that impartiality has not been completely measured.  This 
makes it difficult to draw conclusions regarding the impartiality of the Court.  
       
This is compounded by the existence of missing data.  Missing data makes it 
more difficult to use those variables in the final analysis, meaning that the data is 
essentially lost.  The ethnicity, sentencing and variables relating to the trial judge 
were particularly susceptible to missing data.  Due to difficulty in collecting some 
of these variables they had to be omitted from the analysis.  This means that the 
findings of this study are subject to omitted variable bias, as known variables are 
omitted from the analysis.  Whether these omitted variables would have an 
association with the outcome of appeals is unknown.  Further research could be 
conducted to seek to rectify some of these limitations by expanding upon the 
range of variables studied, or considering different coding options. 
 
The use of two different offences presented both opportunities and challenges in 
the collection of the data.  As there were only two offences to be considered, as 
opposed to the many different offences which are heard in the Criminal Division, 
it was easier to capture variables which would apply to both offences.  For 
instance, both offences contain actus reus and mens rea elements which are 
frequently contested and so this could be used as a variable throughout the 
dataset.  Both offences concerned drugs, fresh evidence, and male and female 
victims of different ages in some significant numbers.  However, some potential 
variables did not apply equally to both offences, or applied only rarely to one 
offence.  For instance, it would have been possible, and it was originally intended, 
to capture whether appeals were more, or less, likely to be successful if a gun or 
knife was used.  But whilst weapons were frequently used in murder appeals, any 
kind of weapon was relatively rarely disclosed in rape appeals.  Consequently, 
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the weapons variable had to be removed as a variable as it was not feasible to 
use in the study.  Further research could be conducted using a larger sample of 
only murder appeals to consider this question further.        
 
As was discussed in Chapter 5, relatively few murder victims were in the youngest 
age categories, and most were over 18.  This means that the younger age 
variables disproportionally applied to rape offences.  Thus, when the age of 
complainant / deceased variables are considered in Chapter 7, the variable is 
more clearly measuring age as a factor in rape appeals rather than rape and 
murder appeals.  A similar point is true about the ‘historical’ variable.  There were 
very few historical murder appeals, while historical rape appeals were relatively 
common.  It may be questioned whether the variables therefore measure the 
Court’s reaction to the factors in both murder and rape, or if particular variables 
are relevant to only murder or rape.  One potential solution was to have two 
datasets, one for murder and one for rape.  If this was done the datasets would 
have been too small and so further cases would need to have been coded.  It 
was decided that the best solution was to continue with one dataset but to 
acknowledge that some variables are more relevant to one offence than others.  
Since the intention is not to predict individual murder or rape decisions, but to 
observe patterns in the data in an explorative way, this is not a significant 
difficulty.       
              
The collection of the data is limited to the facts disclosed by the Court.  It was 
sought to limit the data sources to the Court of Appeal judgments in order to 
ensure that the data source was reliable.  It had to be assumed that the facts 
disclosed in the judgments were accurate, and not biased.  This assumption may 
not necessarily hold.  Furthermore, there may have been evidence which was 
relevant to the case, or which could have been used as a variable, which is not 
disclosed in the judgments.  For instance, there may be a strong piece of 
evidence which is not disclosed in the transcript which leads the Court to be sure 
of the appellant’s guilt or innocence, and so determinative of the appeal.  
Moreover, it is known that some important information, such as ethnicity, could 
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not be collected.  If that piece of evidence was disclosed it may have been 
feasible to use as a variable across the dataset.  Thus, if the research was to be 
designed ideally there would be access to all the pieces of evidence so that a 
more complete picture of each case could be gained.  This was not plausible for 
the kind of research which was conducted.          
 
This limitation is related to the correlative and non-reactive nature of the study. It 
is correlative because the study has sought to explore whether there exists 
relationships between certain features of the appeals (which cannot be controlled 
by the researcher) and the outcome of appeals.  As not all the information which 
would have been desirable was available, there is a limit upon the kinds of 
conclusions which can be reached regarding the decision-making of the Court.  
Moreover, as the variables were designed to allow for an assessment of whether 
the Court appeared to have determined appeals in an impartial manner, the 
limited range of variables places a limit upon how well impartiality has been 
measured.  It has been stressed previously in this thesis that impartiality has not 
been completely captured by the variables under analysis, and so the results of 
the study cannot be conclusive of whether the Court appeared impartial.  A 
summary of the limitations of this study is provided below.       
  
6.3.2 Evaluation of the collection of grounds of appeal 
A brief evaluation of the collection of grounds of appeal is necessary, because it 
forms an important element of this thesis and previous studies.  The collection of 
grounds of appeal was far more difficult than collecting the factual and 
demographic variables.  The primary difficulty is that it is not always easy to place 
particular grounds of appeal into categories.  Some analysis and interpretation is 
needed in some cases.  Grounds of appeal are often combined or built on top of 
each other.  A typical example is where an appellant claims that the judge should 
have excluded a piece of evidence, and contingent upon that incorrect decision 
the judge unfairly summed up the totality of the case to the jury.  This may arise 
when the judge decides to admit the bad character of an appellant, or admits 
hearsay evidence.  If the Court of Appeal decides the judge acted correctly, the 
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summing up argument may fall away, but the Court will frequently still consider 
the fairness of the summing up.  This creates a difficulty in deciding what precisely 
the grounds of appeal argued by the appellant were and how they were dealt with 
by the Court.      
 
Lurking doubt appeals could be seen as qualitatively important because they are 
said to raise the appellant’s innocence, or the potential that the jury reached a 
mistake.  The coding of lurking doubt appeals is difficult because the phrase 
‘lurking doubt’ is rarely used in the Court.  Consider the following typical example: 
the appellant argues that the judge incorrectly admitted hearsay evidence (say), 
and without that evidence the appellant argues there was insufficient evidence, 
or it was unfair, to convict.  If there is ‘insufficient evidence to convict’ the 
argument would appear to be that the Court of Appeal should have a ‘lurking 
doubt’ that there was sufficient evidence to convict.  In this thesis, this would have 
fallen within the ‘misuse of judicial discretion’ and ‘insufficient evidence, generally 
unsafe, lurking doubt ground’, but other researchers may differ.  
 
There is an element of subjectivity in the collection of grounds of appeal.  This is 
because the lawyers do not always present their cases with distinct and neatly-
packaged grounds of appeal.  The researcher then needs to determine what the 
grounds of appeal are.  As was explained in Chapter 3, the job of the appellant’s 
counsel is to persuade the Court in light of all the circumstances that the 
conviction is unsafe.  This will frequently require the combining or layering of 
grounds of appeal in order to create a strong case.  This in turn can make it 
difficult to ‘deconstruct’ arguments back into their individual parts.  However, 
despite these difficulties, the fact that four decades of studies, including this 
study, as will be shown, have found similar results relating to most grounds of 
appeal suggests that grounds of appeal can be collected with some reasonable 
reliability. 
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6.4 Research strengths and limitations  
There is no known publically available dataset of decisions of the Criminal 
Division.  The lack of a pre-existing dataset relating to the Court of Appeal has 
both positive and negative consequences for this study.  The positive aspects of 
having to develop a new dataset is that the dataset was created specifically for 
this research project with the independent variables carefully collected for use 
with this study.  There was no need to second-guess the intentions behind the 
coding decisions of others, as would be the case if a pre-created dataset had 
been used.  This provided a greater element of control over the research.  This 
thesis has the added benefit that the variables were collected for the purpose of 
addressing the question of the impartiality of the Court of Appeal.   
 
The final dataset in this study contained 472 appeals against conviction.  All the 
cases in the dataset were full appeals; not applications or renewed applications.  
Some examples of ELS research have used datasets far larger than 472, while 
some are smaller.  Many examples of ELS utilise pre-coded databases of cases.  
The US Supreme Court Database is the largest, a dataset of US Supreme Court 
decisions dating back to 1791.757 The size of the database allows researchers to 
utilise very large sample sizes, occasionally of several thousand cases.758 The 
University of South Carolina maintains the Judicial Research Initiative (JuRI), 
which contains numerous databases of American courts at numerous levels.759  
This includes the ‘Songer’ database of US Courts of Appeals decisions.760 
Cross’s study of the US Courts of Appeals utilised the Songer Database of 
several thousand cases.761  Sunstein and his colleagues assembled their own 
database of almost 5000 non-unanimous reported Federal Courts of Appeals 
cases,762 and the same database was utilised by Boyd and her colleagues in their 
                                                          
757 HJ Spaeth, L Epstein et al 2016 Supreme Court Database, Version 2016 release 1 
http://supremecourtdatabase.org.   
758 See e.g. L Epstein, WM Landes and RA Posner, ‘Are Even Unanimous Decisions in the United 
States Supreme Court Political?’ (2012) Nw U L Rev 699. 
759 http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/databases.htm <accessed 26 July 16>. 
760 http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm <accessed 26 July 16>. 
761 FB Cross, ‘Decisionmaking in the US Circuit Courts of Appeals’ (2003) 91 Cali L Rev 1457. 
762 See CR Sunstein, LM Ellman and D Schkade ‘Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: 
A Preliminary Investigation’ (2004) (90) Va L Rev 301, 311.  See also CR Sunstein, D Schkade, 
LM Ellman, A Sawicki, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 
(Brookings 2006).  
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study of the influence of gender on outcomes.763  Included as part of JuRI is a 
database of non-US High or Supreme Courts, including a database of UK House 
of Lords decisions decided between 1970 and 2002.764   
 
Other studies have used smaller datasets which are comparable to the sample 
size used in this study.  For instance, Sisk, Heise, and Morriss’s study utilised a 
dataset of 294 cases.765 Two studies from outside of the United States utilised 
samples of 260766 and 507767 decisions respectively.  The former was a study of 
the Israel Supreme Court, the latter the Spanish Supreme Court.  Recently, the 
Howard League for Penal Reform analysed 147 judgments to assess the 
importance placed upon maturity in sentencing decisions.768  As can be seen, 
there is a wide disparity in the sample sizes of empirical studies of judicial 
decision-making.  The sample size of 472 used in this thesis is large enough for 
the kinds of statistical analysis conducted on the dataset.  As is discussed in 
Chapter 7, owing to the number of variables included in this study an initial 
univariate analysis was conducted in order to ensure that there were not too many 
variables relative to the sample size.  This process ensures that the models are 
not overfitted, whilst allowing for a greater number of variables to be explored.      
 
As far as possible, the dataset is a complete collection of all murder and rape 
appeals against conviction decided between January 2006 and December 2010.  
This is all available appeals handed down by the Court, and not only reported 
cases.  This means that the dataset has good coverage of murder and rape 
appeals which helps to ensure that any findings are reliable and replicable.  This 
                                                          
763 CL Boyd, L Epstein and AD Martin, ‘Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging’ (2010) 
Am J Pol Sci 389.  
764 http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/highcts.htm <accessed 26 July 16>. 
765 GS Sisk, M Heise and AP Morriss ‘Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical 
Study of Judicial Reasoning’ 1998 NYU L Rev 1377, 1408. 
766 K Weinshall-Margel, ‘Attitudinal and Neo-Institutional Models of Supreme Court Decision 
Making: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective from Israel’ (2011) JELS 556.  
767 N Garoupa, M Gili and F Gomez-Pomar, ‘Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical 
Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court’ (2012) JELS 795.  
768 Howard League, Judging Maturity: Exploring the Role of Maturity in the Sentencing of Young 
Adults (Howard League 2017).   
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has the benefit of avoiding any kind of selection effect which could be caused if 
only reported cases were used.   
 
It is possible that some murder or rape appeals will not have been available on 
any of the legal databases.  This can happen for a number of reasons: judgments 
may be withheld due to confidentiality issues or awaiting retrials.  It is for this 
reason that the time period 2006 to 2010 was utilised, as the appeal judgments 
are less likely to be embargoed and so more likely to be available.  It is not 
possible to know how many murder or rape appeals are missing from the dataset.  
However, it is likely that the numbers missing will be relatively small, because the 
numbers of appeals in the sample is relatively large.  Importantly, the dataset is 
large enough in its own right for the purposes of the statistical analysis.   
 
Several different legal databases (Westlaw, Lexis Nexis, Casetrack and bailii.org) 
were carefully searched for murder and rape appeals during the period.  The first 
three databases are professional subscription legal research tools, and so 
provide the best coverage of decisions from the Court of Appeal.  Bailii.org is a 
public freely available website which provides a relatively small, yet still large, 
number of decisions from a range of courts and jurisdictions.  This was primarily 
used as a final confirmation that as few cases as possible were omitted from the 
sample.  Westlaw and Casetrack were the most useful databases for the 
collection of cases, because they contained the majority of the cases in the 
sample.769  It was soon discovered that some appeals appearing on one database 
did not appear on another.  By searching all these databases it was possible to 
reduce to a minimum the number of potential missing cases in the dataset.  Thus, 
the dataset is as complete as it can be. 
 
The limitations inherent in this kind of quantitative empirical study have been 
discussed throughout this thesis.  The remainder of this section draws these 
                                                          
769 The Casetrack service was discontinued in February 2017.  Cases which appeared only on 
Casetrack may now be lost unless available elsewhere.   
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limitations together in order to summarise what kinds of conclusions can be 
reached regarding the decision-making of the Court.  The most significant 
limitations of this study are that by its design it is correlative and not causal and 
the variables utilised to measure the concept of impartiality are incomplete and 
could be subject to disagreement.  These two limitations in combination reduce 
how far it can be said that the research successfully captures the appearance of 
the impartiality of the Court of Appeal.           
 
It was explained above that the range of variables used to measure impartiality 
must be incomplete.  This is an inherent limitation within the process of 
quantification of a concept such as impartiality.  As Epstein and Martin explained, 
in all measurement exercises ‘everything about the object of study is lost except 
for the dimensions being studied’.770 For instance, measuring a person by only 
their height omits a great deal of information about that person.  This is a natural 
consequence of seeking to quantify phenomena which occur in the social world.  
A range of variables have been selected for analysis in this study, but whichever 
variables were selected, it would only be possible to capture part of the operation 
of the Court of Appeal.  It is important that the right dimensions are abstracted for 
the purpose of the analysis and to ‘capture all the parts that are essential to our 
research question’.771 It is questionable how far all the essential parts of judicial 
decision-making could be captured in order to fully address the question of the 
Court’s impartiality.  In Chapter 8, it is considered what this means for the results 
of this study, and for judicial studies in the future.   
 
The variables used to measure impartiality were restricted to the information 
available on the Court transcripts.  This was to try to keep the data collection 
uniform and the sources of data restricted to a reliable source.  There were some 
potential independent variables which were considered but rejected for use in the 
study, and these are discussed below.  It is in theory conceivable that uncollected, 
                                                          
770 L Epstein and AD Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press 
2014) 46-7.   
771 ibid, 47.  
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and uncollectable factors, such as eye-colour, height, attractiveness, the 
weather, whether a judge is ill on the day, and so on, could make the judges in 
the Court of Appeal decide differently by affecting their mood or how they view 
the appellant, victim or complainant.  Furthermore, as was explained in Chapter 
2, psychological research suggests that all decision-making is inherently 
unreliable or subject to heuristics.  In light of that, it must be accepted that there 
are potential variables of interest which had to be omitted from the study.  Under 
ideal conditions it would be possible to control for all variables and reduce this 
omitted variable bias, but due to the observational nature of the study this is not 
possible.  This is an understandable limitation of the research.   
 
The research conducted in this thesis is not an experiment, and so such unstated 
matters cannot be controlled and will rarely be disclosed in Court of Appeal 
transcripts.   This means they cannot be considered as variables in this thesis.  
This means that the correct statement of the parameters of this examination of 
the appearance of impartiality is that this study is an examination of whether the 
Court of Appeal appeared to have acted impartially, or not, regarding the 
variables which have been selected for analysis. While this is an important 
limitation and caveat, the variables under analysis are a legitimate source of study 
and are capable of being an appropriate measure of the appearance of 
impartiality.  This is because factual and demographic variables such as those 
utilised in this study have been regularly studied in the context of determining the 
decision-making of judges, notwithstanding these limitations.  Moreover, in their 
role as judges there are certain kinds of partiality which is unjustified,772 and these 
are encapsulated by the variables which are utilised in this study. 
 
Whilst it may be theoretically possible that decision-making could be influenced 
by (for instance), the judges’ individual moods on a particular day; the particular 
idiosyncrasies of judges; the attractiveness of complainants or appellants; the 
                                                          
772 O Raban, Modern Legal Theory and Judicial Impartiality (Glass House Press 2003) 2. 
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time of the day that the decision was made,773 and other such uncollectable 
factors, the size of the dataset compensates for this.  As the dataset is relatively 
large, if such factors did occasionally influence judges, or one particular judge in 
the dataset, they would be cancelled out by the rest of the cases in the study.  
Accordingly, the results of this study are not as vulnerable to the concern that 
such factors could not be collected.      
 
The positivistic nature of this study entails an assumption that it is possible to 
model mathematically and statistically the behaviour of judges deciding real 
cases.  Given that it is known that some variables are not collectable, this may 
lead to the challenge that it is not possible to model the Court sufficiently robustly.  
It is argued that this is primarily a philosophical question, and does not have major 
importance when one is conducting a quantitative socio-legal research project of 
this nature.  It is a philosophical question because there are inevitably missing 
variables in all social science research projects.  If one doubts the ability to 
construct models in such circumstances one is doubting the ability to gain 
knowledge in any social science.774 As Hammersley says, some positivist 
assumptions, such as that nature exists, and that true knowledge can be gained, 
cannot be avoided if one is conducting social science research.775  It must, 
therefore, be believed that the variables which have been selected bare some 
relation to the concept which is being studied and their analysis will provide facts 
and knowledge about the Court of Appeal’s decision-making.   
   
In light of the above, if independent variables are shown to be significant 
predictors of success and are shown to enhance the predictive ability of the 
models, this does not mean that the Court lacked impartiality.  This is because 
other variables which are not tested could have a greater impact.  Similarly, if 
variables are shown to be poor predictors of successful appeals, this would not 
demonstrate that the Court is impartial, as it could have been partial with respect 
                                                          
773 See S Danziger, J Levav and L Avnaim-Pesso, ‘Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions’ 
(2011) 108 PNAS 6889. 
774 See discussion by M Hammersley, Methodology: Who Needs It? (Sage 2011) 34-5. 
775 ibid. 
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to other, untested, factors.  Moreover, the judges may be adept at appearing 
impartial, while not actually being so.  Further research would need to be 
conducted in the future to determine whether any factors untested in this thesis 
are predictors of outcomes.  For instance, the Court could be observed and 
appellants could be asked to self-report their ethnicity for further analysis; or a 
qualitative study could be conducted by talking to judges.  All of these represent 
possibilities for future research.  However, it was not appropriate to take these 
steps as this research has been designed as an explorative quantitative analysis 
of the Court of Appeal transcripts.    
 
The research conducted in this thesis is unique for the Court of Appeal.  The 
research presented in this thesis represents a starting-point for further analysis 
of the Court.  The difficulties with using statistical measures to seek to draw 
inferences about human behaviour need to be remembered.  As such, future 
research would be needed to determine whether the results of this thesis can be 
replicated.  It is only if similar results are discovered through replication in different 
datasets and with different variables that the results of this thesis can be 
confirmed.  This thesis does replicate and confirm some previous research on the 
Court of Appeal.  The findings discussed in Chapter 7 offer some support, and 
are supported by, the analyses of previous research.  For instance, both Roberts 
and Heaton found that appeals are unlikely to be successful if there was no error 
in the proceedings, and this result is found in this study.  This is important 
because the results of this thesis can be considered to be a significant but 
sensible advancement of knowledge about the Court’s decision-making.                
   
As was explained in Chapter 2, it may be impossible to know whether the judges 
were subjectively biased or lacking in impartiality.  To be able to do this, would 
require the ability to observe what was happening in the judges’ minds at the 
precise time in history that any judgments was delivered.  Clearly, this is not 
possible.  Accordingly, there is no allegation in this thesis of subjective 
impartiality.  Although the eventual goal would be to learn what the judges were 
thinking, the best that can be done is to assess the appearance of impartiality.  It 
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is therefore important to state that whatever the results of the analysis are, there 
is no claim that any particular judge lacked impartiality in particular cases over 
which they presided in respect of any particular appellant demographic or case 
characteristic.  To reiterate this, the judges have been anonymised in this study.  
This thesis takes a more neutral standpoint than alleging an actual lack of 
impartiality.  Namely, this thesis seeks to determine whether the independent 
variables, as collected, are predictors of appeal outcomes, and these variables 
were designed to allow for objective impartiality to be measured.  Based upon 
this evidence, it must then be asked, as per the question in Porter v Magill,776 
whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would 
conclude that there was a real possibility that of a lack of impartiality.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Across the previous three chapters, the methodology, methods, data collection 
process, and independent variables have been fully stipulated.  This has been 
necessary to attempt to adhere to the social science aim of systematic and 
replicable research.  This chapter has provided a complete list of all the 
independent variables which will be analysed in the binary logistic regression 
analyses.  The purpose behind this was to allow for scrutiny of the variables and 
to allow for replication.  It has been explained that the collection of the variables 
was a dynamic process, requiring some trial and error.  The result of this process, 
however, was a dataset containing a wealth of reliably collected data on the 
Court’s decision-making which was suitable for statistical analysis. 
 
The next chapter presents the analysis of the Court’s decision-making.  This 
includes descriptive analysis of the grounds of appeal, and a range of binary 
logistic regression analyses.  Additional analyses are then conducted to seek to 
complete the evaluation of the Court.   
 
 
                                                          
776 [2002] 2 AC 357.  
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Chapter 7 
Findings and Analysis 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the descriptive and binary logistic regression analyses of 
the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) cases in the sample.  
This chapter presents two kinds of analysis of the Court’s decision-making.  
Firstly, there is a descriptive quantitative analysis of the grounds of appeal raised 
and the success rates of grounds of appeal.  It replicates the analysis conducted 
in Malleson’s,777 Roberts’s778 and Heaton’s779 studies.  The aim of this analysis 
is to determine whether rape and murder appeals raise different kinds of grounds 
compared to other kinds of offences, and to provide further descriptive analysis 
of the kinds of issues raised in these appeals.  The aim of this element of the 
research is to determine whether the findings of previous studies are further 
confirmed by this study.    
 
In order to gain a further understanding of decision-making in the Court, and to 
make an original contribution to the literature on the Court and the understanding 
of how it operates, it is sought to determine whether a range of variables are 
associated with the outcome of appeals.  This begins with a univariate ‘purposive 
selection’ procedure.  The primary aim of this process is to explore which 
variables are statistically stronger predictors of the outcome of Court of Appeal 
cases.  Following the purposive selection procedure, the remaining variables are 
analysed in a number of binary logistic regression analyses.  This chapter 
presents and evaluates the results of these binary logistic regression analyses.  
Finally, these analyses may miss some nuances in the decision-making of the 
                                                          
777 K Malleson, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Review of the Appeal Process, 
Research Study No 17 (HMSO 1993). 
778 S Roberts ‘The Decision-Making Process of Appeal Against Conviction in the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) (DPhil thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009). 
(Hereafter Roberts (2009)) 
779 SJ Heaton ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Utility of Using Innocence as a Criterion in the Post 
Conviction Process’ (DPhil Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2013). (Hereafter Heaton (2013)).  
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Court.  This is rectified by conducting some further analysis with varying datasets 
and variables.    
 
7.1 Overview of sample profile 
The final dataset contained 472 murder and rape appeals against conviction, 
decided between January 2006 and December 2010.  Figure 7.1 shows the 
numbers of appeals which were successful and unsuccessful.   
 
 
 
The overall success rate was therefore 28%.   
 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3, below, shows the success rates for rape and murder 
respectively.  
135
337
Figure 7.1: Outcome of appeals against 
conviction for Murder and rape 2006 - 2010.
Appeals Allowed Appeals Dismissed
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The success rate for rape appeals was therefore 34%, and for murder 22%.  The 
per-year overall success rate of the appeals in the sample is shown in Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1: Outcome of sampled appeals per year, 2006-2010.  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Appeals 
Dismissed  
87 67 41 70 72 
Appeals 
Allowed 
33 24 25 21 32 
% Successful 27% 26% 37% 23% 30% 
80
151
Figure 7.2: Outcome of sampled rape 
appeals against conviction.
Appeals Allowed Appeals Dismissed
55
186
Figure 7:3: Outcome of sampled murder 
appeals against conviction.
Appeals Allowed Appeals Dismissed
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Table 7.2: Percentage of murder and rape appeals successful per year, 2006 - 
2010. 
 Murder Rape 
2006 25% 29% 
2007 20% 31% 
2008 24% 51% 
2009 16% 31% 
2010 25% 36% 
 
It can be seen that the percentage of murder and rape appeals allowed shows 
some fluctuation by year.  It would be unwise to draw any particular conclusions 
regarding the attitude of the Court to murder and rape appeals from this simple 
table.  It does not suggest that the Court has become steadily any more or less 
inclined to quash convictions as the years moved on.  There is a noticeable 
increase in the success rate for rape in 2008, before a large decline in 2009.  This 
is probably explained by the noticeable decrease in cases heard in 2008 whilst 
the number of successful appeals remained the same.   
 
Data from official statistics show the following success rates for all appeals (i.e. 
not only murder and rape) decided between 2006 and 2010.780 
 
Table 7.3: Overall success rates in Court of Appeal 2006-2010. 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Success % 31% 37% 42% 38% 37% 
 
 
                                                          
780 Data collated from Court Statistics Quarterly January to March 2014. Additional tables, table 
5.8 www.gov.uk/government/statistics/court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2014. 
<accessed 16/09/2016>. 
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More recently, between 1 October 2014 and 30 September 2015, the overall 
success rate of appeals heard by the Court was 40%.781 It will be observed that 
the overall success rate for murder and rape appeals is consistently below the 
overall success rate.  The success rate in rape appeals always higher than the 
success rate in murder appeals.  This may be considered as expected.  In murder 
appeals there is rarely any dispute as to whether an offence was actually 
committed, while it rape this is often the core of the dispute.  This means that 
there is one level of uncertainty in rape appeals which may not arise in murder 
appeals.   
 
It may be possible to read this statistic as evidence of an insidious decision-
making process of the Court.  It may suggest that the judges are slower than 
usual to quash murder convictions than rape convictions.  Murder is one of the 
most serious offences known to the criminal law, and so the relatively low success 
rate for murder might suggest the judges are particularly restrictive in allowing 
murder appeals.  Based upon these statistics, it would again be unwise to draw 
this conclusion.  Whilst it is a fact that the success rate is lower in murder than in 
rape, it is difficult to know whether this is due to a restrictive approach.  What the 
difference in success rates does demonstrate, however, is that there are different 
success rates at appellate level for different offences.  This should caution against 
drawing too many conclusions as to the decision-making of the Court of Appeal 
based on macro-level analyses of overall success rates, as there is high 
variability according to offence type. 
 
7.2.1 Grounds of appeal raised in sample of murder and rape appeals  
Roberts (2009),782 and Heaton (2013)783 each analysed the grounds of appeal 
raised across their samples.  As the grounds of appeal were not necessarily 
measured in exactly the same way, their results are not repeated in full.  The 
results of this element of the research may not, therefore, be directly comparable 
                                                          
781 ibid.  
782 See n 778 above. 
783 See n 779 above. 
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to their results as grounds of appeal may have been coded or grouped differently.  
The intention behind this aspect of the study is to broadly replicate the previous 
studies and locate any obvious differences or similarities.   
 
There are some important points of note about Roberts’s and Heaton’s findings 
relating to grounds of appeal.  Both studies showed that summing up grounds of 
appeal were the most commonly argued and most likely to be successful.784 
Summing up accounted for over 20% of the grounds of appeal in both studies 
and was successful the most often.  The next most common grounds in both 
studies were claims that the judge had wrongly admitted or excluded evidence.785  
Fresh evidence was the next most common.  Fresh evidence represented 9% of 
the grounds of appeal in Heaton’s study, and 6% in Roberts’s study.786  In 
Heaton’s study fresh evidence was successful on 17 occasions; nine occasions 
in Roberts’s study.  Lurking doubt was rarely seen in either study.787          
   
Table 7.4(a) shows the number of times that particular grounds were raised 
across the whole sample of cases in the murder and rape appeals analysed in 
this study.  Over the 472 cases, there were 885 grounds of appeal raised.  The 
‘ground successful’ column shows the number of cases in which that ground was 
one of, or the only, reason for allowing the appeal.  Note that there are more 
successful grounds (154) than the number of successful appeals (135) because 
some appeals were successful for more than one reason.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
784 See Roberts (2009) 64-6, Heaton (2013) 123-5. 
785 ibid.  
786 ibid. 
787 ibid. 
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Table 7.4(a): Grounds of appeal raised in sampled appeals: Overall. 
Ground of Appeal Number of Cases 
Raised 
Ground 
Successful 
(% success) 
Success Rape 
/ Murder 
Summing Up 216  38 (17%) 23 / 15 
Misuse of Evidential 
Discretion 
166  24 (14%) 16 / 8 
Fresh Evidence 130 59 (45%) 27 / 32 
Refused No Case To 
Answer 
51 2 (3%) 0 / 2 
Unfair Trial Specifically 50 8 (16%) 6 / 2  
Abuse of Process 44 0 (-) 0 / 0  
Claim of Lawyer Error 35  3 (8%) 2 / 1 
IE / LD / GU788 30 3 (10%) 1 / 2 
Inconsistent Verdicts 25 3 (12%) 3 / 0 
Prosecution Error (Not 
Disclosure) 
24 1 (4%) 1 / 0 
Jury Irregularity (bias etc.) 20 3 (15%) 2 / 1 
Prosecution Disclosure 18 2 (11%) 2 / 0 
Judicial Intervention 12 1 (8%) 1 / 0 
Refused Severance 7 0 (-) 0 / 0 
Police Irregularity 6 1 (16%) 0 / 1 
Not Able to Mount 
Defence 
3 0 (-) 0 / 0 
Others 48 6 (12%) 6 / 0 
TOTALS 885 154 154 
 
To allow for further comparison of the grounds of appeal raised in the individual 
offences, Tables 7.4(b) and 7.4(c) show the same data for rape and murder 
respectively.  The percentages in brackets shows the percentage of rape and 
murder appeals respectively which raised each ground of appeal.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
788 This stands for Insufficient Evidence/Lurking Doubt/Generally Unsafe. 
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Table 7.4(b): Grounds of appeal raised in sampled appeals: Rape. 
Ground of Appeal Number of Cases 
Raised 
Ground 
Successful 
Summing Up 106 (45%) 23 
Misuse of Evidential 
Discretion 
79 (34%)  16 
Fresh Evidence 54 (23%) 27 
Refused No Case To 
Answer 
17 (7%)  0 
Unfair Trial Specifically 23 (10%) 6 
Abuse of Process 24 (10%)  0 
Claim of Lawyer Error 22 (9%)  2 
IE / LD / GU 13 (5%)  1 
Inconsistent Verdicts 21 (9%)  3 
Prosecution Error (Not 
Disclosure) 
10 (4%)  1 
Jury Irregularity (bias etc.) 11 (4%) 2 
Prosecution Disclosure 4 (1%)  2 
Judicial Intervention 9 (3%)  1 
Refused Severance 5 (2%)  0 
Police Irregularity 1 (1%)  0 
Not Able to Mount Defence 3 (1%)  0 
Other (indictments, etc.) 20 (8%) 6 
TOTALS 422 90 
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Table 7.4(c) Grounds of appeal raised in sampled appeals: Murder 
Ground of Appeal Number of Cases 
Raised 
Ground 
Successful 
Summing Up 110 (45%)  15 
Misuse of Evidential 
Discretion 
87 (36%)  8 
Fresh Evidence 76 (31%)  32 
Refused No Case To 
Answer 
34 (14%)  2 
Unfair Trial Specifically 27 (11%)  2 
Abuse of Process 20 (8%)  0 
Claim of Lawyer Error 13 (5%)  1 
IE / LD / GU 17 (7%)  2 
Inconsistent Verdicts 4 (1%)  0 
Prosecution Error (Not 
Disclosure) 
14 (5%) 0 
Jury Irregularity (bias etc.) 9 (3%)   1 
Prosecution Disclosure 14 (5%) 0 
Judicial Intervention 3 (1%)  0 
Refused Severance 2 (1%)  0 
Police Irregularity 5 (2%)  1 
Not Able to Mount Defence 0 (0%)  0 
Other 28 (11%) 0 
TOTALS 463 64 
 
The findings of this element of the research broadly confirm the previous studies, 
but there are some important differences.  Like Roberts’s and Heaton’s findings, 
the three most commonly argued grounds of appeal relate to claims of errors in 
summing up, claims of misuse of judicial evidential discretion, and fresh evidence.  
When comparing the grounds of appeal raised in the murder and rape appeals, 
it will be seen that on the whole they raised broadly similar grounds of appeal.  
There are, however, a number of noticeable differences.  Fresh evidence; claims 
that the judge should have accepted a submission of no case to answer; and 
allegations of defects with disclosure were raised more frequently in murder 
appeals, while inconsistent verdicts was more commonly argued in rape appeals.  
It will be observed that fresh evidence stands out as the most commonly 
successful ground of appeal in murder appeals.  The summing up and misuse of 
evidential discretion grounds were less likely to be a successful ground in murder 
appeals than rape appeals.  
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7.2.2 Appeals raising fresh evidence as a ground of appeal 
The statistics relating to fresh evidence are quite different in this study compared 
to the previous studies.  Fresh evidence was raised in 130 cases in this study, 
this was 27% of all cases and 14% of all grounds of appeal.  This latter figure was 
9% and 6% in Heaton’s and Roberts’s studies respectively.789  In this study, fresh 
evidence was successful 45% of the times it was raised, which is significantly 
higher than the success rate in Roberts’s and Heaton’s studies (25% and 31% 
respectively).790  One noticeable observation from this study is that fresh 
evidence is actually the ground of appeal most frequently successful in both the 
murder and rape appeals.  In the previous studies, the procedural irregularity 
grounds were most frequently successful.791  One conclusion can safely be drawn 
from this statistic: fresh evidence is more likely to be raised and to be a successful 
ground of appeal in murder and rape cases than it is in the Court of Appeal 
generally.   
 
Fresh evidence was raised in 76 murder appeals and 54 rape appeals.  Whist 
fresh evidence is raised more frequently in murder appeals, it was marginally 
more frequently successful in rape appeals.  27 convictions for rape were 
quashed on the basis of fresh evidence: 50% of the times it was raised.  There 
were 32 murder convictions quashed on basis of fresh evidence, which is 42% of 
the times it was raised.  This suggests that while fresh evidence is less 
forthcoming in rape appeals it is more often considered persuasive than fresh 
evidence in murder appeals. 
 
For the purposes of this study, fresh evidence was divided into a number of 
categories.  These were: 
 
 
                                                          
789 Heaton (2013) 125, Roberts (2009) 64 
790 ibid. 
791 ibid.  
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1) Fresh expert evidence not relating to psychiatric evidence – for instance 
medical evidence of the cause of death or sexual injury 
2) Fresh psychiatric evidence 
3) Fresh statement by a trial witness, or a fresh witness coming forward 
4) Fresh ‘real evidence’ – for instance documentary evidence 
5) Other evidence792 
 
Table 7.5 shows the number of times each category of fresh evidence was raised 
and the frequency that each category of fresh evidence was successful for 
murder and rape.  
 
Table 7.5: Categories of fresh evidence  
Category  Raised overall Successful 
ground murder 
Successful 
ground rape 
1 42 11 6 
2 23 13 2 
3 36 1 9 
4 25 7 10 
5 4 0 0 
  
Some differences become apparent in this data.  Fresh expert evidence, in the 
form of either psychiatric evidence or other expert evidence, was most frequently 
successful in murder appeals.  As discussed below, convictions for manslaughter 
were often substituted in these cases.  23 of the 55 successful murder appeals 
(41%) were successful on the basis of some kind of fresh expert evidence, whilst 
only 10% of successful rape appeals were for this reason.  Successful fresh 
evidence in rape appeals were more likely to be based upon fresh witnesses or 
statements, or other kinds of real evidence.   
                                                          
792 For instance, the fresh evidence of police impropriety seen in R v Steele and others [2006] 
EWCA Crim 195, or jury irregularity following investigation by the CCRC seen in R v Thompson 
and others [2010] EWCA Crim 1623. 
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 Fresh evidence appeals in murder often raised similar issues.  There were 6 
cases where the evidence of Home Office pathologist Dr Michael Heath (which 
would be category 1) was the issue.793 There were 18 murder appeals where 
fresh evidence was submitted to attempt to demonstrate that the appellant had a 
viable defence of diminished responsibility (category 2).  Of these appeals, 11 
were successful, and in all but one case, where a retrial was ordered,794 the 
murder conviction was replaced by a manslaughter conviction.  Once the Court 
is satisfied that the appellant did have a ‘disease of the mind’ and that his or her 
responsibility was diminished,795 so long as he did not hide his condition to 
attempt to secure an acquittal at trial,796 success usually follows.  This again 
demonstrates that the ‘unsafety test’ is, to some degree, mediated by rules.  Often 
the evidence of diminished responsibility will be so inconvertible that the Court 
will ‘have no option’797 but to allow the appeal and replace the murder conviction 
with a manslaughter conviction.  The appeal of Kenneth Erskine, convicted of 
seven counts of murder and one count of attempted murder, was described as 
straightforward; the evidence of diminished responsibility was overwhelming.798  
 
The CCRC is a particularly potent source of fresh evidence.  In the sample of 
murder and rape appeals studied in this thesis, there were 44 appeals following 
a CCRC referral, 33 of which raised fresh evidence.  Of the 33 CCRC referrals 
raising fresh evidence, 21 were successful.  There were therefore 97 non-CCRC 
appeals which raised fresh evidence, 38 of which were successful.  Outside of 
CCRC referrals, therefore, fresh evidence was successful 39.1% of the times it 
was raised.  Whilst this does suggest that CCRC referrals are somewhat 
responsible for the much higher overall success rate of fresh evidence observed 
in this thesis, the 39.1% success rate in non-CCRC appeals remains significantly 
                                                          
793 R v Boreman and others [2006] EWCA Crim 2265; R v O’Leary (aka Dwyer) [2006] EWCA 
Crim 3222; R v L [2007] EWCA Crim 1750; R v Stanley [2008] EWCA Crim 603; R v Simmons 
[2009] EWCA Crim 741; R v Ahmed [2010] EWCA Crim 2899.  
794 R v Inglis [2010] EWCA Crim 2269. 
795 Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957.  The definition of the defence was altered by the Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009, s 52.  
796 See R v Latus [2006] EWCA Crim 3187.  
797 See R v Dass [2009] EWCA Crim 1208 [41].  
798 R v Erskine; R v Williams [2009] EWCA Crim 1425 [95]. 
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higher than that seen in previous studies.  This analysis of the role of fresh 
evidence is discussed further in Chapter 8.    
 
7.2.3 The ‘Insufficient Evidence, Lurking Doubt, Generally Unsafe’ ground 
of appeal 
Grounds of appeal coded as ‘lurking doubt’ were rare in both Roberts’s and 
Heaton’s studies.799 In the present study, a single ground of appeal was coded 
for any appeals which claimed that the verdict was unsafe due to there being 
insufficient evidence; appeals claiming the verdict was ‘generally unsafe’; and 
appeals which referred specifically to ‘lurking doubt’.  Roberts and Heaton coded 
some of these kinds of grounds of appeal separately.  While the Court does not 
often refer to the words ‘lurking doubt,’ both Roberts and Heaton note that there 
are other kinds of appeals which are equivalent to lurking doubt appeals.  Heaton 
refers to there being a category of appeals which require the Court to consider 
the merits of the evidence: fresh evidence, issues of identification, and arguments 
of no case to answer, as well as lurking doubt.800  In Heaton’s study, there were 
13 appeals based upon issues of identification in addition to cases coded as 
lurking doubt.  Roberts coded appeals claiming ‘weak or insufficient evidence’ 
separately from ‘lurking doubt’ appeals, and found there were 8 of those appeals 
in her study, in addition to her lurking doubt appeals.801  
 
In the present study, there were 30 ‘generally unsafe, insufficient evidence, or 
lurking doubt’ appeals, meaning it was claimed in 6% of appeals, or 3% of 
grounds of appeal raised. Roberts’s ‘lurking doubt’ and ‘weak or insufficient 
evidence’ grounds represented 2% of her grounds; Heaton’s ‘lurking doubt’ and 
‘weak ID evidence’ grounds represented close to 4% of his grounds.  Thus, all 
three studies show that grounds of appeal most similar to ‘lurking doubt’ are rarely 
argued on appeal.  Furthermore, such grounds are rarely successful.  It was 
successful on just three occasions in the present study.  It was successful only 
                                                          
799 Roberts (2009) 114, Heaton (2013) 123.  
800 Heaton (2013), 124. 
801 Roberts (2009) 64.  
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once (for the ‘weak ID evidence’ ground) in Heaton’s and three times (twice for 
weak evidence, once for lurking doubt) in Roberts’s study.  Such low numbers for 
success across all these studies show that the Court is indeed slow to quash 
convictions where it is necessary to go against the verdict of the jury in the 
absence of particular errors at trial.   
 
The three cases where the appeal was allowed on the basis of this ground were 
two murder appeals and one rape appeal from 2010: R v Haigh;802 R v Azam and 
others803 and R v J.804 In Haigh, Court held that the judge was correct to have 
allowed ‘bad character’ evidence in, and he was correct to have rejected a claim 
of no case to answer.  The conviction for murder was quashed as there was 
insufficient evidence of murder rather than manslaughter following the death of 
the appellant’s baby.  In Azam convictions for joint enterprise murder gained after 
a third trial were quashed as the evidence relating to the identity of the shooter 
was unclear.  Although the Court did not itself refer to ‘lurking doubt’ in its decision 
it did refer to the statement from the single judge Sir Christopher Holland granting 
leave explicitly on the basis of lurking doubt.  In J, the conviction for rape was 
quashed, after finding (just) that there was a legitimate chain of reasoning 
meaning that the verdicts were not inconsistent, that ‘this is one of those rare 
cases where on the particular facts and circumstances of the case the verdict on 
[the rape count] is unsafe.’805     
 
As Heaton says, there are other grounds of appeal which essentially ask the 
Court to weigh up the evidence against the appellant in a similar way to lurking 
doubt appeals.806  The most important is fresh evidence which has already been 
discussed, but there is another important ground which operates in a similar way.  
Appeals which claim that the judge should have accepted a claim of no case to 
answer are similar to lurking doubt appeals and arise relatively frequently.  The 
                                                          
802 [2010] EWCA Crim 90. 
803 [2010] EWCA Crim 226. 
804 [2010] EWCA Crim 1768. 
805 ibid [25]. 
806 Heaton (2013) 124.  
226 
 
ground was raised in 50 cases in the present study.  Like lurking doubt appeals, 
it is also unlikely to be successful overall: just twice in the present study.  It may 
be concluded therefore that there is relatively little difference as to how murder 
and rape appeals are treated based on this ground compared with appeals 
generally.  As was discussed in Chapter 4, if the Court finds that the judge should 
have accepted a claim of no case to answer, it follows logically and as a matter 
of law that the quashing of the conviction must follow.  Accordingly, it would 
appear that the Court is slow to find that this error occurred, because whilst it was 
raised relatively frequently, it was rarely successful.  This suggests a relatively 
high degree of deference to the decision of the trial judge not to accept a claim of 
no case to answer.         
 
The result of this element of the research suggests that when the Court is asked 
to weigh up the evidence against the appellant, in the absence of fresh evidence 
or procedural irregularities, they will rarely favour the appellant.  Cases which 
could be grouped in an ‘insufficient evidence’ category are rarely successful.  The 
Court of Appeal will usually defer to the judgment of the trial judge in no case to 
answer appeals, with the knowledge that doing otherwise means the conviction 
must be quashed.  While this may be evidence of a restrictive approach, it may 
also make sense that convictions are rarely quashed on this basis.  If the 
appellant was convicted of the offence by a jury, it may be expected that it will be 
rare for a Court of three judges, who did not hear all the evidence, to find there 
was in fact insufficient evidence to convict.  As in previous studies, it is rare for 
the lurking doubt / insufficient evidence ground of appeal to be the only ground of 
appeal.  It tends to be argued by counsel as a final attempt to rescue an otherwise 
failing appeal.  These statistical findings will be discussed in Chapter 8.  In 
particular it will be discussed whether the allegation of a restrictive approach is 
substantiated by these results. 
 
This analysis feeds into the ‘Did Error Occur?’ legal variable which is utilised in 
this study.  This substantiates that if no error occurred, and there is no fresh 
evidence, appeals are unlikely to be successful.  Whilst previous studies have 
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suggested that this demonstrates a restrictive approach, it is not clear how this 
conclusion is reached.  In Chapter 4, it was argued that the ‘unsafety test’ appears 
to provide the Court with fairly wide discretion, but the Court has interpreted the 
test so as to mean that if the Court thinks that the jury would still have convicted, 
had they known what the Court knows by the time of the appeal, they must allow 
the appeal.  This, it was argued, demonstrates that the discretion offered by the 
unsafety test is framed by the necessity to operate the unsafety test in a way 
which upholds the purpose of the Court and the unsafety test – to correct 
miscarriages of justice and to uphold the rule of law.  If it is shown that this is what 
occurs in this study of the Court, as measured by the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable, 
this could be considered a measure of the legal model, and so impartiality, as the 
Court is operating based upon its understanding of the purpose of the ‘unsafety 
test’.       
    
7.3 Summary of findings  
The results of this element of the study broadly confirm the findings of previous 
studies, but there are some differences.  Appeals based on procedural 
irregularities dominate grounds of appeal in murder and rape appeals, but not to 
the same extent as seen in previous studies.  Fresh evidence has a far greater 
role in murder and rape appeals than in the general universe of appeals.  This 
suggests a need for caution in drawing conclusions as to the general decision-
making of the Court of Appeal given the demonstrable difference in approach to 
different crimes.  In some ways the statistics for murder and rape paint a 
somewhat different picture of decision-making in the Court of Appeal, in particular 
in relation to fresh evidence.  However, this study also shows that the Court will 
rarely quash convictions in appeals which require the Court to overrule the jury’s 
finding of fact.  It is also rare for the Court to overrule a judge’s finding of sufficient 
evidence.   
 
The remainder of this chapter explores the impartiality of the Court, and analyses 
the results of the relationship between a range of independent variables and the 
outcome of appeals against conviction.  
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7.4 Purposive selection procedure 
There were over 100 individual pieces of data collected for each case including 
factual and demographic details and grounds of appeal.  Some of the data were 
never intended to be used as variables in the binary logistic regression analysis 
but was intended for use as descriptive statistics or to aid in the creation of new 
variables or for identification purposes.  Field discusses the rule of thumb that for 
binary logistic regression there should be approximately 10 events per variable 
(EPV) included in the analysis.807  Peduzzi et al showed that having fewer than 
10 EPV can lead to biased or overfitting results due to there being too many 
variables compared to the number of events.808 It is the number of successful 
appeals which is considered when determining the number of ‘events’.809 This is 
because it is the outcome which is least likely to occur which should be 
considered when calculating EVP.  This means the relevant number of ‘events’ 
for the purposes of EPV is the 135 successful appeals.  Thus, a maximum of 13 
independent variables, if following the 10 EPV rule of thumb, could be included 
in the final analysis to reduce the chance of biased results.  As Field explains, the 
10 EVP rule of thumb oversimplifies the issue of variable selection.810  For 
instance, Vittinghoff and McCulloch found that as low as 5-9 EPV could be 
cautiously used.811   
 
As was shown in Chapter 6, there are more than 13 independent variables in this 
study.  As a result, some of the variables cannot be utilised in the final modelling.  
Usually, this selection exercise is not necessary because either the dataset is 
very large, or there were a large number of events, or there were fewer or more 
specific variables collected.  For instance, if there were two variables and 200 
‘events’, no selection process would be necessary.  Alternatively, if the 
                                                          
807 A Field, Discovering Statistics Using IMB SPSS Statistics (4th ed, SAGE Publishing 2013) 313. 
808 P Peduzzi, J Concato, E Kemper, TR Holford and AR. Feinstein ‘A Simulation Study of the 
Number of Events Per Variable in Logistic Regression Analysis’ (1997) 49 (12) J Clin 
Epidemiology 1373, see also MA Babyak ‘What You See May Not Be What You Get: A Brief, 
Nontechnical Introduction to Overfitting in Regression-Type Models’ (2004) (66) Psychosomatic 
Medicine 411.  
809 ibid. 
810 Field (n 807) 313. 
811 E Vittinghoff and CE McCulloch, ‘Relaxing the Rule of Ten Events Per Variable in Logistic and 
Cox Regression’ (2007) (165) Am J Epidemiology 710, 717.  
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researcher had access to a large pool of research participants, and a pre-defined 
number of variables, it would be possible to determine how large a sample was 
needed based on the expected power of the variables.  For instance, a researcher 
could determine the size of the sample needed if it was intended to collect ten 
variables from each case, based on an estimation of power.  As Field shows, if a 
researcher intends to collect ten variables and she expects a medium effect, she 
would need to collect a sample of approximately 119 cases.812  
 
As there have been no similar studies of this nature conducted on the Court of 
Appeal, except for the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable, it was not possible to know 
which variables were likely to be associated with outcomes and which were not.  
Accordingly, the purpose of this research is to address that question as an initial 
explorative investigation.  Later researchers can utilise the findings of this thesis 
to conduct further research on the Court of Appeal or other courts.  
 
The method used to select variables for further analysis is the ‘purposive 
selection’ procedure suggested by Hosmer, Lemeshow and Sturdivant.813  They 
suggest conducting univariate analysis on each independent variable separately.  
Any variable with a p-value of 0.25 or higher would be omitted from the analysis.  
Since, as was explained above, the p-value is a relatively weak analytic test of 
the truth of a null hypothesis, this higher p-value cut off means any variables 
dismissed at this stage are likely to have little predictive power.  However, as 
explained in Chapter 5, for variables with larger p-values this should not be 
interpreted as a finding of no association, or an acceptance of the null hypothesis.  
Similarly, variables with p-values smaller than 0.25 should not be interpreted as 
having substantive effects on outcomes.  Rather, the p-value should be 
considered a descriptive finding of the strength of correlation rather than 
inferential.   
 
                                                          
812 Field (n 807) 314. 
813 DW Hosmer, S Lemeshow and RX. Sturdivant Applied Logistic Regression (3rd ed, Wiley 2013) 
89-94.   
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The difficulty with the purposive selection method is that some variables may be 
insignificant on their own but in combination with others may have a stronger 
association with outcomes.814 The alternatives suggested by Babyak are to 
collect more data or to combine variables.  In this study it was decided that the 
sample size was large enough to not require further collection of data, and there 
were no variables to combine.  As Hosmer and his colleagues state, by using a 
higher p-value than the more conventional 0.05 the risk of omitting potentially 
relevant variables is mitigated.815  An analysis by Bursac and colleagues 
suggested that this was a useful and viable technique for covariate selection.816 
This method was useful in removing some variables which had very large p-
values (i.e. non-significant) which would be less likely to contribute to the final 
model as an attempt to model outcomes.  As this is an exploratory study, this 
initial univariate screening exercise was helpful at identifying those variables 
which might, and might not, have an association with the judges’ decision-
making.            
 
Table 7.6 shows the results of the purposive selection procedure.  This shows 
the p-value for each variable and the co-efficient (B) for each variable.  If the co-
efficient has a negative sign this indicates that the variable is associated with 
having an appeal dismissed; a positive sign indicates that the variable is 
associated with a successful appeal.  The further the co-efficient is from zero, in 
either direction, the stronger predictor the variable is likely to be.  Full statistics 
for each variable included in this stage is provided in Appendix C.  The ‘Did Error 
Occur?’ variable was not included in the purposive selection procedure because 
it has already been hypothesised that it would have a strong relationship with 
outcomes, and it had been determined previously that the variable would be 
included in the analysis.   
 
 
                                                          
814 See MA Babyak ‘What You See May Not Be What You Get: A Brief, Nontechnical Introduction 
to Overfitting in Regression-Type Models’ (2004) (66) Psychosomatic Medicine 411, 417. 
815 Hosmer, Lemeshow and Sturdivant (n 813) 91. 
816 Z Bursac, CH Gauss, DK Williams and DW Hosmer, ‘Purposeful Selection of Variables in 
Logistic Regression; (2008) (3) Source Code of Biology and Medicine 17.  
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Table 7.6: Purposive selection procedure results. Cut off: p = > 0.25. 
Variable Name P value B 
1) Joined case (*) (n = 55) 0.13 -0.52 
Multi Murder / Rape (n = 116) 0.505 0.155 
Convicted Other Offences (n = 195) 0.714 -0.76 
Monday (n = 39) 0.49  0.24 
Tuesday (n = 106) 0.57 -0.14 
2) Wednesday (*) (n = 108) 0.09 -0.42 
Thursday (n = 106) 0.68 0.09 
3) Friday (*) (n = 113) 0.17 0.31 
January (n = 39) 0.49 0.24 
4) February (*) (n = 46) 0.18 0.42 
March (n = 46) 0.69 -0.14 
5) April (*) (n = 29) 0.17 -0.69 
May (n = 59) 0.72 0.10 
June (n = 44) 0.57 -0.20 
July (n = 64)  0.92 -0.02 
August (n = 7)  0.41 -0.88 
September (n = 11) 0.44 -0.60 
October (n = 37) 0.87 0.05 
November (n = 43) 0.34 0.32 
December (n = 47) 0.62 -0.17 
Extempore (n = 307) 0.79 0.05 
QC Appellant Only (n = 54) 0.85 0.05 
6) QC Crown Only (*) (n = 35) 0.24 -0.50 
F Counsel Appellant (n = 99) 0.86 0.04 
F Counsel Crown (n = 119) 0.35 0.21 
F Judge Present (n = 133) 0.82 0.04 
LCJ Present (n = 29) 0.76 0.12 
VP Present (n = 39) 0.67 -0.16 
President Present (n = 24) 0.39  -0.44 
Circuit Judge Present (n = 95) 0.42 -0.21 
Recorder Present (n = 60) 0.50 -0.20 
7) Retired Judge Present (*) (n = 52) 0.18 0.41 
Trial Judge Sat in CA (n = 101) 0.13 but see 
discussion in 
Chapter 6 
-0.404 
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Variable Name P value B 
Judge 1(n = 25) 0.33 -0.49 
8) Judge 2 (*) (n = 20) Becomes Judge 
1 
0.03 0.96 
9) Judge 3 (*) (n = 32) Becomes Judge 
2 
0.04 -1.08 
10) Judge 4 (*) (n = 43) Becomes Judge 
3 
0.00 0.97 
Judge 5 (n = 34) 0.77 -0.11 
Judge 6(n = 39) 0.75 0.11 
Judge 7 (n = 20) 0.88 0.07 
Judge 8 (n = 29) 0.47 0.29 
Judge 9 (n = 23) 0.78 -0.13 
Judge 10 (n = 25)  0.60 -0.25 
Judge 11 (n = 26) 0.28 -0.54 
White Brit (n = 83) 0.04 see relevant 
note in Chapter 6 
0.66 
Cases cited 0.81 -0.00 
11) Offence Rape (*) (n = 231) 0.00 -0.58 
12) Low Sentence (*) (n = 76) 0.09 0.45 
Medium Sentence (n = 213) 0.93 -0.01 
High Sentence (n = 86) 0.95 0.01 
13) Very High Sentence (*) (n = 48) 0.05 but see 
relevant note in 
Chapter 6 
-0.83 
Appellant Good Character Stated (n = 
88) 
0.46 0.18 
14) Appellant Bad Character Stated (*) 
(n = 210) 
0.00 -0.65 
Denial of AR (n = 284) 0.50 -0.13 
15) Denial of MR (*) (n = 165) 0.14 0.30 
16) CCRC (*) (n = 44) 0.00 1.128 
17) Granted Single Judge (*) (n = 278)  0.00 -0.65 
18) Historical Offence (*) (n = 57) 0.07 0.51 
Appellant under 18 (n = 49) 0.98 -0.00 
19) Age Under 13 (*) (n = 108)  0.08 0.402 
Age 13 – Under 16 (n = 33)   0.53 0.239 
Age 16 - 17 (n = 34) 0.91 0.04 
20) Age 18+ (*) (n = 296)  0.04 -0.42 
Drink / Drugs (n = 161) 0.27 -0.237 
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Variable Name P value B 
Victim Male (n = 190) 0.62 -0.10 
21) Unanimous Verdict (*) (n = 390) 0.02 but see 
relevant note in 
Chapter 6 
-0.54 
Known Victim (n = 393) 0.87 0.04 
 
Fuller analysis of this Table is deferred until Chapter 8, but there are some 
significant points to note from this initial analysis.  Some variables of note had 
large p-values, suggesting weak association.  For instance, the Female Judge 
variable had a p-value of 0.82.  As was discussed in Chapter 3, gender has been 
frequently used as a variable in ELS studies.  This result therefore adds to the 
already mixed picture of the association between of gender and judging. There 
were 70 murder appeals in which there was at least one female judge, and 17 
(24%) of these were successful.  There were 80 rape appeals in which there was 
at least one female judge, and 22 (27%) of these were successful.  There is little 
difference in the success rates between the two offences when a female judge is 
present, therefore suggesting little association.  If gender could be considered to 
be an issue in rape appeals, it does not appear to have any bearing on the 
outcome of appeals against conviction with female judges.    
 
Other variables of note which had larger p-values were the ranks of the judges in 
the judicial hierarchy.  Only the Retired Judge variable made it through the 
purposive selection procedure.  Thus, an appellant, or the Crown, has little to fear 
if they get more or less senior judges; there does not appear to be a strong 
association.  In Darbyshire’s qualitative observations of the Court she found that 
judges of lower ranks did not simply defer to higher ranks, and could observe no 
patterns in results.817  The present study supports this finding.   
 
It is also interesting to note some of the signs of the coefficients, even for 
variables which were not strong predictors.  For instance, if the trial judge had 
                                                          
817 P Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart Publishing 2011) 
Chapter 14. 
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previously sat in the Court of Appeal, this was associated with an unsuccessful 
appeal.  As is noted in Chapter 6, however, this variable was not included in the 
later models due to missing data.  It is also pertinent to note the opposite signs 
of very low and very high sentences. Very low sentences were associated with 
success and very high sentences were associated with failure.  It will also be 
noted that some judges were associated with successful appeals whilst some 
were associated with unsuccessful appeals.  
 
The majority of the independent variables analysed in this study are shown to be 
only weakly associated with the outcomes of appeals against conviction.  As was 
stated in Chapters 5 and 6, each variable had a null hypothesis that the variable 
is not associated with outcomes.  It was also explained that for most variables it 
is unlikely to ever be the case that there is no association at all with the dependent 
variable.  This was shown to be the case, as no variable had a B of zero, after 
noting that the B is rounded to three decimal places.  Accordingly, it would be 
inaccurate to state that these variables had no association at all with the outcome 
of appeals.  However, in this study, it has been sought to identify the variables 
which are more strongly associated with outcomes.  Only variables with a p-value 
of lower than 0.25 were thus included in the next stage of analysis.            
 
7.5 Results of initial multiple binary logistic regression analysis 
As an initial assessment, all the 21 variables with p-values smaller than 0.25 were 
analysed in a binary logistic regression model.  This caused a reduction in the 
number of cases included in the analysis from 472 cases, to 423 cases.  The 
cause of this reduction is the sentencing variables.  The sentencing variables 
were subject to missing data as not all judgments would state clearly what the 
sentence was.  In the 423 cases the split between outcomes was 311 (73.5%) 
appeals dismissed and 112 appeals allowed.  This means that the missing data 
for sentencing appears to disproportionately impact successful appeals, as the 
percentage of successful appeals in the smaller dataset is lower compared with 
the full dataset.  This is a problem for two reasons: successful appeals were 
already relatively rare which makes them more difficult to predict; and the lower 
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dataset size may affect the EPV.  To reduce the chance of biased results, 11-13 
variables could be included in this dataset.  How this was dealt with is discussed 
below.     
 
Despite this difficulty, the results of the initial binary logistic regression model are 
shown below.  The overall significance of the model was less than 0.000, 
meaning that the model performs significantly better than the constant only 
model.  A Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test was conducted. This tests 
the null hypothesis that the model is a good fit for the data.  The p-values of 0.727 
meaning that the model is a good fit for the data.  The Cox and Snell and 
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 were 0.14 and 0.21 respectively.  This means that the 
model explains between 14% and 21% of the variation in outcomes.  This shows 
that the 21 variable model performs moderately well at predicting outcomes.  This 
means that this model would be unlikely to be of use in predicting outcomes in 
particular cases, but it does allow an assessment of the strength of the 
association between the variables and the outcomes.   
 
The following Table shows the number of successful and unsuccessful appeals 
which were correctly classified by this model.   
 
Table 7.7: Classification table: Initial analysis.  
  Appeals Allowed 
Appeals 
Dismissed  
  
Correctly Classified 30 (26.8%)  294 (94.5%)   
Overall Correct     324 (76.6%) 
 
 
It will be seen that the model performs very well at predicting dismissed appeals 
but only moderately at predicting successful appeals.  However, of the 423 cases 
included in this model, some 375 were predicted to have been dismissed based 
by the model.  This may explain why model is able to correctly classify a very high 
proportion of unsuccessful appeals.  Since most appeals were predicted to have 
been dismissed, and most appeals were dismissed, by chance it will correctly 
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predict a large amount of unsuccessful appeals.  It would appear therefore that 
this model does not perform especially well at discriminating between successful 
and unsuccessful appeals, and the variables are poor at predicting an allowed 
appeal.  This would suggest that, while overall the model can correctly classify 
76.4% of appeals, the model is not able to differentiate between successful and 
unsuccessful appeals to any great extent.       
 
Table 7.8, below, shows the variables which were entered into the model.  The B 
column is the co-efficient for each variable.  The S.E column in the standard error 
of the co-efficient.  In this model the standard errors are relatively small and 
robust, i.e. none are approaching 1.  The Sig. column is the p-value for the 
individual variables.  The Exb(b) column is the odds ratio (OR), which explains 
the change in the likelihood of a successful appeal if that variable is present.  An 
odds ratio below 1 indicates that if the variable is present the odds of a successful 
appeal decrease by the value of the odds ratio; an odds ratio of above 1 indicates 
that if the variable is present the odds of success increase by the value of the 
odds ratio.  Variables marked with an asterisk in the Sig. column indicate that the 
variable is a statistically significant predictor at the 5% level.  
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Table 7.8: Variables in equation: Initial analysis. 
Variable B S.E Sig. Exp(B) 
Joined Case -0.265 0.445 0.551 0.767 
Wed -0.223 0.318 0.483 0.800 
Fri 0.288 0.309 0.351 1.334 
Feb -0.147 0.444 0.741 0.864 
Apr -0.803 0.570 0.159 0.448 
QC Crown Only -0.953 0.529 0.072 0.386 
Retired Judge Present 0.141 0.374 0.706 1.152 
Judge1 1.230 0.560 0.028* 3.421 
Judge2 -1.164 0.659 0.077 0.312 
Judge3 0.959 0.417 0.021* 2.610 
Offence Rape -0.194 0.326 0.552 0.824 
Sentence Low 0.600 0.311 0.054 1.822 
Sentence V High -0.317 0.477 0.507 0.729 
Bad Character -0.367 0.273 0.179 0.693 
Denial of MR 0.818 0.289 0.005* 2.266 
CCRC 1.167 0.459 0.011* 3.212 
Single Judge -0.660 0.265 0.013* 0.517 
Historical Offence 0.863 0.388 0.026* 2.370 
Under_13 0.304 0.423 0.472 1.356 
Age_18+ 0.018 0.378 0.962 1.018 
Unanimous -0.242 0.297 0.414 0.785 
Constant -0.913 0.505 0.070 0.401 
* = significant at 5% level 
 
This Table is shown largely for completeness and openness of data and the 
analytic process.  There is no intention to further analyse this Table, because 
there are likely to be too many variables included in this model to mean the results 
are reliable.  As such, confidence intervals are not provided at this stage.   
 
In order to have the EPV at an acceptable level, several variables need to be 
removed.  Only variables with a p-value below 0.500 are retained in the analysis 
initially, the rest are removed.  This higher p-value was used in order to retain 
more potential variables in the model.  This resulted in the removal of the 
following variables with p-values higher than 0.500: 
 
 Joined case 
 February 
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 Retired Present 
 Rape 
 Sentence very high 
 Adult Victim 
  
Note that this does not remove any cases from the sample, but removes that 
variable from the analysis.  The remaining day of the week and months of the 
year variables were also removed from the model at this stage.  This was 
because the majority of these variables were removed at the univariate stage, 
and they had only moderate association with outcomes in the above binary 
logistic regression analysis, and so it was concluded that these associations were 
more likely to be spurious.  After removing the three remaining date variables, the 
number of variables is reduced to 12.  Finally, it was decided to remove the ‘low 
sentence’ variable.  This is because of the effect it has on the size of the dataset.  
It was also not statistically significant.  Therefore, at this stage the model was 
returned to the full size of 472 appeals, with 11 variables.  As there were 135 
‘events’, the EPV was now over 10, thereby helping to ensure the robustness of 
the data analysis being undertaken.  
 
7.6 Binary logistic regression Model 1 
The 11 remaining variables were included in a further binary logistic regression 
model, the results of which are now presented.  This will be called MODEL 1 
throughout this chapter.  Model 1 was statistically significant, with a p-value of 
less than 0.000. The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit test showed the 
model to be a good fit for the data, with a p-value of 0.852.  The Cox and Snell 
and Nagelkerke pseudo R2 results were 0.11 and 0.16 respectively. The 
classification Table for this model is shown below. 
 
Table 7.9: Classification table: Model 1.   
  Appeals Allowed Appeals Dismissed    
Correctly Classified 33 (24.4%)  318 (94.4%)   
Overall Correct     74.4% 
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The variables included in this model and their p-values are shown in the Table 
below.  Variables significant at the 5% level are marked with an asterisk.   
 
Table 7.10: Variables in equation: Model 1. 
Variable B S.E Sig. Exp(B) 
QC Crown Only 0-.745 0.476 0.118 0.475 
Judge1 1.025 0.504 0.042* 2.787 
Judge2 -0.785 0.558 0.160 0.456 
Judge3 1.034 0.345 0.003* 2.813 
Bad Character -0.531 0.233 0.023* 0.588 
Denial of MR 0.532 0.245 0.030* 1.703 
Historical Offence 0.730 0.345 0.034* 2.076 
Under 13 0.215 0.292 0.461 1.240 
CCRC 0.884 0.370 0.017* 2.420 
Single Judge -0.515 0.239 0.031* 0.598 
Unanimous -0.483 0.261 0.064 0.617 
Constant -0.540 0.337 0.109 0.583 
* = significant at 5% level 
 
The following Table shows the 95% confidence intervals for the exp(B) (odds 
ratio) of each variable.  The 95% confidence interval can be interpreted as 
meaning that the odds of a successful appeal may change by as little as the lower 
bound of the interval, or as much as the upper bound, with 95% confidence.818  
For instance, the first entry in Table 7.11, QC Crown Only, means the model 
calculates with 95% confidence that the odds of a successful appeal may decline 
to 0.187 or increase to 1.207 if only the Crown was represented by a QC.  It is 
possible that the true odds ratio is outside this range, but it is relatively unlikely if 
a 95% confidence interval is used.819  A smaller range means that the variable is 
more robust, and more confidence can be had in the precision of the results.  
Variables in which the confidence interval crosses the boundary of 1, such as the 
QC Crown Only variable, will not be statistically significant, because an OR of 1 
means there is no observed difference in outcome when that variable is present.  
                                                          
818 See DW Hosmer, S Lemeshow and RX Sturdivant, Applied Logistic Regression (3rd ed, Wiley 
2013) 54. 
819 There is disagreement and some controversy over the proper interpretation of confidence 
intervals.  This interpretation is the most widely used, see G Cumming, Understanding the New 
Statistics: Effect Sizes, Confidence Intervals, and Meta-Analysis (Routledge 2012) 80.    
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Accordingly, since the confidence interval operates at 95% confidence, and not 
100% confidence, it is not possible to exclude the possibility that the odds ratio is 
actually 1, and so the variable will not be statistically significant.  The further away 
the range is from 1, in either direction, the stronger the association.   
 
Table 7.11 95% confidence interval for exp(B): Model 1. 
Variable Lower bound Upper bound 
QC Crown Only 0.187 1.207 
Judge 1 1.038 7.479 
Judge 2 0.153 1.363 
Judge 3 1.431 5.530 
Bad Character 0.373 0.929 
Denial of MR 1.054 2.751 
Historical Offence 1.055 4.083 
Under 13 0.700 2.197 
CCRC 1.171 5.000 
Single Judge 0.374 0.954 
Unanimous 0.370 1.029 
 
As this is not the final model of the study, it is unnecessary to scrutinise these 
statistics in great detail, however, a number of points are important.  Recall that 
the odds ratio is the change in odds of a successful appeal if that variable is 
present.  Only one variable, at the lower bound, is very much above 1 – Judge 3.  
The other statistically significant variables, such as Judge 1, denial of MR, and 
CCRC are only just above 1 at the lower bound – meaning that it is possible their 
association with outcomes is minimal.  On the other hand, the upper bound of 
some variables is much higher than 1, suggesting it is possible that the 
association is strong.  However, as Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant note, it 
is common for binary logistic regression confidence intervals to be right-skewed 
(i.e. high upper bounds) because the confidence interval can range from 0 to 
infinity.820  The confidence intervals in this model are frequently fairly large, 
suggesting that the model is imprecise.        
                                                          
820 Hosmer, Lemshow, and Strudivant (n 818) 54.  
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The pseudo R2 statistics show that this model accounts for approximately 11% to 
16% of the variation in the sample.  This is within the range of R2 statistics 
reported in other ELS studies of judicial decision-making.  For instance, Sisk and 
Heise reported a score for Nagelkerke R2 beginning at 18%, although at times 
rising to 40%.821 Sisk, Heise and Morriss’s logistic regression tests reported a 
McFadden pseudo R2 (not reported in this thesis) of between 6% and 30%.822 In 
Chew and Kelley’s study of the influence of race on decision-making they 
reported a Nagelkerke R2 of between 3% and 17%.823  Juliano and Schwab’s 
study of sexual harassment cases reported a pseudo R2 (it did not stipulate which 
test is reported) of between 11% and 20%.824 The most comprehensive use of R2 
as an assessment of the power of models is Cross’s,825 he rarely received R2 of 
above 15% for his numerous studies of variables. What this means is that the 
model could not be used to predict particular outcomes, particularly given the low 
level of correct classification if the appeal was allowed.  The model is therefore 
best used to demonstrate that there is an association between particular variables 
and outcomes.   
 
The binary logistic regression model shows that a number of the variables 
analysed are statistically significant at the 5% level in their measured effect on 
the prediction of Court of Appeal decisions.  The statistically significant variables 
are: Judge 3; Bad Character; Denial of Mens Rea; Historical Offence; CCRC 
Reference; and Single Judge.  The remaining predictors were not significant at 
the 5% level.   
 
Using the odds ratios in Table 7.10 it can be seen that in an appeal with Judge 3 
on the bench, the odds of having a conviction quashed increase by 2.666, and 
                                                          
821 GC Sisk and M Heise ‘Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical 
Measures’ (2005) (99) NWU L Rev 743, at footnotes 266-7.  
822 GC Sisk, M Heise and AP Morriss, ‘Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical 
Study of Judicial Reasoning’ (1998) (73) NYU L Rev 1377, at 1433 - 48.   
823 PK Chew and RE Kelley ‘Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial 
Harassment Cases’ (2009) (86) Wash U L Rev 1117, footnote 143.  
824 A Juliano and SJ Schwab ‘The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases’ (2001) (85) Cornell Law 
Review 548, 572. 
825 FB Cross, Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals (Stanford University Press 2007).  
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this is statistically significant.  Although not statistically significant, if Judge 1 was 
on the bench the odds increase by 2.826.  The odds of having a conviction 
quashed increase by 2.459 if the case was a CCRC reference; but decline to 
0.594 if leave was granted by the single judge.  Interestingly, the odds of having 
a conviction quashed are increased by 1.625 if the defence at trial was a denial 
of mens rea, while denying the actus reus was excluded at the univariate stage.  
Intuitively this seems to make sense from a legal perspective.  It is much more 
difficult to prove a person’s state of mind in at the time of allegedly committing a 
criminal offence.  It follows that the Court of Appeal may be more inclined to quash 
convictions where the mens rea is in dispute because definitive proof of a mental 
state is very difficult to obtain.  
 
As was discussed above, however, the confidence intervals for the odds ratios 
are for some variables fairly wide.  Some variables range from having potentially 
very little association with outcomes to potentially a strong association with 
outcomes.  As such, at this stage it appears that the model lacks precision.    
 
It is useful to look at the variables and consider whether the outcome of the binary 
logistic regression analysis has face validity; that is, whether it makes intuitive 
sense.  In particular, it is useful to look at the exp(B) column and ask whether the 
direction of the change in odds is what would be expected.  All of the variables 
included in the above model make intuitive sense.  It makes sense that having a 
QC for the Crown and not for the appellant could lead to lower odds of having a 
conviction quashed; it would require a strained interpretation for increased odds 
to make intuitive sense.  It also makes sense that the inclusion of some judges 
on a bench leads to increased odds, and the inclusion of others (i.e. Judge 2) 
leads to reduced odds.  It makes sense that if the judgment states that the 
appellant has bad character the odds of having a conviction quashed are 
reduced.  Historical offences are shown to be associated with increased odds of 
having convictions quashed.  This may be understandable, convictions relating 
to offences committed many years in the past are more suspect; it follows that 
the Court of Appeal may be more inclined to quash them.  CCRC referrals have 
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already gone through a significant review process and so it follows that they may 
be more likely to be quashed.   
 
If leave was granted by the single judge, as opposed to being a CCRC referral, 
or leave having been granted by the full court or by the trial judge (which is very 
rare), the odds of having a conviction quashed are reduced.  Again, this arguably 
makes intuitive sense.  The majority of appeals are granted leave by the single 
judge and the majority of appeals are dismissed. It may suggest that the single 
judge is too ready to give leave, or the Court is generally conservative in quashing 
convictions without closer scrutiny by the Full Court or the CCRC.  Finally, if the 
verdict was unanimous the odds decrease.  This makes sense: if the jury was 
unanimous if follows that the Court may be less inclined to allow the appeal.  
 
As has been discussed previously in this thesis, some variables may be indicators 
of a lack of impartiality because it would be improper for them to be associated 
with outcomes.  The judges on the bench are shown to be predictors of success 
or failure; this could be considered a behavioural variable, and may be considered 
contrary to the legal model of judicial decision-making.  Alternatively, this 
underlying relationship between judges and outcomes may relate to the 
institutional factors which determine how benches of judges are composed.  The 
previous bad character of an appellant should not be associated with outcomes, 
but this model shows that bad character is associated with having lower odds of 
a conviction being quashed.  As has been stated previously, this is insufficient as 
evidence to conclude that the Court lacked impartiality in its decision-making.  
The aim of this study was as an initial exploration of patterns in the data, and in 
this firm model there are indeed patterns in the data.    
 
As was discussed in Chapter 6, the CCRC referral variable is included in the 
study as a counterweight to factual and demographic variables. It is known that 
CCRC appeals are more likely to be successful, and so it may appear reasonable 
that CCRC referrals are statistically significant.  CCRC referrals have previously 
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been through a lengthy review process, and the CCRC will have concluded that 
there is a real possibility that the conviction will be found unsafe.  As this variable 
is found to be statistically significant, and has some relationship with the odds of 
successful appeals, it would appear that the institutional relationship between the 
CCRC and the Court of Appeal is observable in the Court of Appeal data.   
 
Table 7.7 shows that this model can correctly predict 94.1% of cases which were 
dismissed but only 21.5% of cases which were allowed. As Hosmer, Lemeshow 
and Sturdivant note,826 it is quite common that binary logistic regression models 
perform better in predicting one outcome than another.  This is particularly likely 
to occur when one outcome occurs considerably less frequently than another.827 
The 94.1% correct figure is likely to be artificially high due to the relatively high 
number of appeals which were dismissed overall. The more interesting finding is 
that the model can predict only 21.5% of successful appeals.  This represents 
only a moderate ability to correctly predict successful appeals.  This suggests 
that there may be an alternative variable or factors which helps to explain 
successful appeals.  One additional variable which could account for success is 
the law which governs the case.   
 
7.7.1 The law governing the case 
Model 1 explored the relationship between a range of variables on the question 
of whether the conviction is unsafe, and it has been shown that some variables 
are associated with particular outcomes.  It has been explained previously in this 
thesis that a variable designed to capture the law has been created.  The 
measure used is the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable.  In the data collection exercise, 
the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable was answered ‘Yes’ if the Court decided that an 
error occurred which required them to decide whether the error made the 
conviction unsafe.  Accordingly, the variable was answered ‘No’ if the Court found 
                                                          
826 DW Hosmer, S Lemeshow and RX Sturdivant Applied Logistic Regression (3rd ed, Wiley 2013) 
170-1. 
827 ibid.   
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that there was no error in the proceedings, or that the error was so minor that it 
was not necessary to consider whether it made the conviction unsafe.     
 
The following Table shows the relationship between the ‘Did Error Occur?’ 
variable and the ‘Conviction Quashed’ variable. 
 
Table 7.12: Number of appeals allowed / dismissed, by whether an error 
occurred. 
  Error Occurred Error Did Not Occur 
Appeals Allowed 86 49 
Appeals Dismissed 59 278 
Total 145 327 
 
As Table 7.12 shows, there were 145 cases where an error occurred, and 327 
appeals where the Court found that no error occurred.  Of these 327, 278 appeals 
were subsequently dismissed.  It will be observed that this is by far the most likely 
occurrence.  This suggests that a decision that an error did not occur has a 
significant association with the outcome of appeals.  It further suggests that when 
an error did not occur appeals are very likely to be dismissed.  When the variable 
‘Did Error Occur?’ was answered ‘Yes’ there were 59 appeals dismissed.  When 
the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable was answered ‘No’ there were 49 appeals allowed.  
All but one of these latter appeals was a fresh evidence appeal.  When the 
variable ‘Did Error Occur?’ was answered ‘Yes’ there were 86 appeals allowed.  
The significance of this is considered below. 
 
The ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable may provide some measure of law on decision-
making.  It is bound to be incomplete because it is only one facet of ‘law’ but it 
may provide some insight.  It is considered to be a legal variable because the 
question is usually addressed by reference to legal rules.  It is a legal variable 
because the Court will determine what the existing law is and determine whether 
the law was correctly applied in the facts of the case.   
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In order to evaluate the legal variable, a further binary logistic regression analysis 
was conducted to explore whether the variables which passed the initial 
‘purposive selection’ screening were predictors of the answer to the question: ‘Did 
an error occur’?  The same 21 independent variables as were included in the 
initial multivariate model were included this model, this time the outcome variable 
was the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable.  The justification for conducting a further 
binary logistic regression model with an amended outcome variable is that the 
decision-making of the Court of Appeal is a distinctly two-stage process.  In most 
appeals the Court will have to decide whether an error occurred, and then decide 
whether the conviction is unsafe.  This model is testing whether the variables are 
predictors of the answer to this first question.   
 
This model performed poorly at predicting outcomes and few of the variables 
were statistically significant.  Because this model had the sentencing variables 
the dataset size was again reduced, the full results are not reported here.  Overall 
correct classification fell to 70.2%, with only 8% of cases where an error occurred 
correctly classified.  The Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke R2 statistics were 0.063 
and 0.09 respectively. Only one variable was a significant predictor at the 5% 
level: bad character.     
 
To complete this analysis of the legal variable, a final binary logistic regression 
analysis was conducted on the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable using the same 11 
variables as were included in Model 1.  This will be called MODEL 2 in the 
remainder of this chapter.  Model 2, now with the full dataset of 472 cases, 
showed no improvement on the previous model in terms of goodness of fit and 
accuracy. The pseudo R2 range was 0.04. and 0.06, meaning 4% to 6% of the 
variation in the outcome was explained by the model.  The classification Table 
for this model is below: 
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Table 7.13: Classification table: Model 2. 
  Error Did Occur Did Not Occur    
Correctly Classified 12 (8.3%)  312 (95.4%)   
Overall Correct     68.6% 
 
It will be observed that the correct classification of cases which were found to 
contain errors was 8.3%, with 68.6% of decisions correctly classified overall.  
There were only 12 appeals correctly classified by the model as being answered 
‘Yes’, suggesting that the variables are poor predictors of whether the Court 
would find that an error occurred.  
 
The significance of the variables is shown below.  Variables significant at the 5% 
level are marked with an asterisk.  Owing to the limited power of this model 
overall, confidence intervals are not considered necessary.   
 
Table 7.14: Variables in equation: Model 2. 
  B S.E Sig. Exp(B) 
QC Crown Only -0.636 0.449 0.157 0.530 
Judge 1 0.395 0.495 0.425 1.484 
Judge 2 -0.341 0.450 0.448 0.711 
Judge 3 0.884 0.334 0.008* 2.420 
Bad Character 0.205 0.215 0.341 1.227 
Denial of MR 0.295 0.229 0.198 1.343 
Historical Offence 0.883 0.331 0.008* 2.418 
Under 13 -0.326 0.294 0.267 0.722 
CCRC -0.354 0.402 0.379 0.702 
Single Judge -0.166 0.224 0.460 0.847 
Unanimous -0.368 0.251 0.143 0.692 
Constant -0.680 0.323 0.035 0.506 
* = Significant at 5% level 
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7.7.2 Discussion 
It will be observed that two of the 11 variables remain significant at the 5% level: 
Judge 3, and Historical Offence.  Both have positive coefficients (B column) 
meaning that these two variables are predictors of the Court finding that an error 
did occur.  This may suggest that historical offence trials were more likely to be 
found to have had procedural irregularities.  This is a noteworthy point, because 
a common argument in historical offences was that the trial should never have 
occurred due to the delay in bringing the proceedings being an abuse of process.          
 
Some of the variables change from being significant in Model 1, to being non-
significant in Model 2.  For these variables, there was a statistically significant 
relationship with the question of unsafety, but not with the question of whether an 
error occurred.  The overall statistics for Model 2 show that the variables are weak 
predictors of the answer to the question ‘Did Error Occur?’  This data is potentially 
revealing regarding decision-making in the Court of Appeal.  The independent 
variables show limited ability to predict the outcome of the answer to the first 
question, ‘Did the error occur?’ Conversely, the independent variables showed 
greater predictive power in relation to the second question ‘Is the conviction 
unsafe?’  It must be recalled, however, that the power of Model 1 was still fairly 
weak.  This may suggest that the question of whether an error occurred has less 
of an association with the independent variables.  This may suggest that the 
question of whether an error occurred is answered in a more objective, or 
impartial, manner.   
 
Although one judge was shown to be a statistically significant predictor, the 
overall predictive power of Model 2 does not suggest that there is any substantive 
significance to that judge.  This may be because the question ‘Did the error 
occur?’ is more clearly a legal question than the overall question of unsafety.  
Statutes and common law lay down rules and the Court of Appeal must determine 
whether they were correctly applied by the Court below.  This decision is usually 
made by reference to the statutes or precedent and it appears that this question 
will usually be the same regardless of which variables are present.      
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This suggests that the answer to the question ‘Did the error occur?’ appears not 
to be associated strongly with factual and demographic variables.  It also confirms 
that when the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable is answered yes, the appeal will often 
be successful.  This may partly explain why Model 1 performs only moderately 
well at predicting allowed appeals: the majority of allowed appeals are settled by 
the answer to the question ‘Did the Error Occur?’  This supports the statistical 
conclusions of previous studies, in relation to the presence of an error being a 
strong predictor of the outcome of appeals against conviction.  As has been 
explained previously, however, it is not argued that this is strong evidence of the 
‘restrictive approach’ of the Court, but could be interpreted as the Court following 
the law.     
 
As Table 7.12, above, shows, in most appeals the answer to ‘Did the Error 
Occur?’ is ‘No’, and usually this will lead to the appeal being dismissed.  This 
confirms Roberts’s finding that a finding of no error usually determines appeals.828  
But as is also shown by Table 7.12, there is a split between appeals which were 
successful when an error occurred, and appeals which were unsuccessful when 
an error occurred.  There were also appeals which were successful when there 
was no error found at trial.       
 
This is partly explained by the fact that all but one of the 49 cases which were 
allowed when there was no error at trial were fresh evidence appeals.  As was 
discussed in Chapter 3, the power to admit and accept fresh evidence is 
discretionary and requires careful judgment by the judges.  Since these cases 
were successful when there was no error the sole question for the Court is 
whether the conviction is generally unsafe based upon their own subjective 
assessment of all the facts of the case.  As was shown by Model 1, the 
independent variables appear to be predictors of the answer to this question.  
Further analysis of the association between variables and the decision to quash 
convictions on the basis of fresh evidence is presented below.    
                                                          
828 Roberts (2009) 166. 
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7.8 Inclusion of the primary legal variable as an independent variable 
In a final analysis, the outcome variable was reverted to the ‘Was Appeal 
Allowed?’ variable.  This will be called Model 3.  Model 1 was amended.  All 
variables with a p-value higher than 0.05 were removed and the ‘Did Error 
Occur?’ variable added.  As this is a study of the decision-making of the judges, 
it was decided to retain the three judge variables in this analysis.  This meant that 
the dataset was its full size of 472 appeals, with 9 independent variables in the 
model.   
 
As was expected, the inclusion of the legal variable significantly improved the 
performance of the model.  The final model was statistically significant, with a p-
value of less than 0.000.  The Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke pseudo R2 scores 
were 0.26 and 0.37 respectively.  This is a considerable improvement upon the 
previous models presented in this chapter.  The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was 
not significant (p = 0.266) meaning the model is a good fit for the data.  The 
classification table is shown below.  It can be observed, as would be expected, 
the overall correct classification percentage has increased, in particular for cases 
predicted to have been allowed. 
       
Table 7.15: Classification Table: Model 3. 
  
Appeals 
Allowed 
Appeals 
Dismissed  
  
Correctly Classified 75 (55.6%)  307 (91.1%)   
Overall Correct     80.9%) 
 
The variables included in this model are shown below.  Variables significant at 
the 5% level are marked with an asterisk.  
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Table 7.16: Variables in equation: Model 3. 
  B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
Judge 1 1.092 0.546 0.046* 2.980 
Judge 2 -0.825 0.615 0.180 0.438 
Judge 3 0.764 0.390 0.050* 2.147 
Bad Character -0.879 0.260 0.001* 0.415 
Denial of MR 0.377 0.260 0.148 1.458 
Historical Offence 0.523 0.376 0.164 1.687 
CCRC 1.230 0.411 0.003* 3.422 
Single Judge -0.537 0.270 0.047* 0.585 
Did Error Occur 2.346 0.260 0.000* 10.441 
Constant -1.621 0.290 0.000 0.198 
* = Significant at 5% level  
The 95% confidence intervals for the variables’ odds ratios is shown below.  
Table 7.17: 95% confidence intervals for exp(B): Model 3. 
Variable Lower Upper 
Judge 1 1.022 8.692 
Judge 2 0.131 1.463 
Judge 3 1.001 4.609 
Bad Character 0.249 0.692 
Denial of MR 0.875 2.429 
Historical Offence 0.808 3.523 
CCRC 1.529 7.660 
Single Judge 0.345 0.992 
Did Error Occur 6.275 17.373 
 
After this model was completed, all the original variables which were included in 
the purposive selection procedure were reintroduced into the model individually.  
The results of this closing analysis are not reported in this thesis, but none of the 
variables were statistically significant at the 5% level or had any discernible 
impact on the accuracy of the model, according to the R2 statistics and 
classification matrix.  
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7.9 Summary of findings 
These results are considered more closely in Chapter 8, but an initial impression 
of the results will now be provided.  The variable representing the strongest 
measured relationship with the decision to allow an appeal, with an odds ratio of 
10.441, is the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable.  This means that the odds of having a 
conviction quashed are measured to increase 10-fold if the Court finds an error 
occurred.  Note that the broad confidence interval indicates that the true odds 
ratio may reach as high as 17.373.  Whilst the confidence interval is broad, the 
lower bound reaches 6.275 meaning that the variable clearly has a strong 
relationship with the outcome of appeals.  It has been argued that this variable is 
a counterweight to the factual and demographic variables, and is a measurement 
of the ‘legal model’ or the Court having decided appeals impartially in accordance 
with the law.  
 
A number of the independent variables remain statistically significant predictors.  
Some of the judge variables remain statistically significant predictors of outcomes 
in combination with the legal variable.  It is important, however, to notice the 
confidence intervals of the odds ratios.  At the lower bound of the confidence 
interval for Judges 1 and 3, the odds ratio is only slightly above 1.  The confidence 
interval is also broad, suggesting a lack of precision.  Based upon this finding, 
there is not strong support for the claim that these judges had a clear relationship 
with the outcome of appeals.       
 
The inclusion of a legal variable in the model adds significantly to the accuracy of 
the modelling.  This suggests that studies which overlook the law may be 
overlooking a significant influence on Court of Appeal outcomes.  Overall, the 
statistics of this model show that the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable has by far the 
strongest association with the outcome of appeals amongst the variables which 
have been analysed.  This does not mean that the Court has been proven to have 
determined appeals impartially, but the patterns found in this data add little 
support to the behavioural or attitudinal models of judicial decision-making.  
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The results of this study can best be summarised as indicating that there is 
insufficient evidence that the Court determined appeals other than in an impartial 
manner.  As has been explained throughout this thesis, the methods employed 
in this study – a non-reactive observational study – mean there are limitations as 
to the conclusions which can be reached.  How well the concept of impartiality 
has been modelled is considered in Chapter 8.  The finding of statistical 
significance of some variables, and lack of significance of others, does not mean 
that the question of the Court’s impartiality is resolved.  Rather, as an initial 
exploration, it has been shown that some tentative patterns exist within the data 
and these are more indicative of the legal or institutional models.          
 
7.10 Additional analysis of data – fresh evidence and CCRC referrals  
Model 3, shown above, represents the final model of the whole dataset of murder 
and rape appeals analysed in this thesis.  This is the primary model which will be 
discussed in Chapter 8.  One difficulty with the above model is that it may miss 
the importance of fresh evidence and CCRC referrals on the outcome of appeals.  
As has been shown by the descriptive statistics relating to grounds of appeal, 
fresh evidence was the most frequently successful ground of appeal.  Fresh 
evidence appeals may not be completely captured by the above model because 
they often do not contain procedural irregularities.  Thus, while the ‘Did Error 
Occur?’ variable may measure the association between procedural irregularities 
and outcomes, it may not capture how the independent variables are associated 
with the admission of fresh evidence.  
 
CCRC referrals are not ‘ordinary’ appeals against conviction, but are by their 
nature exceptional.  Almost all CCRC referrals will have already been before the 
Court of Appeal and been rejected.  CCRC referrals are made when the appellant 
continues to protest the conviction and lodges an application to the CCRC.  The 
CCRC then conduct a review of the case and can refer the conviction back to the 
Court of Appeal.  CCRC referrals more frequently uncover true miscarriages of 
justice, in the sense of the conviction of the innocent, in a way which is much 
rarer in routine appeals against conviction.  Accordingly, they could be considered 
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as outliers in the sample – more likely to raise fresh evidence; have already had 
an extensive review; and more likely to uncover miscarriages of justice.  
Moreover, it is already known that a high proportion of CCRC appeals are 
successful.      
    
In order to account for some of these factors, further analysis was conducted to 
supplement Model 3.  As it is known that fresh evidence is a frequently successful 
ground of appeal, it is highly likely that some of the variation in outcomes is 
explained by the Court’s reception of fresh evidence.  In the data collection 
exercise, a variable was collected which was answered ‘yes’ if the appeal was 
quashed due to fresh evidence.  Since this is itself an outcome variable, it could 
not be included as an independent variable because it would be collinear to the 
overall outcome variable.  This would compromise the statistics because 
whenever the ‘quashed due to fresh evidence’ variable was answered ‘yes’, the 
overall outcome variable would also be ‘yes’, and this could confound or suppress 
other variables.  One possibility was to conduct further binary logistic regression 
analyses with the ‘quashed by fresh evidence’ variable as the outcome, in a 
similar way as was done to the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable.  This was also 
problematic because the quashed by fresh evidence variable occurred on only 
59 occasions, and so was a comparatively rare event.  This makes it difficult to 
accurately model.   
 
The preferred solution was to conduct analysis of the relationship between the 
independent variables and the ‘quashed by fresh evidence’ variable using 
Pearson chi-square (X2) analysis.  Chi-square analysis tests the null hypothesis 
that two variables are independent of each other.  It does this by calculating the 
difference between the observed frequencies of convictions quashed by fresh 
evidence when the independent variable is present, with what would be expected 
if there was no relationship, or any relationship was due to chance.829 The greater 
the disparity between the observed and the expected frequencies, the less likely 
                                                          
829 G Norris, F Qureshi, D Howitt, D Cramer, Introduction to Statistics with SPSS for Social 
Science (Pearson 2012) 179. 
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it is that this null hypothesis is true.830 This allows for the analysis of the strength 
of a relationship between two categorical variables.  This will allow for an analysis 
of whether the variables included in Model 3 have a relationship with the decision 
to quash a conviction on the basis of fresh evidence.  The results of this analysis 
will then be considered in light of Model 3 to provide a more adequate analysis of 
the Court’s decision-making and its impartiality.       
 
All the variables included in Model 3, excluding the ‘Did Error Occur’ variable, 
were analysed in a 2x2 chi-square analysis.  The following Table shows the p-
values for each of the variables included in this analysis.   
  
Table 7.18: Results of X2 Analysis. 
Independent Variable   p-value   
Judge 1831  0.028*   
Judge 2832  0.406   
Judge 3  0.025*   
Bad Character  0.010*   
Denial of MR  0.913   
Historical Offence  0.957   
CCRC  0.000*   
Single Judge  0.000*   
* = significant at 5% level 
 
Whilst Table 7.18 shows whether the variables are associated with each other, it 
gives little indication of the strength of the relationship.  The strength of the 
correlation between each variable and the ‘quashed by fresh evidence’ variable 
was calculated using the phi-coefficient, which states the level and direction of 
any correlation.  The higher the number, between +1 and -1, the stronger the 
correlation.  A coefficient of 0.00 means there is no relationship.  The following 
Table shows the phi-coefficients for the above variables.  
                                                          
830 ibid.  
831 This variable violated the assumption that there will be five expected values in each field. 
Accordingly Fisher’s exact test p-value is provided.  
832 As per previous note.  
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Table 7.19: Phi-coefficients. 
Independent Variable   Phi coefficient   
Judge 1  0.111   
Judge 2  -0.051   
Judge 3  0.103   
Bad Character  -0.119   
Denial of MR  0.005   
Historical Offence  -0.002   
CCRC  0.342   
Single Judge  -0.283   
 
As would be expected, variables with larger p-values have extremely small phi 
coefficients, suggesting little relationship between the variable and the quashing 
of a conviction due to fresh evidence.  It will be observed that most of the variables 
are only weakly positively or negatively associated with the decision to quash a 
conviction on the basis of fresh evidence.  It is only CCRC references and the 
‘single judge’ variables which have a correlation coefficient of higher than 0.200.  
The same variables as were statistically significant predictors in Model 3, are also 
statistically significant in the X2 test.  For these variables, the X2 null hypothesis 
that the variables are independent of each other (there is no association) cannot 
be accepted.  This suggests that as well as the variables being predictor of the 
outcome of appeals generally, there is some further relationship between the 
variables and the decision to quash convictions on the basis of fresh evidence.  
On the basis of the X2 statistic, it is not possible to say what effect the variables 
have on the likelihood of having a conviction quashed on the basis of fresh 
evidence, as can be done in binary logistic regression analysis.  The low phi-
coefficients for these variables suggests that the relationship would be marginal, 
but the relationship is there.  
 
As a final analysis of the dataset, the CCRC appeals were removed from the 
sample and a new binary logistic regression analysis was conducted.  By 
removing the CCRC appeals, the issue that these appeals are ‘outliers’ is 
dissipated.  With the CCRC referrals removed, the dataset was 428 cases, with 
112 successful appeals (26.2%), and 316 unsuccessful appeals (73.8%).  
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Accordingly, this dataset has no EPV issues if the variables in Model 3 are 
utilised.  The same variables as were included in Model 3 were used in a further 
binary logistic regression model, with the exception of the CCRC variable.  The 
results are shown below. 
 
The Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke pseudo R2 statistics were 0.27 and 0.40, 
representing some improvement upon Model 3.  The Hosmer and Lemeshow test 
was not significant (p = 0.585), meaning the model was a good fit for the data.  
The classification Table for this model is shown below.  
 
Table 7.20: Classification table: Model 4. 
  
Appeals 
Allowed 
Appeals 
Dismissed  
  
Correctly Classified 64 (57.1%)  292 (92.4%)   
Overall Correct     83.2% 
 
This model also improved in classification accuracy when compared to Model 3, 
with overall correct classification increasing from 80.9% to 83.2%.  Moreover, the 
percentage of appeals predicted to have been successful also showed an 
increase.  The variables included in this model and their p-values is shown below.  
 
Table 7.21: Variables in equation: Model 4. 
  B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
Judge 1 0.938 0.614 0.126 2.556 
Judge 2 -0.858 0.635 0.177 0.424 
Judge 3 0.995 0.432 0.021* 2.705 
Bad Character -0.924 0.286 0.001* 0.397 
Denial of MR 0.508 0.285 0.074 1.662 
Historical Offence 0.444 0.406 0.274 1.559 
Single Judge -0.567 0.279 0.042* 0.567 
Did Error Occur 2.597 0.280 0.000* 13.426 
Constant -1.772 0.310 0.000 0.170 
* = significant at 5% level  
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When CCRC referrals are removed from the dataset, Judge 3, bad character, 
single judge, and Did Error Occur continue to be statistically significant predictors 
of outcomes.  By this model, Judge 1 is now no longer a statistically significant 
predictor of outcomes.  When CCRC appeals are removed, the odds ratio of the 
‘Did Error Occur?’ variable increases to 13.426.  The primary contribution of this 
model to the overall analysis of the Court may be that, in fact, the removal of the 
CCRC appeals from the sample did not greatly alter the results of Model 3.  Whilst 
the classification accuracy was improved, it was based upon a smaller dataset 
and so was not a ‘complete’ picture of the Court’s decision-making, in the way 
that Model 3 is.  CCRC referrals may not, therefore, be as ‘outlying’ as was 
thought.  
 
7.11 Conclusion 
This study has been designed to capture some pertinent components of the 
principle of impartiality.  It has been sought to test whether the Court appeared 
impartial, by exploring whether there is a relationship between a range of 
variables and the outcome of appeals against conviction. As was shown by the 
purposive selection procedure, most of the independent variables were weak 
predictors of outcomes in the Court of Appeal.  Since there has been no previous 
study of this nature on decision-making in the Court of Appeal this does not 
confirm or refute previous studies, but provides some findings which can be 
confirmed or refuted in later studies.  Similar to other ELS studies, a number of 
variables are shown to be statistically significant predictors of outcomes.   
 
As is shown in Model 3, the variable with the strongest association with the 
outcome of appeals is the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable.  It has been explained that 
previous studies have found that the presence / absence of an error is related to 
the likelihood of a successful appeal.  It has been claimed in this thesis that this 
factor can be understood as being indicative of the ‘legal model’ or impartial 
decision-making.  Some of the behavioural factual and demographic variables 
analysed were associated with the outcome of appeals.  
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The analysis conducted and reported in this chapter was designed to test the 
concept of impartiality.  The rationale was that the variables were observable 
implications of impartiality or a lack of it.  The next chapter explores these results 
further.  A key question addressed by Chapter 8 is how successful this study has 
been in capturing the concept of impartiality, and so what claims can be made 
regarding the impartiality of the Court of Appeal.  
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Chapter 8 
Discussion: The Impartiality of the England and Wales Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) 
 
Introduction 
This thesis has critically analysed the creation of the England and Wales Court 
of Appeal (Criminal Division), its powers, and the perception of potential 
deficiencies in its decision-making.  This study had analysed the Court from an 
Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) perspective.  It did not address directly the 
question of how well the Court performs in correcting injustice, but instead sought 
to explore whether any of a range of variables are associated with the outcome 
of appeals against conviction.  These are the ‘observable implications’ of 
impartiality or a lack of it, and this is how the concept of impartiality has been 
sought to be captured.  It has been found that variables which are observable 
implications of impartial decision-making have the strongest relationship with 
outcomes.  These variables measure the controlling role of law, or the Court’s 
relationship with other institutions.  Factual and demographic variables have a 
limited association with outcomes.  The study presented in this thesis is an initial 
exploration of the question of the Court’s impartiality.  Thus, the patterns found in 
the data are consistent with the observable implications of having determined 
appeals in an impartial manner, but more evidence is needed to conclude this 
with certainty.   
 
This chapter explores what the results of this study mean about the Court’s 
decision-making.  It will be discussed how successful this study has been as an 
exploration of the Court’s impartiality, given the limitations of the methods 
employed. It will be explained that the results of this analysis, to a considerable 
extent, are both supported by, and support, the previous research on the Court.  
This thesis has, however, examined the Court’s decision-making in a new and 
original way and this provides further insights into the Court’s decisions.  In 
Chapters 2 and 3, theories of judicial decision-making by Lord Bingham, Hart, 
Dworkin, and the Legal Realists were discussed.  Conclusions will be offered, 
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based upon the reading of cases and the analysis of the data, as to which of 
these theories appears to be best reflected in the Court of Appeal judgments.   
 
8.1 Overview of study 
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of whether appellants, and other users 
and observers of the Court of Appeal, can be confident that the Court appeared 
to have determined appeals against conviction in an impartial manner.  Impartial 
decision-making is the null hypothesis or default assumption of this study, which 
could only be rejected if there is sufficient evidence.  This is because impartiality 
is inherent within the ‘legal model’ of judicial decision-making.  The ‘legal model’ 
postulates that judicial decisions are primarily determined by judges impartially 
applying the law, and so judicial discretion is constrained by law.  In Britain, as 
there is no great tradition of ELS on judges, there was no empirical a priori reason 
to suspect that judges do not adhere to the legal model.  It was found that, whilst 
some variables potentially indicative of behavioural or attitudinal models were 
associated with the outcome of appeals against conviction, it is unclear how 
strong this association is.  Moreover, variables which were offered as being 
observable implications of the legal model and impartial decision-making were 
found to be strongly associated with outcomes.  Accordingly, there is insufficient 
evidence to reject the legal model.      
 
The meaning of impartiality, and its importance, was discussed in Chapter 2.  To 
address the question of the Court’s impartiality, a sample of 472 appeals against 
conviction was created, which recorded the demographic, factual, and legal 
independent variables collected from each case.  The analysis began with a 
replication of Roberts’s,833 and Heaton’s834 studies of the grounds of appeal 
argued in appeals against conviction.  In each of these earlier studies, data 
relating to the grounds of appeal was collected in order to assess the Court’s 
                                                          
833 S Roberts ‘The Decision-Making Process of Appeals Against Conviction in the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) (DPhil Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009).  
(Hereafter Roberts (2009)). 
834 SJ Heaton, A Critical Evaluation of Using Innocence as a Criterion in the Post-Conviction 
Process (DPhil Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2013). (Hereafter Heaton (2013)).  
262 
 
approach to determining appeals.  Roberts read the first 300 available appeals 
from 2002, and Heaton read all Court of Appeal cases decided in the calendar 
year 2009, all CCRC referral appeals, and consulted CCRC case files.  In this 
thesis, all available murder and rape appeals against conviction decided between 
January 2006 and December 2010 were collected.  The intention behind the initial 
analysis of grounds of appeal was to discover whether these two specific offences 
raised different grounds of appeal to those seen in the previous studies, which 
included not only murder and rape appeals but appeals relating to numerous 
different crimes.  It was shown in Chapter 7 that there were significant similarities 
between these three studies, with the important exception of fresh evidence.  The 
implications of this finding are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The method of data collection in the previous studies and the present were 
identical.  The cases were downloaded from legal databases and analysed by 
means of a case-by-case quantitative content analysis before being coded into 
SPSS.  The difference between this thesis and the earlier studies was that as well 
as the collection of grounds of appeal, a wider variety of other variables were also 
collected.  Thus, although there are many similarities in methodology and subject 
matter between this thesis and the earlier studies, they diverge at the point at 
which this thesis moves beyond grounds of appeal and into considering factual, 
demographic, and other legal variables as predictors of outcomes.  There has 
been no known similar study of this nature conducted on the Court of Appeal.  It 
is this difference which leads to the original methodology and original analysis of 
decision-making contained in this thesis.  In this thesis, the decision-making of 
the Court was analysed using a series of binary logistic regression analyses, to 
determine the extent of any statistical relationships between success in the Court 
of Appeal and the independent variables.   
 
The analysis was in the form of a series of null hypothesis significance tests.  It 
was determined whether each independent variable was a statistically significant 
predictor of a successful appeal by considering a number of statistics, including 
the p-value of each variable, and the overall predictive accuracy of each model 
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using pseudo R2 statistics, classification tables, confidence intervals and 
goodness of fit tests.  A p-value is a percentage between 0 and 1 which quantifies 
the degree to which the data confirms with the null hypothesis prediction.  Smaller 
p-values can indicate that there is a greater statistical incompatibility between the 
data and what the null hypothesis would predict, which may therefore give some 
reason to doubt the null hypothesis.  The standard values for rejection of the null 
hypothesis in social science research are p = <0.05 and p = <0.01, respectively 
relating to the 5% and 1% levels of significance.   
 
The use of p-values was discussed in Chapter 5.  It was shown that the use of p-
values is controversial, as p-values are frequently misinterpreted.  It is important 
to recall that the ‘rejection’ of a null hypothesis does not mean that the alternative 
hypothesis is true.  Furthermore, the rule that significance is reached if the p-
value is smaller than 0.05 is an arbitrary figure.  As was discussed in Chapter 5, 
the limitations of significance testing mean that they provide only tenuous 
evidence against a null hypothesis.  The results of this study are returned to 
below, where the strength of the findings regarding the impartiality of the Court in 
light of this, and other, limitations of the research design are discussed.   
 
This thesis has eschewed examination of the normative significance of particular 
cases, or the correctness of particular cases, in order to instead consider whether 
any factors are associated with Court’s decisions.  The aim of the study was to 
conduct an exploration of whether statistical patterns exist between the outcome 
of appeals against conviction and the independent variables.  This is an ELS 
perspective to legal scholarship, in that it sought to discover with greater 
objectivity what occurs in the Court of Appeal.  This is in contrast with some 
previous studies of the Court of Appeal, which have examined the Court’s 
decision-making from a ‘miscarriage of justice’ perspective.  The thesis has 
considered the methodologies of the many empirical studies of judicial decision-
making primarily from the United States.   
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The infamous case of Timothy Evans highlights the different approaches adopted 
in this thesis and previous studies.835  Timothy Evans was convicted of the murder 
of his wife and child.  He appealed in 1950, but the appeal was dismissed, and 
he was duly hanged.  It is now believed, beyond reasonable doubt, that he was 
innocent of the crime.  It was later revealed that his landlord was a serial killer, 
and he confessed to the murders.  The decision of the Court of Appeal to dismiss 
his appeal in 1950 was wrong, and arguably restrictive.  The Court of Appeal did 
not know that Evans was innocent when they dismissed the appeal, and they did 
not know at the time that his landlord was a serial killer, but the decision to dismiss 
the appeal was wrong.  Evans’s appeal against conviction could be criticised on 
other grounds.  Counsel for the Crown, Christmas Humphreys, was appearing 
before his own father, also Christmas Humphreys, in the appeal.  This would 
never be acceptable in the modern day, as the appearance of a lack of impartiality 
would be too great.  The decision could therefore be considered illegitimate, 
regardless of whether it was right or wrong.  It is this aspect of the Court’s 
decision-making, its legitimacy to reach decisions, with which this thesis has been 
concerned.     
 
8.2 Grounds of appeal argued in the Court of Appeal in murder and rape 
appeals – Is the Court of Appeal restrictive? 
Since the 1970s, there have been four empirical studies of the grounds of appeal 
raised by appellants.  These four studies are by Knight,836 Malleson,837 
Roberts,838 and Heaton.839 The latter two are more important to this thesis 
because only they were conducted after the enactment of the Criminal Appeal 
Act 1995, and so the older studies have been superseded by the more recent 
research.  Their findings in relation to grounds of appeal were critically analysed 
in Chapter 7.    
                                                          
835 See R v Evans (1950) 34 Cr App R 72. 
836 M Knight, Criminal Appeals (Stevens and Sons 1970). 
837 K Malleson, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Review of the Appeal Process, 
Research Study No 17 (HMSO 1993). 
838 S Roberts, ‘The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and Factual Innocence: Remedying 
Wrongful Convictions in the Court of Appeal’ (2004) (1)(2) JJ 86; and Roberts (2009). 
839 See Heaton (2013).  
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In Roberts’s, Heaton’s, and this study, two grounds of appeal dominated the 
arguments raised by appellants: complaints regarding the trial judge’s summing 
up, and allegations that the trial judge incorrectly exercised his evidential 
discretion.  The results of this study therefore partially support the findings of 
previous studies, as procedural irregularities do form the majority of the Court’s 
workload in murder and rape appeals.  At least one of these two grounds of 
appeal was raised in 80% of appeals against conviction in murder and rape 
appeals, and they together accounted for almost 45% of all grounds of appeal.  
Therefore, murder and rape appeals are just as likely to raise procedural 
irregularity appeals as was found in earlier studies which considered a range of 
different offences.  Roberts and Heaton also found that fresh evidence and lurking 
doubt appeals were rare and unlikely to be successful.  In relation to lurking doubt 
appeals, this thesis confirms this previous finding.  In this sense, murder and rape 
appeals appear to be similar to most other appeals in the Court.   
 
Fresh evidence, however, was raised more frequently in this study than was seen 
in either Roberts’s or in Heaton’s studies.  In contrast to their findings, fresh 
evidence was raised in 130 appeals, which was 27% of all cases and 15% of total 
grounds. Fresh evidence was successful on 59 occasions, which was 45% of the 
cases where it was raised, and was the most frequently successful individual 
ground of appeal.  The corresponding fresh evidence success rate was 25% for 
Roberts; and 31% for Heaton.  This suggests that fresh evidence is more likely 
to be raised, and is more likely to be a successful ground of appeal in murder and 
rape cases than it is in the Court of Appeal generally.  Moreover, as was shown 
in Chapter 7, whilst CCRC referrals did account for a large number of the CCRC 
referrals, murder and rape non-CCRC appeals still raised fresh evidence more 
commonly than seen in earlier studies, and it was more likely to be successful.  
  
The low success rate of fresh evidence seen in the earlier analyses is seen as 
one piece of evidence that the Court is restrictive or fails to correct miscarriages 
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of justice.840  This is because fresh evidence most clearly raises the possibility of 
innocence, and requires the Court to go beyond its comfort zone, and come close 
to retrying the appellant on the basis of the fresh evidence.  The conclusion drawn 
from this element of the thesis, that fresh evidence was actually the most 
frequently successful ground of appeal, and was successful 45% of the times it 
was raised, must therefore lead to some pause for thought regarding the 
conclusion of restrictiveness.  It could also be considered one of the most 
significant findings of this study.    
 
It appears that murder and rape convictions are more susceptible to finding fresh 
evidence, and to being rendered unsafe by fresh evidence.  There are some 
plausible reasons why this may be the case.  Murder trials often involve scientific 
evidence, frequently at the cutting edge of pathology, and such evidence is 
always liable to be undermined or challenged by later developments.  The experts 
giving evidence may offer exaggerated, or simply wrong, opinions which may be 
picked up by other experts or new lawyers.  Professor Sir Roy Meadow’s 
evidence, implicated in a number of ‘shaken baby’ cases,841 is one example of 
this occurring.  His evidence was described by the Court of Appeal as being 
grossly negligent.842 A further example is former Home Office pathologist Dr 
Michael Heath, who was referred to the Home Office pathology regulators by his 
own colleagues.843  His methodological errors in attributing causes of death was 
a source of a number of fresh evidence appeals against conviction.844 There were 
numerous appeals against convictions for murder where fresh evidence provided 
evidence of diminished responsibility due to previously undiagnosed (or 
incorrectly diagnosed at trial) mental illness.845  Scientific evidence given at trial 
can be rendered invalid or suspect if scientific knowledge changes, and this new 
                                                          
840 S Roberts, ‘The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and Factual Innocence: Remedying 
Wrongful Convictions in the Court of Appeal’ (2004) (1)(2) JJ 86. 
841 Eg R v Sally Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020; R v Angela Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1. 
842 GMC v Professor Sir Roy Meadow v HM Attorney General [2006] EWCA Civ 1390 [82] 
843 R (oao Heath) v Home Office Policy and Advisory Board for Forensic Pathology [2005] EWCA 
Crim 1793.  
844 See R v Puaca [2005] EWCA Crim 3001; R v O’Leary [2006] EWCA Crim 3222, R v Khokhar 
[2007] EWCA Crim 1756; R v Stanley [2008] EWCA Crim 603. 
845 Eg R v Erskine; R v Williams [2009] EWCA Crim 1425. 
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knowledge can be adduced at appeal as fresh evidence.846  All of these factors 
may mean that fresh evidence may be more likely to arise in murder appeals than 
in other offences.    
 
In rape trials, especially historical rape trials, the only evidence called at trial is 
often medical evidence and / or the complainant’s testimony.  Both of these are 
susceptible to be dislodged by fresh evidence.  Changing understanding of, or 
rather, appeals challenging the accepted understanding of, injuries caused by 
childhood sexual abuse was a potent source of fresh evidence appeals in rape.847 
Fresh evidence was frequently raised which sought to challenge the integrity of 
the complainant’s testimony, by, for example, demonstrating that the complainant 
made a claim for compensation which allegedly exaggerated the offences, or 
other attacks on credibility.848 Fresh evidence did arise where the complainant(s) 
admitted that the allegations were false.849 These kind of attacks on credibility on 
the basis of fresh evidence are difficult to envisage for many other offences which 
the Court hears.   
 
In the absence of further research or data, it is not known whether only certain 
kinds of offences, in addition to murder and rape, form the bulk of fresh evidence 
appeals.  Further research could be conducted to discover this.  If the majority of 
appeals in Roberts’s and Heaton’s samples are by their nature not generally 
susceptible to uncovering fresh evidence or to being quashed by fresh evidence, 
this might explain why they saw that fresh evidence was raised relatively 
infrequently.  This might undermine the claim that the Court is restrictive or overly 
cautious about fresh evidence.  Certainly, the finding of this thesis that fresh 
evidence was successful 45% of the times it was raised, or 39% of the times it 
                                                          
846 Eg R v Reed and Reed; R v Garmson [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 in which the Court considered 
the state of knowledge relating to DNA evidence.  See also R v Lawless [2009] EWCA Crim 1308, 
relating to new understanding of how abnormally suggestible suspects may wrongly confess to 
crimes.  
847 Eg R v Michael A [2006] EWCA Crim 905; R v Martin T [2008] EWCA Crim 3229; R v PF 
[2009] EWCA Crim 1086.  
848 Eg R v B [2008] EWCA Crim 559; R v Charova [2008] EWCA Crim 1767.  
849 Eg. R v Barker [2006] EWCA Crim 3249; R v Anwar [2007] EWCA Crim 3226.  
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was raised in non-CCRC referral cases, does not support a conclusion of 
restrictiveness in relation to fresh evidence. 
 
The Court of Appeal explained in R v Erskine,850 that the primary question for the 
Court when deciding whether to receive fresh evidence is whether it is in the 
interests of justice.851 The Court may be called restrictive for declining to receive 
fresh evidence by interpreting the section 23 requirements in a narrow way.  The 
first two tests under section 23, whether the evidence appears ‘capable of belief’ 
and whether the Court thinks the evidence ‘affords any ground for allowing the 
appeal’, are tests of the Court’s view of the fresh evidence.  To be more liberal in 
applying these tests, the Court would need to receive fresh evidence if it finds the 
evidence not capable of belief, or where it does not think the evidence makes the 
conviction unsafe.  It would be an unusual situation for the Court to quash 
convictions on the basis of fresh evidence which it does not itself believe, as the 
Court made clear in cases such as Stafford v DPP852 and R v Pendelton.853  
 
Heaton argued that the Court ‘displays confusion about the correct test to be 
applied in  fresh  evidence  cases  and  applies  the  test  in  an  unpredictable  
manner’.854  On the contrary, this thesis concludes that the Court is sufficiently 
clear in the test to be applied, and that the unpredictable manner of decision-
making is due to the different facts of cases.  As was explained in Chapter 4, in 
fresh evidence appeals, the question for the Court is whether they think the 
conviction is unsafe, and one way of judging that is to consider whether it is sure 
that the jury would have still convicted if it had heard the fresh evidence.855  As 
Ashworth and Redmayne say, there is relatively little at stake as to whether the 
‘correct test’ is the ‘jury impact’ test or the subjective ‘judge impact’ test, because 
the question is whether the conviction is safe or unsafe.856  Different cases, or 
                                                          
850 [2009] EWCA Crim 1425. 
851 ibid [39]. 
852 [1974] AC 878 
853 [2001] UKHL 56 
854 Heaton (2013) 175.  
855 See R v Pendleton (n 853).  
856 A Ashworth and M Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th edition, Oxford University Press 
2010). 
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different judges, may appear to be applying one test rather than the other, but 
they in effect amount to the same thing – does the Court think the conviction can 
stand in light of the fresh evidence?  There are numerous examples of judges 
stating this, but one is sufficient to demonstrate the point.  In R v Williams857 Auld 
LJ said:  
 
‘Having received … “new” psychiatric evidence … a court may allow 
an appeal against a conviction for murder as unsafe on the ground 
that, if that evidence had been before the trial jury, they might have 
acquitted the appellant on one or other of the defences of diminished 
responsibility, or provocation where applicable, or self-defence’.858    
 
In that case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the conviction was safe because 
the material upon which fresh expert evidence was based was of so little weight, 
and, in fact, potentially damaging to the appellant’s case, it could not have 
changed the jury verdict.  Heaton’s claim that the Court uses the section 23 
provisions in order to restrictively dismiss appeals which had already been 
decided on some ‘underlying, unarticulated basis’859 suggests that there is some 
insidious aspect to the Court’s decision-making.  An alternative explanation is 
that the ‘unarticulated basis’ of appeals is that the Court simply does not believe 
the evidence, or does not think that the evidence would have made a difference 
to the verdict; i.e. the Court is sure of guilt.   
 
If the Court dismisses an appeal, this does not necessarily mean the Court is 
restrictive or slow to act, but instead may demonstrate that there was no basis in 
fact or law to find the conviction unsafe at the time the case is before the Court.  
As a result of this, the Court might on occasion uphold the conviction of a person 
who is actually innocent.  This would of course be a miscarriage of justice, and 
devastating to the victim of the miscarriage of justice.  However, unless the Court 
is to be expected to quash convictions whenever there is any doubt about guilt, 
                                                          
857 [2007] EWCA Crim 2264.  
858 ibid.  
859 Heaton (2013) 211.  
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which will almost always arise, there appears to be no way to avoid the situation 
that the Court may on occasion fail to correct the conviction of the innocent.  The 
best way to avoid the conviction of the innocent, it is argued, may be to make 
further efforts to prevent the conviction of the innocent occurring, beginning by 
reforming police investigation practices.   
 
The allegation of restrictiveness, it is submitted, does not appear warranted 
based upon the empirical analysis of this study and a more neutral analysis of 
the Court’s decision-making.  As explained in Chapter 4, previous analysis of the 
Court has been conducted from a miscarriage of justice perspective.  Naughton, 
for instance, criticises the Court of Appeal as he felt that it does not properly 
perform its function of ‘assisting potentially factually innocent victims to have 
miscarriages of justice overturned.’860 From the ELS perspective of this study, the 
conclusion that the Court’s approach is ‘restrictive’ does not appear stable or 
objective.  There will always be appeals which are unsuccessful, and there may 
always be doubt whether those decisions were correct or whether the appellant 
is innocent.  However, having doubt about a particular decision cannot be 
evidence of a restrictive approach, because that is not empirical evidence.    
 
The allegation of a restrictive approach implies that quashing more convictions 
by being more liberal would produce more justice.  But, as Roberts 
acknowledged, the Court cannot quash every conviction, and it must find a way 
to determine which appeals can stand and which cannot.861 Whilst Naughton is 
highly critical of the Court’s decision-making processes,862 he provides no 
evidence that the Court’s approach systematically has led to it upholding 
convictions which should have been quashed.  Moreover, it is unclear how such 
evidence could be provided, as it is rarely ever known which appellants, if any, 
were actually innocent.   
                                                          
860 M Naughton, The Innocent and the Criminal Justice System: A Sociological Analysis of 
Miscarriages of Justice (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 147. 
861 See Roberts (2009) 41-2. 
862 See Naughton (n 860) especially Chapter 6. 
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In this study, there were 337 appeals which were unsuccessful.  It is possible that 
at least some of these appellants were in fact innocent.  At least one appellant in 
the sample later had his conviction for murder quashed following a CCRC 
referral.863 Does this mean that all the unsuccessful appeals were potentially 
restrictive interpretations?  Proponents of the allegation of a restrictive approach 
would need to explain which elements of the decision-making in these 337 cases 
are indicators of a restrictive approach, and which would be considered 
acceptable decision-making by the Court.  It is difficult to locate such an indicator, 
because the Court’s decision-making is focussed upon operating the unsafety 
test and it will quash all, but only, those convictions which it thinks are unsafe.  
Others may disagree with the Court’s decision in the unsuccessful appeals, but, 
as Roberts noted, this does not mean that the conviction should have been 
quashed.864          
 
The greatest difficulty with the allegation of a restrictive approach is that it is 
based upon the assumption that the approach leads to some appeals to be 
wrongly decided.  There is no acceptable evidence that this routinely does occur.  
This thesis has eschewed the question of whether certain cases were rightly or 
wrongly decided, for the reason that it is very difficult to know whether the 
outcome in any particular appeal was wrong.  Instead, whilst certain decisions 
have been discussed for their qualitative significance, this thesis has taken a 
broader approach to analysing the Court.  It has sought to analyse the emergence 
of patterns in the data, taking a wider view of the Court’s decisions.  The question 
addressed was whether the Court appeared to have determined appeals in an 
impartial manner.  The remainder of this chapter addresses that question.           
 
8.3 Analysing the impartiality of the Court of Appeal 
In addition to the analysis of the grounds of appeal raised in the murder and rape 
appeals against conviction, this thesis sought to analyse an additional component 
                                                          
863 Sam Hallam had his appeal dismissed in [2007] EWCA Crim 966, and quashed in [2012] 
EWCA Crim 1158.   
864 Roberts (2009) 213.  
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of the Court of Appeal’s decision-making.  A variety of factual, demographic, and 
legal details were collected from each case, some of which formed the 
independent variables which were analysed.  The methodology employed in this 
study has been explained earlier in this thesis, in depth.  This methodology was 
important, because it explained how far the results were valid, leading to 
meaningful results.  The results of this analysis forms an original contribution to 
the understanding of decision-making in the Court of Appeal.  Furthermore, the 
methodology employed in conducting the research represents an additional 
original contribution.      
 
The results of this element of the study have been presented in Chapter 7.  In the 
final binary logistic regression model, Model 3, which included the ‘Did Error 
Occur?’ variable, six of the independent variables were statistically significant 
predictors at the 5% level of success or failure of an appeal against conviction in 
the Court of Appeal.  These were: Judge 1, Judge 3, Bad Character, CCRC, 
Single Judge, and Did Error Occur? (the ‘legal variable’).  As has been explained 
previously, the rejection of these null hypotheses based on statistical significance 
is descriptive, and not inferential.  This means that the rejection of the null 
hypotheses does not mean that the Court lacked impartiality.  This is owing to a 
number of substantial limitations, which are explored in the next section.  
 
The legal variable, ‘Did Error Occur?’ was the strongest predictor of successful 
appeals, with an odds ratio 10.441.  This increased to 13.426 when CCRC 
appeals were removed from the analysis.  This means that the odds of having a 
conviction quashed increase ten-to-thirteen fold if the Court finds an error 
occurred at trial.  Moreover, the confidence interval for this variable was broad, 
with a lower bound of 6.275, suggesting that as a minimum appeals were 6 times 
more likely to be successful when an error occurred.  The inclusion of the legal 
variable considerably improved the predictive power and accuracy of the models.  
In many studies of judicial decision-making, in particular ‘attitudinal’ studies of US 
Courts, there is rarely any measurement of law.  This is a problem because the 
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attitudinal model argues against the ‘legal model’ claim that the law is a constraint 
on judicial discretion.865   
 
The results of the binary logistic regression analyses conducted in this thesis 
revealed that some of the judges who heard more than 20 appeals were 
statistically significant predictors of the outcomes of appeals.  This effect 
persisted when the legal variable was included in the analysis.  If an appellant 
had Judge 1 or Judge 3 as a judge the appellant was, respectively, 2.147 and 
2.980 times more likely to be successful.  The p-values were significant at 0.05 
and 0.04 respectively.  As has been stated previously, this finding is tenuous and 
so provides no evidence that these judges, or the Court generally, lacked 
impartiality.  This is compounded by the observation that the lower bound of the 
confidence intervals for these variables were very close to 1, suggesting only a 
weak association.  As an initial exploration of the Court’s impartiality, this study 
has uncovered a relationship between certain judges and the outcome of appeals 
against conviction.  There is insufficient evidence to draw any further inference of 
a lack of impartiality from this data, but the observation of this emerging pattern 
would warrant further study.  Further research could be conducted to determine 
whether this could be evidence of attitudinal decision-making, or whether this 
finding is a relic of institutional factors owing to the manner of case allocation in 
the Court.   
    
The importance of the judge variables for this thesis is that the performance of 
the Court under the ‘unsafety test’, and, indeed, under all the previous tests, has 
been heavily dependent upon how particular judges have exercised their powers.  
It is possible to induce a number of possibilities for the finding of a statistical 
relationship between judges and the outcome of appeals.   Judges 1 and 3 may 
be more likely to quash convictions when an error occurred because their own 
conceptions of justice leads them to think that convictions ought to be quashed 
when errors occurred at trials.  Rather than this being evidence of a lack of 
                                                          
865 See JA Segal and HJ Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, 
(Cambridge University Press 2002).  
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impartiality, these may judges demonstrate greater fidelity to law; the opposite of 
a lack of impartiality.  The two-stage decision-making process in procedural 
irregularity appeals is important here. It was seen in Chapter 7 that often when 
the Court finds that an error occurred they will allow the appeal, but the Court 
also frequently dismisses the appeal.  The finding that Judges 1 and 3 were 
predictors of successful appeals might suggest that they are more likely to take 
the next step and decide that errors make convictions unsafe.   
 
The decision-making of the Court of Appeal in relation to the murder and rape 
appeals against conviction in the sample could be summarised in the following 
way.  When the judges concluded that an error did not occur at trial, the appeal 
was usually dismissed.  There were 278 appeals, out of a total of 472 appeals, 
which were dismissed when the Court found that no error had occurred.  This 
adds support to, and is supported by, previous research into the Court of Appeal.  
It suggests that if an appellant cannot point to a procedural irregularity, the appeal 
is likely to be unsuccessful.  It confirms Roberts’s conclusion that the most 
common result if the Court finds that an error did not occur is that it will dismiss 
the appeal.866 One possible interpretation of this finding is that the Court of Appeal 
is restrictive, in that it will not normally quash convictions if it does not feel that an 
error occurred at trial.  As explained above, this conclusion does not appear 
supported by this finding.  An alternative interpretation, based on theories of 
judicial decision-making, is offered below.       
 
Whilst in the majority of appeals in which no error occurred were dismissed, there 
were 49 appeals which were successful when the Court found that no procedural 
irregularity occurred during the trial. All but one of these was successful due to 
fresh evidence.  This potentially adds further support to the concern that if an 
appellant reaches the Court with no fresh evidence or procedural irregularity there 
is hardly any chance of having the conviction quashed.  The appeal which was 
successful when the Court allowed the appeal when there was no error at trial, 
                                                          
866 Roberts (2009) 149. 
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and no fresh evidence, was R v Haigh.867 She submitted three grounds of appeal: 
that the judge wrongly admitted certain evidence; that the judge should have 
acceded to a claim of no case to answer; and, simply, ‘the conviction for murder, 
rather than manslaughter, is unsafe’.868 The Court rejected the claim that the 
evidence should not have been admitted, and held that there was a case to 
answer.869 They allowed the appeal, and substituted a verdict of manslaughter, 
because:  
 
‘There was no evidence at all on the basis of which the jury could 
reasonably decide whether the appellant had the intent to kill or cause 
really serious harm … or the lesser intent which was sufficient for 
manslaughter … we are driven to the conclusion that the murder 
conviction is unsafe’.870       
 
It is pertinent to note that at no point did the Court directly or indirectly refer to the 
concept of ‘lurking doubt’, yet the case appears to be an archetype ‘lurking doubt’ 
case, in which the Court allowed the appeal because of concern that an injustice 
could have been done.   
 
As was described in Chapter 7, as further analysis, it was sought to explore the 
relationship between the independent variables and the decision to quash 
convictions on the basis of fresh evidence.  Using a chi-square analysis, it was 
shown that the same independent variables as were statistically significant 
predictors in Model 3, were weakly correlated individually with the quashing of 
convictions on the basis of fresh evidence.  This suggests that the variables have 
a consistent relationship with the decision to allow appeals, either on the grounds 
of procedural irregularities or fresh evidence, but that the substantive importance 
of the variables is relatively low.  When the chi-square analysis is considered 
alongside Model 3, it can be seen that the variables are individually associated 
with the decision to quash convictions on the basis of fresh evidence, and 
                                                          
867 [2010] EWCA Crim 90. 
868 ibid [1].  
869 ibid [23] and [92].  
870 ibid [97].  
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collectively associated with the general question of the unsafety of convictions.  
However, this additional analysis suggested that the correlation between the 
variables and the decision to quash convictions on the basis of fresh evidence 
was low.     
 
One significant finding from this study is that 59 appeals were unsuccessful, and 
86 appeals were successful, when the Court concluded that an error had 
occurred at trial.  The binary logistic regression analysis showed that there is a 
tenfold increase in the odds of a successful appeal when the Court found that an 
error occurred, in combination with the other variables included in the model.  This 
is a large odds ratio, demonstrating a strong relationship between this variable 
and the outcome of appeals against conviction.  The observation that 59 appeals 
were dismissed when the Court found that an error occurred suggests that this 
variable is not fully determinate of appeals.  It suggests the presence of a gap or 
discretion when the Court finds that an error occurred.  The ‘two-step’ process of 
decision-making in relation to the ‘unsafety test’ was discussed in Chapter 3, and 
it would appear that the observation of 59 unsuccessful appeals is an artefact of 
this process.     
 
The CCRC variable was also a statistically significant predictor of success.  This 
variable had an odds ratio of 3.422 meaning that appeals brought by the CCRC 
were more than three times more likely to be successful when considered in 
combination with the other variables included in the model.  The finding that 
CCRC referrals are significant predictors of success is as expected because the 
CCRC can only refer appeals back to the Court of Appeal if they think it has a 
‘real possibility’ of success.  Moreover, appeals go through a detailed review by 
the CCRC before being referred.  The CCRC’s own statistics show that they have 
a success rate of cases referred of 65%.871 Owing to this high success rate, the 
CCRC variable was always likely to be a positive predictor of outcomes.  The 
CCRC variable was offered as an additional counterweight to the factual and 
                                                          
871 http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/case-statistics/ <6 June 2016>.  
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demographic variables included in this study.  It was argued that this variable 
reflected the broader institutional relationships between the CCRC and Court of 
Appeal.  In this instance, it would appear that the Court of Appeal and the CCRC 
are likely to draw upon each other.  The CCRC must consider how it thinks the 
Court will respond to the appeal, and the Court will consider carefully that an 
independent body thinks that the conviction is potentially unsafe.   
 
This finding relating to the CCRC variable is in contrast with the finding relating 
to the Single Judge variable.  Owing to its negative coefficient, if leave was 
granted by the single judge there were reduced odds of having a conviction 
quashed.  The odds of success if leave was granted by the single judge was 
0.585 that of an appeal granted leave by other means, and this was statistically 
significant.  This may suggest that appeals granted leave by the single judge are 
particularly susceptible to being dismissed.  It should be noted that a ‘Full Court’ 
variable was collected, for appeals which were granted leave by the Full Court, 
but this was shown to be a weak predictor in the purposive selection procedure 
and so not carried forward to the next stage of analysis.  There was a persistent 
statistical relationship between the single judge variable and unsuccessful 
appeals throughout the analysis.  This may suggest that the Court of Appeal 
judges do not see the granting of leave by the single judge as a prima facie 
indicator of unsafety.  This is in contrast to the CCRC variable, in which there 
must be a strong likelihood that the conviction will be considered unsafe, owing 
to the extensive review by the CCRC.             
 
Owing to its negative coefficient, the question of whether the appellant had ‘bad 
character’, was a predictor of reduced odds of success.  This variable required 
some interpretation in the collection process.  The variable was always answered 
‘Yes’ if the Court specifically referred to relevant bad character or previous 
convictions, and it was answered ‘No’ if the Court was silent on character, or if 
the transcript stated good character.  However, at times, bad character was 
imputed, for instance if the appellant was a known gang member, or involved in 
drugs etc., notwithstanding that he may not have any convictions.  This approach 
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is justifiable as the definition of bad character includes ‘reprehensible conduct’, 
which is interpreted broadly.872  This variable may not, therefore, be a precise 
measure whether the appellants had ‘bad character’, and all observers might not 
agree with the coding decisions made.  There were 210 cases coded as having 
bad character.  If the appellant had bad character, as defined, the odds of a 
successful appeal were 0.415 that of an appellant without bad character, i.e. less 
than half as likely to be successful.  As an attitudinal matter, it makes intuitive 
sense that appellants with bad character may be considered more likely to be 
guilty by the Court.  Indeed, in limited circumstances bad character evidence can 
be admitted as evidence towards a defendant being more likely to have 
committed the crime with which he is charged.  There is strong evidence that 
people convicted of a crime are more likely to commit more crimes.873   
 
Despite this, the admission of bad character evidence in criminal trials can be 
criticised as propagating stereotypes or prejudice.874 Impartiality, or the ‘legal 
model’, maintains that judges ought to determine cases only with reference to the 
law, and not by bias or prejudice.  With a p-value of 0.003, the bad character 
variable had the strongest association with outcomes after the ‘Did Error Occur?’ 
variable.  This finding may suggest that previous offending behaviour creates a 
heavy burden for an appellant to overcome.  This finding is not strong evidence 
of a lack of impartiality, however.  As has been explained previously, and will be 
summarised in the next section, the rejection of null hypotheses on the basis of 
p-values does not mean that the alternative hypothesis is true.  However, the 
emergence of this pattern in the data is one that may warrant further analysis in 
the future.             
 
This section has analysed in more depth the results of Model 3.  The intention 
behind this thesis was to collect a range of variables in order to explore the 
                                                          
872 See Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 112, and Code for Crown Prosecutors guidance on bad 
character evidence http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/bad_character_evidence/ (accessed 
24/06/2017)   
873 See M Redmayne, Character in the Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press 2015) 17-25.  
874 ibid, Chapter 3.  
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Court’s decision-making.  It was intended that the variables would capture in part 
the principle of impartiality, to allow for conclusions to be drawn regarding 
whether the Court appeared to have determined appeals in an impartial manner.  
Accordingly, how well this study has captured the concept of impartiality is at the 
core of what kinds of claims can be made about the Court’s impartiality.  The next 
section discusses how successful this thesis has been at exploring the impartiality 
of the Court.    
  
8.4 How successful is the study as an exploration of impartiality? 
As an exploration of whether a range of variables act as predictors of decision-
making in the Court of Appeal, this study has been successful.  This study has 
shown that there are some observable patterns between the variables selected 
for analysis and the outcome of appeals.  Owing to the limitations of the methods 
of this study, however, it is less clear whether it can be said that the impartiality 
of the Court has been modelled very successfully.  It is clear that the 
measurement of impartiality is incomplete.  This means that whilst it has been 
shown that there appears to be patterns in the data, the relationship between 
these patterns and the concept of impartiality is somewhat tenuous.  Making an 
extraordinary claim about a Court – such as it lacks impartiality – requires 
extraordinary evidence, and the onus is always upon the researcher to provide 
such evidence.  In this study, the evidence of a lack of impartiality is too limited 
to support such claims.  The reasons for this are now recounted. 
 
The analysis of the impartiality of the Court focussed upon the collection of a 
range of variables which were then analysed statistically for the emergence of 
patterns in the data.  This kind of research is correlative, and as such causal 
inferences cannot be drawn.  As was discussed in Chapter 5, the ideal conditions 
to be able to begin to make causal inferences is a randomised controlled 
experiment using validated (by replication) measures.  This study, a correlative, 
non-reactive observational study, is several stages removed from this ideal 
condition.  In an experiment, the researcher can control variables in order to 
observe whether changes in one variable lead to different outcomes when all the 
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other variables remain the same.  This study has relied upon the observation that 
certain variables have an association with outcomes.  This necessarily limits 
significantly how far it can reasonably be inferred that the variables have any 
actual effect on outcomes. 
 
Epstein and King made this same point regarding ELS in 2002.875 They note that 
whilst frequently the aim of ELS is to draw inferences regarding the causal effect 
of one variable upon another, it may not be possible to draw causal inferences 
owing to how far removed ELS is from a genuine experiment.876 This is 
particularly true for this study, given its explorative nature and the use of some 
variables which have not been tested previously in earlier studies.  This is one 
reason why the results of this study must be read cautiously and not 
misinterpreted.  The observation that there appears to be a statistical relationship 
between some variables and outcomes, cannot be conclusive of whether there 
exists a true causal relationship.  It is important for the future credibility of ELS 
that researchers carefully stipulate the epistemological limits of the method.   
 
A related point is the method of testing for statistical relationships.  As was 
discussed in Chapter 5, the American Statistical Association (ASA) have recently 
produced a report on p-values and statistical significance.877 The ASA statement 
followed growing concern of a ‘replication crisis’ in numerous branches of 
science.878 A key concern of the ASA was the interpretation of p-values and 
‘statistical significance’.  It was explained in Chapter 5 that rejecting a null 
hypothesis due to statistical significance is not evidence that the alternative 
hypothesis is true.  Moreover, the concept of ‘statistical significance’ if a p-value 
is smaller than 0.05 is arbitrary and has been discouraged.  The use of p-values 
in science is also controversial, because the correct interpretation of a p-value is 
                                                          
875 L Epstein, G King, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) U Chi L Rev 1. 
876 ibid, 37. 
877 RL Wasserstein and NA Lazar ‘The ASA’s Statement on P-values: Context, Process and 
Purpose’ (American Statistical Association 2016). 
878 ibid.  
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complex.879  As a result, the rejection of null hypotheses in this study, owing to 
different levels of p-values, should not be read as being strong evidence that 
those particular variables influenced judicial decision-making.  It should instead 
be read as a descriptive finding that in this particular sample and in this particular 
study there appears to be a statistical relationship between some variables and 
outcomes.  
 
The problems relating to the use of p-values has been mitigated in this study.  
This study has utilised other measures of fit, such as classification tables and 
confidence intervals.  Moreover, in explorative studies such as the present, p-
values are a useful way to describe and to record the presence of patterns in 
data.  Whilst this study has taken account of the ASA’s statement, and the 
controversy relating to the use of p-values, there has been little mention of the 
statement within the ELS community.  For instance, at the time of writing, there 
has been no discussion of the statement in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 
and a search of legal databases found no mention of it.  That particular journal is 
aware of the arbitrary character of statistical significance, however, with a 2013 
foreword calling for authors to present effects with measures of statistical 
uncertainty.880 It stressed that ‘conventional levels of statistical significance’ are 
simply academic, and that descriptive analyses of law utilising statistics can also 
be useful.  Thus, whilst there are inherent limitations within the methods used to 
model impartiality, there remains value in the observations of patterns within data.  
This gives rise to rich opportunities for research in the future.          
 
A further reason why it may be said that impartiality has not been fully validly 
modelled, and so conclusions regarding the impartiality of the Court must be 
drawn cautiously, relates to the variables used.  As was stated in Chapters 5 and 
6, there are variables which could measure a concept such as impartiality which 
were not used in this study.  There are several reasons why certain variables 
                                                          
879 See S Greenland, C Poole, ‘Problems in Common Interpretations of Statistics in Scientific 
Articles, Expert Reports, and Testimony’ (2011) (51) Jurimetrics 113. 
880 DE Ho ‘Foreword: Conference Bias’ (2013) (10) 4  JELS 603. 
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were not used: difficulty in reliably capturing the data from the Court judgments; 
data simply not being available; and the constraints of time needed to collect data.  
In any study such as the present, a range of decisions need to be made as to 
which variables will be included in the study.  It will always be possible to argue 
that alternative variables could have been used.  This study has provided an initial 
range of variables, and has shown what variables, for the particular cases in this 
study, have an association with the outcome of appeals.  As other variables could 
have been used, it is impossible to say that impartiality has been measured with 
precision.  It will be the task of research in the future to determine whether any of 
these associations also exist in other samples of cases.         
 
Within the variables which were utilised in this study, it may have been possible 
to have coded them differently.  This further reduces how objective the variables 
are, and so how closely impartiality has been measured.  As was shown in 
Chapter 6, some of the variables did require an element of subjective decision-
making in their design and the collection.  This was, however, for a minority of 
variables.  Most of the variables were binary variables, which could be collected 
easily with the aid of the data collection template.  If some variables were to be 
coded differently, it is possible that the level of association between that variable 
and the outcome variable could change.   This could in turn have an impact on 
the conclusions of the study.  Accordingly, the results of this study are best 
understood as an analysis of whether the particular range of variables used, 
including how they are coded, which may not be agreeable to every observer, are 
statistically associated with the outcome of appeals.        
  
The ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable is an important variable in this study.  It was 
shown to be the independent variable which was most strongly associated with 
the outcome of appeals against conviction.  This variable has been presented as 
a measurement of the role of law, or a measure of the ‘legal model’.  Thus, the 
variable is interpreted as being a counterweight to factual and demographic 
variables, and an indicator of impartial decision-making.  It may be challenged 
how well this variable does measure the Court’s application of law.  The finding 
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of a relationship between the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable and the outcome of 
appeals is similar to previous findings in studies of the Court.  Previous studies 
have found that appeals which cannot point to an error of law are unlikely to be 
successful, and appeals which can point to an error are the most likely to be 
successful.  Accordingly, it cannot be surprising that there was a strong 
association found in this study, and that the addition of this variable improved the 
accuracy of the models.  
 
Whilst previous studies have suggested that findings such as this is evidence of 
the allegedly restrictive approach of the Court, this study has contested this 
conclusion.  Instead, it has been argued that the finding that the presence of legal 
errors are associated with successful appeals indicates that judges follow the law 
and legal rules, including the aims of the ‘unsafety test’.  This is one interpretation 
of the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable, but further research could be considered to 
explore this further.  Accordingly, this variable could be considered a relatively 
modest measure of the law governing the case. 
 
It is argued, therefore, that the relationship between the variables in this study 
and the principle of impartiality, could be considered tenuous.  This is owing to 
inherent limitations within the methods used, and limitations within the variables 
and their interpretations.  This has led to the conclusion that taken as a whole 
there is insufficient evidence to doubt the null hypothesis that the Court 
determines appeals in an impartial manner.  The relationships which have been 
found within the data are indicative of patterns, but cannot defeat the null 
hypothesis.  It may be argued that this study is closer to an analysis of whether a 
range of variables are predictors of the outcome of appeals, rather than an 
analysis of the impartiality of the Court.  As was stated at the outset of this thesis, 
this is as expected and this was the core aim of the study.  This is an initial 
analysis of decision-making in the Court of Appeal, and as such it would be 
unlikely that it would be possible to draw strong conclusions from it.   
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Accordingly, the core conclusions which can be drawn from this study are that 
there is evidence of emerging patterns in the data, but this is insufficient to cause 
a reasonable observer to doubt the impartiality of the Court until further studies 
are undertaken to confirm this.       
 
8.5 The ‘unsafety test’ and theories of judicial decision-making 
In this thesis, a number of legal theories and theorists of judicial decision-making 
have been referred to.  Three of these theories, by Lord Bingham, Hart, and the 
Legal Realists, accepted that judges exercise a discretion when they decide 
cases.  Lord Bingham argued that when the law does not determine the outcome 
of a case, judges exercise discretion if they have to decide what is fair and just to 
do in the particular case.881  Hart argued that when judges have to determine the 
meaning of a statute to determine a hard case, occasionally the meaning will not 
be clear.  Due to the ‘open texture’ of language, judges may have a discretion 
open to them when deciding what the outcome of litigation should be.882 The 
Legal Realists argued that law is at least locally indeterminate, in such cases the 
law will not fully determine the outcome of litigation.883 That being the case, the 
Legal Realists sought to discover what did determine litigation if it was not the 
law.  In contrast, Dworkin argued that judges do not exercise discretion in the 
same way as these writers argued.  Instead, they must discover which litigant has 
a right to win, by deciding which outcome would best fit and justify the existing 
political mortality and law.884  
 
The question which arises, therefore, is whether any of these theories are most 
accurately reflected in the decision-making of the Court of Appeal for these 
appeals, and how does the Court’s decision-making accord with legal theory?  It 
has been argued throughout this thesis that the ‘unsafety test’ invites the judges 
to exercise their discretion, but this is controlled by the law.  It is more likely, 
                                                          
881 T Bingham, 2006 British Academy Maccabean Lecture, available from 
www.law.cf.ac.uk/newsandevents/transcripts/271005.pdf <accessed 07 August 2016>. 
882 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 2012). Chapter 7. 
883 B Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in 
Legal Philosophy, (Oxford University Press 2007) 41 
884 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986). 
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therefore, that decision-making was accord with the theories of Bingham, Hart, 
or the Realists rather than Dworkin.  It is submitted that there is relatively little 
dispute between Hart and Lord Bingham, and the Legal Realists.  All agreed that 
the law had indeterminate edges in which judges must exercise discretion.  Hart 
argued that owing to the nature of ordinary language there would be 
circumstances in which the law would prove indeterminate.  This part of the ‘open-
texture’ of language.885 ‘Open-textured’ appears a particularly appropriate term 
for the ‘unsafety test’ given its fact sensitivity and the judges’ exercise of 
judgment.       
 
Lord Bingham’s description of judicial decision-making is well reflected in the 
decisions of the Court.  In many ways this would be expected, since Lord 
Bingham gave a number of important judgments explaining the ‘unsafety test’.886 
He argued that a judges have no discretion when deciding issues of law, but that 
‘it is only when he reaches the stage of asking himself what is the fair and just 
thing to do or order in the instance case that he embarks on the exercise of a 
discretion’.887 As discussed in Chapter 4, some kinds of appeals are determined 
after answering a question of law, such as whether the trial should have been 
stayed.  In those which are not, the judges in the Court of Appeal exercise a 
degree of discretion, because deciding what is ‘fair and just’ to do in the appeals 
is what is required by the ‘unsafety test’.  This also accords with Dennis’s opinion 
that the core of the ‘unsafety test’ is a question for the judges whether they are 
satisfied in the factual accuracy and moral authority of convictions, and that the 
conviction was achieved in accordance with the rule of law.888             
 
Although, as was explained in Chapter 3, it is difficult to provide a definition of 
Legal Realism, some Realists appeared to suggest that the law was only a minor 
                                                          
885 See Hart (n 882 above).  
886 For instance, R v Graham [1997] 1 Cr App R 302, and R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66.  
887 T Bingham, The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches (Oxford University 
Press 2000) 36.  
888 I Dennis, ‘Fair Trials and Safe Convictions’ [2003] CLP 211. 
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constraint upon judicial decision-making.889  This more radical ‘rule sceptic’ view 
of Legal Realism cannot be supported by this thesis because, as has been 
shown, it is the measurement of the law which is the strongest predictor of the 
outcome of appeals against conviction.  However, as Leiter argued, most Realists 
did not deny that legal rules determine cases, and instead argued that the law 
was only ‘locally indeterminate,’ in particular at the level of appellate review.890 
The ‘received view’ of Legal Realism, which holds that the Realists believed 
judges exercise unfettered discretion in all cases, is a ‘Frankified’, or Critical Legal 
Studies, version of Realism, and was not held by most Realists.  The Realists 
held empirical goals to discover whether non-legal factors, such as judicial 
personality or politics filled some of the gap in what determines cases.  Lord 
Bingham accepted that the more senior the court, the more influence political 
considerations can have.891   
 
Whilst it has been explained above that the results of this study must be read 
cautiously, it has been found that there appears to be a relationship in the data 
between judges and outcomes. This could be interpreted to suggest that the 
personalities of particular judges may have a role in appeals.  However, even if 
the limitations of the study are overlooked, it is not possible to accept that judicial 
personality has a major role, because it was the legal variable which had the 
greatest association with outcomes.   It is submitted, therefore, that a radical 
Legal Realism cannot be accepted, but a more nuanced version, embodied by 
Lord Bingham and Hart, is best reflected in the decision-making of the Court of 
Appeal.  When the law governing the case shows that certain errors have 
occurred, this will usually render convictions unsafe, the judges have no 
discretion and will allow appeals.   
 
                                                          
889 Jerome Frank’s Law and the Modern Mind (Transaction Publishers 2009) could be seen as 
the strongest statement of ‘rule scepticism’.     
890 See Leiter (n 883). See also Introduction by Schauer in KN Llewellyn, The Theory of Rules 
(edited and compiled by F Schauer) (University of Chicago Press 2011), suggesting Llewellyn 
was not a rule sceptic.  
891 Bingham (n 887) 28. 
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8.6 Outcome of null hypothesis tests of judicial impartiality  
The question addressed in Chapter 1 of this thesis was whether the Court 
appeared to have determined appeals against conviction in an impartial manner.  
This has was presented in the form of the following null hypothesis:  
 
H0 = The Court of Appeal appeared to have determined appeals in an impartial 
manner. 
 
The alternative hypothesis was: 
 
H1 = The Court of Appeal appeared to lack impartiality.   
 
The proposition that the Court was impartial was chosen as the null hypothesis 
in this study because there is a lack of previous empirical evidence on the Court 
to suggest any other a priori hypothesis would be suitable.  These hypotheses 
were tested by conducting a large number of other null hypothesis tests on the 
independent variables.  Each factual and demographic variable had its own 
associated null hypotheses that it was not a statistically significant predictor of 
outcomes in the Court.  To be able to justifiably reject H0, and make a declaration 
that H1 is more likely, extraordinary evidence would be required.  It would need 
to be shown that a well informed observer would conclude that the Court was 
biased or lacking in impartiality.892  As was explained above, this level of evidence 
is not found in this thesis, and could only be sustained following replication and 
repeated testing.  Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to cause a 
reasonable observer to justifiably conclude that the Court lacked impartiality.  The 
patterns which were found in the data are insufficient to be able to reject the null 
hypothesis, but should be a foundation for further research and analysis.       
 
                                                          
892 As per Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357. 
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It was hypothesised that the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable would have a strong 
relationship with successful appeals, if it was found that an error occurred.  This 
was found to be the case.  As explained above, this is not a surprising outcome, 
because it echoes previous studies of the Court.  However, it has been argued 
that the ‘Did Error Occur?’ variable encapsulates the ‘legal model’ of judicial 
decision-making.  Thus, similar to the findings of Sisk, Heise and Morriss in their 
study,893 ‘the law remains the alpha and omega of judicial decision-making.’894 
Similar to Cross, ‘legal rules of procedure matter greatly in determining 
outcomes’.895 Thus, a behavioural, attitudinal, or a radical Legal Realist 
perspective, of unfettered discretion or ideological decision-making cannot be 
supported by the results of this thesis.   
 
Despite most of the variables having little association with successful appeals, 
some variables were statistically significant predictors.  One potential explanation 
of this is that legal rules determine most appeals, but that there is a gap – the law 
does ‘run out’.  Clearly, fresh evidence appeals, which often do not raise 
procedural irregularities, account for part of this gap.  In fresh evidence appeals 
the outcome is largely based upon whether the judges think the fresh evidence 
could have led to a different outcome.  Appeals which raise procedural 
irregularities usually require the judges to determine whether the error makes the 
conviction unsafe.  It is in this area, the point at which judges have decided that 
an error did occur and need to decide whether that makes the conviction unsafe, 
that judges have to exercise their judgement relating to the facts of the case.  
Research in the future could be conducted to further scrutinise this particular gap 
and exercise of judgment.  It may be in these cases that the personality of the 
judge, or behavioural and attitudinal factors, could play a role.   
 
 
                                                          
893 G Sisk, M Heise and P. Morriss, ‘Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical 
Study of Judicial Reasoning’ (1998) 37 NYU L Rev 1377.  
894 ibid, 1500. 
895 FB Cross, Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals (Stanford University Press 2007) 67. 
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8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to explain what the results of this thesis mean about 
decision-making in the Court of Appeal.  It has been shown that appeals against 
murder and rape convictions raise broadly similar issues as found in previous 
studies of the Court of Appeal.  Appeals against murder and rape convictions 
were dominated by issues relating to the summing up, and claims that the judge 
incorrectly exercised his discretion to admit or exclude evidence.  Lurking doubt 
appeals were also relatively rare, and were shown to be unlikely to be successful.  
The major difference in grounds of appeal raised was that fresh evidence was 
more frequently raised, and more frequently successful, in the murder and rape 
appeals than was seen in earlier studies.  Given the significance which is placed 
on the finding that fresh evidence is usually rare, this has some importance.  
Where fresh evidence was raised in the murder and rape appeals, it was 
successful almost as frequently as it was unsuccessful.  This means that it is not 
possible to support the conclusion that the Court was restrictive, across the cases 
in this sample, to fresh evidence. 
 
The innovation in this thesis is that as well as collecting grounds of appeal, which, 
as was noted, is not necessarily an easy or a neutral task, other factual, 
demographic, and legal variables were collected.  This allowed for binary logistic 
regression analysis of whether the variables collected were predictors of the 
outcomes of appeals.  It was found that the law is the greatest predictor of 
success.  However, factual and demographic factors, in particular the judges 
hearing the case and bad character, were shown also be to be predictors of 
appeals.  These results were analysed closely in order to give scrutiny to the 
findings.  It has been submitted that there is insufficient evidence from this study 
to justifiably challenge the impartiality of the Court.  A number of patterns have 
emerged from the data, which should give cause for research in the future.    
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Chapter 9 
Thesis Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
The research question raised in Chapter 1 of this thesis was whether the Court 
of Appeal determined appeals against conviction in murder and rape appeals in 
an impartial manner.  It was sought to explore this question by collecting data in 
relation to a range of variables.  This is a critical question, because impartiality is 
the minimum standard expected of the courts if they are to have legitimacy.  In 
Chapter 2 it was explained that this is an objective test.  From Porter v Magill,896 
the test is whether ‘a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the 
facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was 
biased’.897  Prior to this study, there was little direct quantitative empirical analysis 
of this question in relation to the senior British judiciary.  This thesis has examined 
the literature on the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 
scrutinised the principle of impartiality, and explained how the analysis of 
impartiality was conducted.   
 
It has been concluded that there is insufficient evidence for a fair-minded and 
informed observer to think that the Court was biased or lacking in impartiality.  
The study has, however, uncovered interesting evidence of patterns and 
relationships between certain variables and the outcome of appeals.  This is not 
enough to justifiably begin to doubt the impartiality of the Court, but may lead to 
a basis for further research.  In this chapter there is a summary of the original 
contributions made by this thesis, and an overview of the research findings.  The 
relationship between this thesis and previous research is discussed.  It is 
explained what can be concluded about the decision-making in the Court in light 
of the newly extended corpus of research.  Avenues for future research, and the 
strengths and limitations of this study, are also discussed.    
 
                                                          
896 [2002] 2 AC 357.  
897 ibid.  
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9.1 Summary of original contributions              
This thesis has taken what has previously been written about the Court of Appeal, 
and asked an alternative question regarding its decision-making.  Whilst previous 
studies were concerned with how well the Court performs in correcting 
miscarriages of justice,898 this thesis was concerned with the impartiality of the 
Court’s decision-making.  This thesis has explained in a comprehensive manner 
how the question of the Court’s impartiality was measured and answered.  It has 
been explained that the concept of impartiality has been incompletely measured, 
and so it is not possible to draw strong conclusions regarding impartiality.  
Accordingly, this study complements, but has analysed the Court of Appeal from 
a very differing perspective in respect to previous studies. This study has been 
designed to study the Court of Appeal from an Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) 
perspective, with the aim of making a methodological contribution.  If looking for 
an objectivist, quantitative, Empirical Legal Studies analysis of the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal, this thesis should be the starting-point. 
  
There were two elements to the empirical analysis of the Court of Appeal.  Firstly, 
previous research relating to the grounds of appeal raised has been replicated.  
Secondly, binary logistic regression analysis of the factors which predict 
successful appeals in appeals against conviction in murder and rape appeals was 
conducted.  The first aspect of this study broadly supported the findings of 
previous research.  It has been shown that in murder and rape appeals, 
procedural irregularity grounds are the most commonly argued.  This supports 
previous research which has highlighted the grounds of appeal raised.899  While 
this element of the research generally supported the findings of earlier studies, it 
was not wholly supportive.  In particular, it was shown that fresh evidence appeals 
were raised more frequently in murder and rape appeals than was seen in 
previous studies.  This is an important finding because the success rate of fresh 
evidence has some importance in earlier studies regarding the apparent 
                                                          
898 See S Roberts, The Decision Making Process of Appeals Against Conviction in the England 
and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (DPhil thesis, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2009); SJ Heaton, A Critical Evaluation of Using Innocence as a Criterion in the 
Post-Conviction Process (DPhil Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2013). 
899 ibid.  
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approach of the Court.  As such, the results of this study did not necessarily 
support the claim of a restrictive approach because one of the factors seen to be 
pointing towards a restrictive approach in previous studies, namely a restrictive 
approach to fresh evidence appeals, was not seen in this study.   
 
The second element of this thesis was to address the question of whether the 
Court of Appeal appeared to have decided the appeals against conviction in an 
impartial manner.  It has been explained how that question was addressed in a 
methodological manner.  In order to answer this question, a dataset of 472 full 
appeals against conviction, for the offences of murder and rape, was created.  
The creation of this dataset, in particular the methodologies behind its creation, 
represents a further original contribution to knowledge specifically from a 
methodological standpoint.  It has been explained how a normative concept – 
impartiality – needs to be made concrete so that data can be collected.  The key 
to making a normative concept concrete, and so susceptible to analysis, is to 
identify the ‘observable implications’ of the concept.  
 
Based party upon previous ELS research, and partly upon experience of reading 
Court of Appeal judgments, a range of variables were collected.  ELS research 
has sought to test a range of models of judicial decision-making, including the 
legal, behavioural, attitudinal, and institutional models.  Variables from these 
models have been drawn upon in this thesis.  In combination, these variables 
sought to capture the principle of impartiality.  The ‘legal model’ is most closely 
based upon the idea that judges decide appeals impartially.  The ‘Did Error 
Occur?’ variable sought to capture elements of this model, and acted as a 
measure of whether the Court did determine appeals in an impartial manner.  
Variables drawn from the behavioural and attitudinal models were those which 
would not appear consistent with impartial decision-making.  
 
Using the observed outcome of the appeal (successful or unsuccessful) as the 
dependent variable, the binary logistic regression analyses undertaken provides 
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the odds that a particular case will fall into a particular category (successful or 
unsuccessful), given the presence of particular independent variables.  When this 
analysis was conducted, the majority of the independent variables were weak 
predictors of successful appeals.  The lack of a strong relationship between 
behavioural variables is a potential indicator of impartial decision-making.  The 
view that the Court could generally be considered to have appeared impartial was 
strengthened when the measurement of the law was included in the analysis.  
This is an important variable, because it acted as a counterweight variable for the 
factual and demographic variables whose statistical significance points to a 
departure from impartiality.   
 
Judges are supposed to apply the law, and so any analysis which did not offer 
some role for the law would be much weaker.  It was found that the law governing 
the case, measured by the answer to the question: in the opinion of the judges, 
‘Did an Error Occur?’ was a strong predictor variable of case outcomes. The law 
determined a large proportion of appeals against conviction, leaving factual and 
demographic details with reduced predictive power with the models developed in 
the study.  Moreover, the finding that factual and demographic variables had a 
limited role when fresh evidence appeals were considered in isolation, and when 
CCRC appeals were removed from the dataset.  
 
Although it may be concluded that the Court did appear impartial, some variables 
drawn from the behavioural model showed an association with the outcome of 
appeals.  These included the judges an appellant had, and whether the appellant 
was stated to have had bad character.  The question of objective impartiality asks 
whether reasonable observers of the Court, after being informed of the facts, can 
be confident that the Court appeared to have decided cases in an impartial 
manner.  It was ultimately suggested that, despite the finding of statistical 
significance of behavioural variables, that is insufficient for an objective and 
informed observer to question the appearance of the impartiality of the Court.   
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9.2 Decision-making in the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) 
Since 1995, the sole test for the Court of Appeal when seeking to discharge its 
duty of doing justice is whether the conviction is ‘unsafe’.900  This thesis has 
sought to investigate one specific aspect of the Court’s decision-making: whether 
it acted in an impartial manner.  Since the enactment of the unsafety test, there 
have been two empirical analyses of the approach of the Court: by Roberts,901 
and Heaton.902  Prior to this was Malleson’s study on behalf of the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice.903 Critical analysis of the Court’s decision-
making has suggested that the Court is too slow to overturn jury verdicts when 
nothing went wrong at trial; that it is unduly deferential to the verdict of the jury 
and the principle of finality; and that it is fearful of opening the floodgates.904 
These are extremely serious allegations to make against the Court, and is 
suggestive of favouring legal principles, such as finality, over doing substantive 
justice.  As has been explained, analysis of the approach of the Court has been 
explicitly eschewed in this thesis as it does not appear to be a stable standard 
against which to review the Court’s decision-making.  
 
The operation of the ‘unsafety test’ is based upon whether the particular judges 
hearing the appeal, at the particular time that the appeal is heard, are sure of the 
factual accuracy of the conviction; its moral authority; and that the conviction is 
grounded in the rule of law.905  It is only if the Court can answer these questions 
affirmatively that convictions can be safe.  If the judges have anything more than 
a lurking doubt about guilt, up to and including being sure that the appellant is not 
                                                          
900 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s 2. (As amended by Criminal Appeal Act 1995).  
901 S Roberts, The Decision Making Process of Appeals Against Conviction in the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (DPhil thesis, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2009); S Roberts, ‘The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and Factual 
Innocence: Remedying Wrongful Convictions in the Court of Appeal’ (2004) (1)(2) JJ 86. 
902 SJ Heaton, A Critical Evaluation of Using Innocence as a Criterion in the Post-Conviction 
Process (DPhil Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2013). 
903 K Malleson, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Review of the Appeal Process, 
Research Study No 17 (HMSO 1993). 
904 See S Roberts and L Weathered, ‘Assisting the Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and 
Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2009) 29 OJLS 
43 
905 See I Dennis ‘Fair Trials and Safe Convictions’ (2003) CLP 211. 
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guilty, the conviction will be unsafe.906  The power to determine appeals against 
conviction is vested in judges; that is their role.  They are required to determine 
appeals based on all the circumstances as they see them, in an impartial 
manner.907  This thesis is the first attempt to model the behaviour of the Court 
using advanced inferential statistics in order to explore its decision-making in 
murder and rape appeals against conviction.   
 
The results of this thesis suggests that most factual and demographic variables 
have no, or little, association with the judges’ decisions of where justice lies.  
Some evidence has been uncovered which suggests that certain judges may be 
more likely to find convictions to be unsafe, and others may be more likely to find 
convictions to be safe.  However, the regression analysis conducted is correlative 
and does not imply causation.  The emergence of patterns found within the data 
give grounds for further analysis of the issues raised.    
 
9.3 Strengths and limitations of study  
The work conducted in this thesis has a number of strengths.  The dataset 
developed for the purposes of the analysis was relatively large, and within the 
range of dataset sizes used in previous ELS research.  Due to the way in which 
the data was collected, utilising the template with multiple fields discussed in 
Chapter 6, a wide variety of factual, demographic and legal variables could be 
collected.  By utilising the purposive selection procedure it was possible to 
determine at an early stage which variables showed some predictive strength for 
inclusion in later models.  The collection of the variables was driven by previous 
ELS research into the decision-making of judges, coming primarily from the 
United States.  This embedded the research study within the ELS movement, 
utilising their methods and learning from their mistakes.  The research was not, 
therefore, conducted in a vacuum, but has been conducted in line with ELS 
research which has a long history.  This is important because utilising these 
                                                          
906 See JC Smith, ‘The Criminal Appeal Act 1995: Part 1: Appeals Against Conviction’ (1995) Crim 
LR 920.  
907 See Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights. 
296 
 
methods to study the England and Wales Court of Appeal was an innovative step, 
and fairly alien to the British legal academy.  By conducting the research within a 
movement with heritage, concerns regarding the feasibility of the study can be 
dispelled.  
 
The primary limitations of the study are inherent within the chosen methodology.  
There were no circumstances in which to replicate experimental conditions, and 
so the study had to be conducted observationally.  This resulted in a sense of 
artificiality, as only part of the decision-making process (that pertaining to the 
factual, demographic, and legal variables used in the analysis) could be 
observed.  This imposes difficulties as there could always be other variables 
which would explain Court decisions which were not captured in the data 
collection process.  Indeed, the pseudo R2 statistics presented in Chapter 7 
suggests that not all the variation in Court outcomes has been explained by the 
models, and so there may be other variables which may explain more variation 
in the outcomes. 
 
This study has been presented as an exploration of the Court’s impartiality.  
However, it has been questioned how successfully impartiality has been 
measured.  As discussed in Chapter 8, impartiality has not been completely 
measured.  There are other variables which could have been utilised to provide 
a fuller approximation of the concept.  Furthermore, coding decisions were made 
with which not all observers will agree.  This means that the results regarding the 
concept of impartiality must be interpreted cautiously.  The study modelled a 
range of variables in order to explore the relationship between them and the 
outcome of appeals.  These variables are related to but do not fully encapsulate 
the principle of impartiality.  Within these variables there is evidence of patterns 
within the data.  Some of these patterns are indicative of impartial decision-
making, and some patterns may be suggestive otherwise.  However, as 
impartiality is incompletely measured, it cannot be said that this resolves the 
question of the Court’s impartiality.  Instead, patterns have emerged between 
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certain variables and outcomes, which will require further development in the 
future.           
     
9.4 Potential avenues for future research 
This thesis has created a number of potential avenues for future research.  
Initially, it could be sought to replicate this study, or it could be sought to utilise 
the methods of this thesis to study the approach of the Court.  This thesis has 
highlighted a number of factual, demographic, and legal factors which were 
associated with the outcome of appeals.  In order to validate the results of this 
thesis, the analysis will need to be replicated.  The analysis could be replicated 
by analysing the same variables across different offences or periods of time.  
Future research could also seek to improve upon some of the variables which 
were collected.  There were a number of important variables which could not be 
collected in this thesis, this is a limitation of the study and could be sought to be 
rectified. For instance, ethnicity of the parties to appeals was not collectable, and 
data relating to the trial judge and sentencing was often missing.  Techniques to 
remediate these difficulties could be further considered, for instance by 
systematically interviewing judges or other professionals working in the Court.   
 
Moreover, a fuller account of the role of law in judicial decision-making could be 
considered.  The legal variable used in this thesis could be improved by, for 
instance, considering more closely the role of precedent in forming the rules 
which govern the Court.  If the legal variable could be enhanced, and further 
behavioural variables could be collected, then impartiality may be more closely 
measured.  This would mean that impartiality would be measured with more 
validity, and so stronger conclusions regarding impartiality could be drawn.      
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9.5 Conclusion 
This study sought to address the impartiality of the decision-making of the 
England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) by observing patterns 
emerging from data collected from Court judgments.  By conducting research 
within an Empirical Legal Studies framework, this study has embarked upon an 
exploration of what kinds of factors drive judicial decision-making.  It has been 
shown that the strongest relationships were between outcomes and variables 
which suggested impartial decision-making.  The presence of other relationships 
in the data warrants further analysis, and it is intended that this study will 
contribute to the development of this conversation in Britain.      
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Appendix A 
List of Variables  
 
Factual and demographic variables 
 
 The day of the week and month of the year of the appeal  
 Whether the appellant is a child 
 Whether appellant was of previous good character 
 Whether appellant was of previous bad character  
 The deceased / complainant age range 
 The ranks of the judges  
 Complainant / deceased gender 
 Whether the appellant was convicted of other offences  
 Whether appellant convicted of multiple counts of rape or murder 
 Nature of the defence: whether denial of actus reus or mens rea or both 
 Whether drink or drugs were involved 
 Whether verdict ex tempore 
 Whether only the appellant had a female counsel  
 Whether only the Crown had female counsel 
 Whether a female judge present on the bench 
 Whether offence an historical offence 
 The individual judges who heard at least 20 appeals 
 Whether appeal was a joined appeal  
 Whether deceased / complainant were known to the appellant 
 Whether only the appellant was represented by a QC 
 Whether only the Crown was represented by a QC 
 Sentence severity 
 Whether trial judge had sat in the Court of Appeal  
 White British Appellant 
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Institutional variables  
 CCRC reference 
 Unanimous jury verdict 
 How leave was granted 
 
Legal variables  
 Did error occur? 
 Number of Cases cited 
 Offence 
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Appendix B 
List of Sampled Appeals 
 
2006 EWCA Crim […]  
         
67 657 56 179 1359 8 14 454  
193 231 623 408 165 139 3427 195  
862 441 556 542 417 756 868 691  
786 809 1220 627 268 905 706 866  
946 793 962 819 1275 821 853 1294  
1325 1503 1509 1233 1292 955 1267 1973  
1971 1155 1824 1419 1941 1622 1652 1371  
1645 1353 1498 2265 1705 1720 2029 1860  
1721 2052 1703 2308 1976 1928 1887 1980  
1891 1395 1843 1901 2120 2150 1884 2351  
2325 2101 2441 2442 2317 2545 3364 3044  
2945 3038 2636 2800 2752 2792 2743 2898  
2625 2984 2983 2988 2914 2919 2749 3326  
3227 3222 3092 3336 3182 3120 3249 3378  
3360 3388 3187 3347 3381     
         
2007 EWCA Crim […]  
         
23 1 30 57 185 329 237 219  
462 378 518 709 985 597 710 342  
684 481 691 966 804 1122 764 1182  
942 2605 1620 1779 1275 1184 1251 1250  
1837 2064 1237 3201 1619 1669 1581 1494  
1558 1665 1743 1698 1471 1756 1750 1709  
1680 1556 1912 1699 1702 1899 1715 1943  
2687 2083 3234 2018 2264 2109 2066 2236  
2176 2283 2660 2551 2739 2633 2631 2974  
2887 2741 2881 2581 2865 3198 3083 2722  
3029 3473 3027 3226 2870 3437 3282 3047  
3323 3132        
         
2008 EWCA Crim […]   
         
219 4 6 266 76 312 183 3305  
587 460 866 559 593 544 434 603  
688 754 529 585 678 939 968 817  
1359 879 994 1033 923 1126 1092 971  
973 1014 1329 1415 1111 1370 1156 2015  
1222 1305 1342 1801 1851 1767 1792 1850  
1923 2121 1739 3229 2552 2774 2874 3249  
3018 2563 2564 2946 2788 3949 2787 2989  
         
3147 3238 3059       
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2009 EWCA Crim […]   
         
52 65 208 165 64 20 19 255  
316 86 236 50 190 805 280 213  
404 513 434 678 490 594 593 910  
741 742 819 734 1187 1240 789 905  
1370 1086 1057 1239 1208 1254 1130 1165  
1211 930 1531 1372 1076 1308 1457 1371  
1326 1617 1362 1425 1960 1600 1721 1718  
1569 1829 1638 1739 1876 2137 2342 2345  
2368 2520 2530 2425 2243 2294 2291 2457  
2458 2552 2728 2553 2705 2688 2804 2909  
2695 2668 2732 2781 2878 2698 2969 2697  
2698         
         
2010 EWCA Crim […]   
         
7 3 4 119 203 312 2402 90  
194 138 147 350 195 1228 226 445  
385 525 416 450 909 496 516 777  
547 865 755 1034 929 830 1251 2353  
926 832 1380 1379 914 1176 2317 1230  
1082 1150 1152 1213 1149 1417 1325 1269  
1589 1461 1579 1683 1595 1768 1578 1620  
1623 1622 1692 1836 1859 2259 2039 1818  
2299 1691 1856 1924 1980 3271 2144 2101  
2134 2349 2358 2072 2647 2269 2445 2981  
2620 2438 3335 2553 2725 3339 2664 3096  
2740 3067 2847 3117 2899 2949 2936 3089  
2975 2972 2950 2974 2499     
         
Other cases:  
         
2009 All ER 47   
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Appendix C 
Purposive Selection Results 
 
Joined Case 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Joined_Case 
-0.526 0.354 2.215 1 0.137 0.591 
Constant -0.860 0.107 64.423 1 0.000 0.423 
 
Monday 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Mon 0.243 0.356 0.464 1 0.496 1.275 
Constant -0.936 0.107 76.731 1 0.000 0.392 
 
Tuesday 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Tues -0.141 0.248 0.320 1 0.572 0.869 
Constant -0.884 0.115 59.171 1 0.000 0.413 
 
Wednesday 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Wed -0.429 0.258 2.765 1 0.096 0.651 
Constant -0.824 0.114 52.366 1 0.000 0.439 
 
Thursday 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Thur 0.099 0.241 0.169 1 0.681 1.104 
Constant -0.937 0.116 65.041 1 0.000 0.392 
Friday 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Fri 0.314 0.232 1.830 1 0.176 1.369 
Constant -0.994 0.119 69.893 1 0.000 0.370 
 
January 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Jan 0.243 0.356 0.464 1 0.496 1.275 
Constant -0.936 0.107 76.731 1 0.000 0.392 
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February 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Feb 0.425 0.324 1.722 1 0.189 1.530 
Constant -0.959 0.108 78.530 1 0.000 0.383 
 
March 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a March -0.140 0.352 0.158 1 0.691 0.869 
Constant -0.902 0.107 71.108 1 0.000 0.406 
        
April 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Apr -0.690 0.503 1.885 1 0.170 0.502 
Constant -0.879 0.104 70.914 1 0.000 0.415 
 
May 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a May 0.105 0.303 0.120 1 0.729 1.111 
Constant -0.928 0.109 72.243 1 0.000 0.395 
 
June 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a June -0.202 0.364 0.307 1 0.579 0.817 
Constant -0.897 0.107 70.826 1 0.000 0.408 
 
July 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a July -0.027 0.299 0.008 1 0.928 0.973 
Constant -0.911 0.109 69.278 1 0.000 0.402 
 
August 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Aug -0.887 1.085 0.669 1 0.413 0.412 
Constant -0.904 0.102 77.998 1 0.000 0.405 
 
September 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sept -0.601 0.788 0.582 1 0.446 0.548 
Constant -0.903 0.103 77.104 1 0.000 0.405 
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October 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Oct 0.059 0.375 0.025 1 0.874 1.061 
Constant -0.920 0.106 74.956 1 0.000 0.399 
        
November 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Nov 0.322 0.338 0.908 1 0.341 1.379 
Constant -0.946 0.108 77.326 1 0.000 0.388 
December 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Dec -0.172 0.351 0.240 1 0.624 0.842 
Constant -0.898 0.107 70.520 1 0.000 0.407 
        
Ex-tempore 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Ex_tempore 0.055 0.214 0.065 1 0.799 1.056 
Constant -0.950 0.174 29.972 1 0.000 0.387 
 
QC Appellant Only 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a QC_APP_Only 
0.056 0.317 0.032 1 0.859 1.058 
Constant -0.921 0.108 72.254 1 0.000 0.398 
 
QC Crown Only 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a QC_Crown_Only 
-0.505 0.435 1.345 1 0.246 0.604 
Constant -0.881 0.105 70.298 1 0.000 0.414 
 
F Counsel Appellant 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a F_Counsel_App 
0.043 0.249 0.029 1 0.864 1.044 
Constant -0.924 0.115 64.755 1 0.000 0.397 
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F Counsel Crown 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a F_Counsel_Crown 
0.214 0.230 0.863 1 0.353 1.238 
Constant -0.970 0.119 66.252 1 0.000 0.379 
 
F Judge Present 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a F_Judge_Present 
0.049 0.225 0.047 1 0.828 1.050 
Constant -0.929 0.121 59.353 1 0.000 0.395 
        
LCJ Present 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a LCJ_Present 0.124 0.415 0.089 1 0.765 1.132 
Constant -0.923 0.105 76.749 1 0.000 0.397 
 
VP Present 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
VP_Present -0.163 0.382 0.182 1 0.670 0.850 
Constant -0.902 0.106 72.307 1 0.000 0.406 
 
President Present 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
President_Present 
-0.440 0.513 0.736 1 0.391 0.644 
Constant -0.895 0.104 73.836 1 0.000 0.409 
 
Circuit Judge Present 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Circuit_Judge_Present 
-0.211 0.262 0.648 1 0.421 0.810 
Constant -0.874 0.113 59.821 1 0.000 0.417 
 
 
Recorder Present 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Recorder_Present 
-0.209 0.317 0.435 1 0.509 0.811 
Constant -0.889 0.108 67.255 1 0.000 0.411 
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Retired Present 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Retired_Present 
0.411 0.308 1.784 1 0.182 1.509 
Constant -0.963 0.109 77.934 1 0.000 0.382 
 
Trial Judge CA 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Trial_J_CA -0.404 0.273 2.184 1 0.139 0.668 
Constant -0.862 0.128 45.447 1 0.000 0.422 
 
Judge 1 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Dobbs -0.495 0.511 0.939 1 0.333 0.610 
Constant -0.891 0.104 73.250 1 0.000 0.410 
 
Judge 2 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Gage 0.962 0.459 4.382 1 0.036 2.616 
Constant -0.962 0.105 83.628 1 0.000 0.382 
 
Judge 3 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Hallett -1.088 0.545 3.990 1 0.046 0.337 
Constant -0.858 0.104 67.748 1 0.000 0.424 
 
Judge 4 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Hooper 0.970 0.324 8.957 1 0.003 2.638 
Constant -1.016 0.109 86.470 1 0.000 0.362 
 
 
Judge 5 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Hughes -0.115 0.403 0.081 1 0.775 0.891 
Constant -0.907 0.106 73.790 1 0.000 0.404 
 
Judge 6 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Judge 0.113 0.363 0.098 1 0.755 1.120 
Constant -0.924 0.107 75.247 1 0.000 0.397 
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Judge 7 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Latham 0.071 0.499 0.020 1 0.888 1.073 
Constant -0.918 0.104 77.658 1 0.000 0.399 
  
Judge 8 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Moses 0.292 0.405 0.520 1 0.471 1.339 
Constant -0.934 0.106 78.232 1 0.000 0.393 
  
Judge 9 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Openshaw -0.133 0.486 0.075 1 0.785 0.876 
Constant -0.909 0.104 75.884 1 0.000 0.403 
  
Judge 10 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Rafferty -0.250 0.480 0.272 1 0.602 0.778 
Constant -0.902 0.104 74.705 1 0.000 0.406 
 
Judge 11 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Thomas -0.547 0.508 1.157 1 0.282 0.579 
Constant -0.888 0.104 72.665 1 0.000 0.411 
 
Judge 12 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Judge 12 
0.665 0.329 4.080 1 0.043 1.944 
Constant -1.234 0.237 27.124 1 0.000 0.291 
 
 
 
Cases Cited 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Cases_Cited 
-0.005 0.022 0.053 1 0.818 0.995 
Constant -0.895 0.124 52.095 1 0.000 0.408 
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Offence (Rape) 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Offence -0.583 0.207 7.968 1 0.005 0.558 
Constant -0.635 0.138 21.103 1 0.000 0.530 
 
Low Sentence 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Sentence_Low 
0.456 0.272 2.816 1 0.093 1.578 
Constant -1.110 0.124 79.724 1 0.000 0.330 
 
Medium Sentence 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Sentence_Med 
-0.019 0.220 0.008 1 0.930 0.981 
Constant -1.012 0.156 42.025 1 0.000 0.364 
 
High Sentence 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Sentence_High 
0.017 0.273 0.004 1 0.950 1.017 
Constant -1.025 0.124 68.783 1 0.000 0.359 
 
Very High Sentence 
  B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Sentence_V_High 
-0.833 0.425 3.844 1 0.050 0.435 
Constant -0.935 0.115 66.541 1 0.000 0.393 
 
Good Character 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
App_GC_Stated 
0.189 0.256 0.547 1 0.460 1.208 
Constant -0.951 0.114 69.834 1 0.000 0.386 
 
 
 
 
Bad Character 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Bad_Character 
-0.652 0.213 9.392 1 0.002 0.521 
Constant -0.648 0.130 24.785 1 0.000 0.523 
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Denial of AR 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
DENIAL_OF_AR 
-0.139 0.207 0.451 1 0.502 0.870 
Constant -0.832 0.159 27.503 1 0.000 0.435 
 
 
Denial of MR 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Denial_of_MR 
0.306 0.210 2.107 1 0.147 1.357 
Constant -1.026 0.130 62.780 1 0.000 0.358 
 
CCRC 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
CCRC 1.128 0.321 12.335 1 0.000 3.090 
Constant -1.037 0.110 88.966 1 0.000 0.354 
 
Single Judge 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Single_Judge 
-0.658 0.206 10.172 1 0.001 0.518 
Constant -0.550 0.149 13.593 1 0.000 0.577 
 
Historical Offence 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Historical_Offence 
0.519 0.294 3.122 1 0.077 1.680 
Constant -0.983 0.110 79.466 1 0.000 0.374 
 
Appellant under 18 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Appellant_under_18 
-0.009 0.010 0.842 1 0.359 0.991 
Constant -0.923 0.102 81.233 1 0.000 0.397 
 
 
Under 13 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
UNDER 13 0.402 0.234 2.951 1 0.086 1,494 
Constant -1.013 0.119 72.946 1 0.000 0.363 
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Age 13_Under 16 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Age 13_Under_16 
0.239 0.384 0.387 1 0.534 1.270 
Constant -0.932 0.106 77.334 1 0.000 0.394 
 
 
16 - 17 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a 16_17 
0.042 0.391 0.012 1 0.914 1.043 
Constant -0.918 0.106 75.259 1 0.000 0.399 
 
Known Victim 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a KNOWN 0.045 0.275 0.026 1 0.871 1.046 
Constant -0.952 0.251 14.386 1 0.000 0.386 
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Appendix D 
Binary Logistic Regression Tables: Model of Legal Variable 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  
Chi-
square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 27.720 21 0.148 
Block 27.720 21 0.148 
Model 27.720 21 0.148 
 
Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & 
Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
1 485.810a 0.063 0.090 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step 
Chi-
square Df Sig. 
1 16.741 8 0.033 
 
Classification Tablea 
Observed 
Predicted 
Did_Error_Occur 
Percentage 
Correct Yes No 
Step 
1 
Did_Error_Occur Yes 10 115 8.0 
No 11 287 96.3 
Overall Percentage     70.2 
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Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
Joined_Case 
0.520 0.357 2.122 1 0.145 1.683 
Wed -0.075 0.286 0.068 1 0.794 0.928 
Fri 0.327 0.279 1.371 1 0.242 1.386 
Feb -0.298 0.431 0.479 1 0.489 0.742 
April -0.304 0.481 0.399 1 0.528 0.738 
QC_Crown_Only 
-0.599 0.465 1.658 1 0.198 0.549 
Retired_Present 
0.135 0.350 0.150 1 0.699 1.145 
Judge 1 0.454 0.521 0.759 1 0.384 1.575 
Judge 2 -0.510 0.496 1.056 1 0.304 0.601 
Judge 3 0.455 0.396 1.321 1 0.250 1.576 
Offence 0.310 0.303 1.050 1 0.306 1.364 
SENTENCE_LOW 
0.332 0.296 1.260 1 0.262 1.394 
SENTENCE_V_HIGH 
-0.482 0.405 1.418 1 0.234 0.617 
Bad_Character 
0.457 0.246 3.452 1 0.063 1.580 
DENIAL_OF_MR 
0.364 0.254 2.057 1 0.152 1.439 
CCRC -0.095 0.462 0.042 1 0.837 0.909 
Single_Judge 
-0.304 0.240 1.597 1 0.206 0.738 
Historical_Offence 
0.804 0.358 5.028 1 0.025 2.233 
Under_13 
0.255 0.396 0.414 1 0.520 1.290 
Adult 0.397 0.314 1.603 1 0.205 1.488 
UNANIMOUS 
-0.357 0.275 1.676 1 0.195 0.700 
Constant -0.393 1.542 0.065 1 0.799 0.675 
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